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Its principal aim is to fill a perceived gap in policy-related research and understanding 
of the development of the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sector in the Asia-
Pacific region, in the context of a rapidly changing and mutating international business 
environment.
To  foster  growing  national  economies,  policymakers  in  virtually  all  countries 
are  expected  to  facilitate  the  entry  of  new  business  ventures  and  to  increase  the 
competitiveness of SMEs. SMEs typically account for the vast majority of companies in 
an economy, create the majority of employment, and are responsible for a substantial 
number of technical innovations in various sectors. Thus, their growth and survival are 
critical for sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development under intensified global 
competition. 
Although considerable research has already been undertaken in this broad field, 
many developing countries in Asia and the Pacific lack a comprehensive understanding of 
the rapidly changing needs of the business sector—a result of the ongoing globalization 
of production—and how such needs should be taken into account in the design and 
implementation of effective enabling policy frameworks for SME development. This paper 
attempts to fill that lacuna.
This paper was penned in the latter part of 2008, when the global “credit crunch” and 
its wider impact on the global economy were becoming more readily apparent. The likely 
consequences in 2009 and beyond will only add to the challenges faced by SMEs—and 
policymakers seeking to support the SME sector—in an increasingly volatile international 
business environment. In particular, the business risks associated with uncertainty have 
risen considerably.  
However, the current global economic recession should not derail ongoing efforts 
to support SME development, as those businesses provide part of the solution to the 
current economic woes. SME development is a key ingredient in the policy mix that will 
allow international business to return to healthy growth and permit Asia-Pacific economies 
to return to robust and inclusive growth.
PREFACEiv
This research project was implemented by Masato Abe under the overall supervision 
of Ravi Ratnayake, Director, Trade and Investment Division, and Marinus W. Sikkel, Chief, 
Private Sector and Development Section, all of ESCAP. Natthika Charoenphon of ESCAP 
provided secretarial services and formatted manuscripts. Profound gratitude is due to the 
authors for their contributions.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSv
        Page
Preface      iii
Acknowledgements  iv
List of contributors  ix
Explanatory notes  x
Abbreviations    xi
Executive summary   xii
1.  SMEs IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC  1
  1.1.   Definitions and profiles   1
  1.2.   Market entries, survival, prosperity and exits  10
    Box:  The 2008 credit crunch: some initial considerations  18
  1.3.  Gender issues relating to SME development  26
  1.4.   Cradle to grave: the role of policymakers and development   27
    partners in supporting the SME sector
2.  GLOBALIZATION OF PRODUCTION AND THE COMPETITIVENESS   33
  OF SMEs IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS
  2.1.   The setting  33
  2.2.   SMEs and competitiveness  38
  2.3.   Competing in a changing global economy  42
  2.4.  Implications for the prospects of Asia-Pacific SMEs  51
Contentsvi
3.  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI), GLOBAL SOURCING AND   59
  INDUSTRIAL LINKAGES
  3.1.  Motivations for FDI and the development of global value chains  59
  3.2.  Trends in foreign direct investment   60
  3.3.  FDI and spillover benefits  61
  3.4.  Global sourcing and the development of industrial linkages  63
  3.5.  Global supply networks: challenges and constraints for SME suppliers  67
  3.6.  Multinational enterprises and host country Governments  69
4.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  73
  4.1.  Introduction  73
  4.2.  A role for government  73
  4.3.  Improving the micro-environment for SME competitiveness  75
REFERENCES    91vii
1.  The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor model of entrepreneurship   13
  and economic development
2.  Competitiveness and productivity  39
3.  Food safety and quality standards in the global value chain for fresh fruit   44
  and vegetables
4.  Correlation between growth in exports from China to major developed   50
  countries and imports from East Asia to China
5.  Institutional support for the development of small and medium-sized   56
  enterprises: the Philippines 
6.  Institutional support for the development of small and medium-sized   57
  enterprises: Thailand
7.  Flows of foreign direct investment in select economies of Asia   60
  and the Pacific, 2007
8.  Inflows of foreign direct investment for select developing economies   61
  of Asia and the Pacific, 2005-2007
9.  Global supply networks, global value chains and backward linkages  64
10.  Value-chain analysis of denim jeans exports from Cambodia: implications   76
  of import-export procedures
11.  Improvement in logistics + trade facilitation = competitiveness and profits   77
Figuresviii
1.  Some differing definitions of SMEs in South-East Asia  4
2.  Just for comparison: the European Union definition of an SME  5
3.  Doing Business 2009: aggregate rankings for Asia-Pacific economies  7
4.  Economic freedom: rankings for Asia-Pacific economies  8
5.  Global Competitiveness Index: rankings for Asia-Pacific economies  9
6.  Doing Business 2009: starting a business in the Asia-Pacific region  14
7.  Capital Access Index 2007: Asia-Pacific economies compared  19
8.  Corruption Perceptions Index: the rankings of Asia-Pacific economies   20
  compared
9.  Doing Business 2009: closing a business in Asia and the Pacific  24
10.  Prevalence rates of entrepreneurial activity, by gender, across five   27
  Asian economies, 2007
11.  Matrix of common SME development interventions  28
12.  SMEs among total enterprises, contribution to employment, and total   33
  value added, in selected Asia-Pacific economies 
13.  A summary profile of SMEs in East Asia/the Asia-Pacific Economic   35
  Cooperation forum
14.  Doing Business 2009: exporting and importing in Asia and the Pacific  45
15.  Expansion of intra-East Asian trade, 1990-2005: the example of  machinery   49
  and machine parts
16.  Cluster linkages and partnerships  84
Tablesix
Nick J. Freeman is an independent consultant, currently based in Ho Chi Minh City, Viet 
Nam. He currently serves as an advisor to a number of development agencies, investment 
funds and business intelligence providers. Mr. Freeman was previously Head of Indochina 
Research for ING Barings in Bangkok, and a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies in Singapore. He holds a PhD in International Business, an MA in South-
East Asia area studies, and a BA (Hons.) in Peace Studies. Mr. Freeman’s analytical work 
has been published widely.
George Abonyi is currently a visiting professor in the Department of Public Administration 
and  Executive  Education  Program,  Maxwell  School,  Syracuse  University,  and  Senior 
Advisor at the Fiscal Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Thailand. In his 25-
year association with Asia, including 20 years based in Asia, primarily in Thailand and 
Singapore, Mr. Abonyi has held senior advisory positions with governments, international 
institutions and corporations. He has also held senior academic and research positions 
at: University of Ottawa; Anderson School of Management, University of California at Los 
Angeles; National University of Singapore; Harvard Institute for International Development; 
and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Mr. Abonyi received his BA (Hons.) 
in Economics from the University of Toronto (1971), his MA in Economics and Systems 
Planning from York University in Toronto (1972), and his PhD in Strategic Management 
from the Graduate School of Management (now the Anderson School of Management), 
University of California at Los Angeles (1978).
Atipol Bhanich Supapol is Associate Professor of Economics in the Schulich School of 
Business, York University. He was previously a Director with PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Securities LLC in New York. Prior to joining PricewaterhouseCoopers, he was Country 
Manager and Head of Corporate Finance for NatWest Securities Asia/NatWest Markets 
Thailand. Mr. Atipol completed his PhD in Economics at Carleton University in Canada, 
and has held faculty positions at the University of Western Ontario and Wilfrid Laurier 
University. He was also a visiting professor at Chulalongkorn University and the Asian 
Institute of Technology in Thailand, and at Nankai University in China. Mr. Atipol has 
served as a consultant to the United Nations (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development and ESCAP), and a number of government organizations. 
List of contributorsx
The opinions, figures and estimates set forth in this publication should not be 
considered as reflecting the views or carrying the endorsement of the United Nations. 
Mention of firm names and commercial products does not imply the endorsement of the 
United Nations.
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication 
do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the 
United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its 
authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. 
Where the designation “country or area” appears, it covers countries, territories, 
cities or areas.
References to dollars ($) are to United States dollars, unless otherwise stated.
Use of a hyphen between dates (e.g. 1980-1985) indicates the full period involved, 
including the beginning and end years.
The following symbols have been used in the tables throughout the publication:
A hyphen (-) indicates that the item is not applicable.
A point (.) is used to indicate decimals.
A space is used to distinguish thousands and millions.
Totals may not add precisely because of rounding.
Bibliographical and other references have, wherever possible, been verified. The 
United Nations bears no responsibility for the availability or functioning of URLs.
EXPLANATORY NOTESxi
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BDS  business development services 
ESCAP  United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
FDI  foreign direct investment
GDP  gross domestic product 
GVC  global value chain 
ICT  information and communications technology 
IPN  international production network 
ISO  International Organization for Standardization
MNE  multinational enterprise
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEM  original equipment manufacturer
QS  quality system 
SA  social accountability
SMEs  small and medium-sized enterprises (including microenterprises)
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNIDO  United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
ABBREVIATIONSxii
The Asia and Pacific region has achieved unprecedented growth and development 
in recent decades. Asia is increasingly playing the role of a global growth pole, and fast 
emerging as a manufacturing and information technology hub of the world economy, yet 
more than 600 million people in the region still live in absolute poverty. China and India are 
reshaping international business and the global economy, partly through the operations 
of  internationally  competitive  enterprises  such  as  Lenovo  and  Infosys.  Nevertheless, 
they coexist with far greater numbers of traditional, local micro-, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Those smaller enterprises, confronted with the perennial challenges 
of gaining access to finance, technology, human resources and market information, must 
also adjust to the new opportunities and threats posed by globalization. 
This paper focuses on a key dynamic that is changing the business environment: 
the globalization of production, which has major implications for the growth prospects of 
SMEs in Asia and the Pacific. The current global economic environment is characterized by 
trade liberalization, rapidly changing technology, and growing and ever-mutating demand 
for higher-quality and differentiated intermediate and final products and services that must 
meet increasingly stringent international standards. Traditional SMEs find it difficult to 
stay competitive in such an environment, even in their domestic markets. Conversely, 
by facilitating linkages with foreign buyers and large multinational enterprises, the forces 
of globalization loosen the constraints of domestic economies and markets, and provide 
local SMEs with potential access to globally distributed assets, including information, 
technology, skills, capital and markets. 
So how can Asia-Pacific SMEs, policymakers and development partners seek to 
mitigate the challenges posed by the former trend by optimizing the latter trend? This 
paper seeks to provide some policy-oriented recommendations and practical initiatives 
that the authors believe would be of use. These include: (a) implementing a number of 
focused improvements to the (external) business enabling environments for SMEs, with 
particular emphasis on logistics systems; (b) carrying out multiple efforts to improve the 
sophistication of (internal) operations and business strategies of SMEs; (c) developing 
and supporting more enterprise “clusters”; and (d) pursuing a number of subregional 
cooperative actions. The paper concludes with a suggested action plan, comprising 10 
specific  components,  designed  to  assist  the  burgeoning  community  of  SMEs  in Asia 
and the Pacific to become more competitive, and thereby harness the globalization of 
production trend to best effect.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARYSMEs IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Asia and the Pacific is a region of contrasts. The region as a whole has achieved 
unprecedented growth and development in recent decades. The general picture, however, 
hides a great diversity of economies, development experiences, and challenges. Asia is 
increasingly playing the role of a global growth pole, and is fast emerging as a manufacturing 
and information technology hub of the world economy. Yet the World Bank estimates that 
more than 900 million people still live in extreme poverty, now defined as less than $1.25 a 
day. Asia is the home of China and India—giants that are reshaping international business 
and the global economy through, among other things, the operations of internationally 
competitive enterprises such as Lenovo (China) and Infosys (India); but such giants also 
coexist with a large number of traditional, local micro- and small enterprises. In addition, 
China  and  India  share  this  vast  continent  with  Bhutan,  Nepal  and  the  Lao  People’s 
Democratic Republic, all considered least developed countries, and the region includes 
the small island nations of the Pacific, whose prospects for development also remain far 
more limited.  
One characteristic of this vast and diverse region is the presence and importance 
of a large SME sector comprising the majority of enterprises in all the region’s economies. 
Given the region’s diversity, enterprises in general, and SMEs in particular, are at different 
stages of evolution in their respective economies; their relative roles and contributions 
also  differ.  Thus,  the  constraints  they  face  and  the  corresponding  policies  aimed  at 
strengthening their competitive performance are expected to vary. Nevertheless, there are 
also basic similarities in the broad challenges faced by SMEs in the region, for example in 
terms of access to finance, technology, human resources, market information and, above 
all, in adjusting to both the opportunities and threats of globalization. 
1.1.  Definitions and profiles
SMEs are a source of employment, competition, economic dynamism, 
and innovation; they stimulate the entrepreneurial spirit and the diffusion of 
skills. Because they enjoy a wider geographical presence than big companies, 
SMEs also contribute to better income distribution.
Supachai Panitchpakdi, Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (Panitchpakdi 2006)
Most people have a broad sense of what constitutes an SME, if only a rather 
stereotypical  image  of  a  young  and  relatively  fragile  business.  In  many  cases,  that 
stereotype indeed holds true. Like any stereotype, however, it is neither the full picture nor 
universally correct. There is a temptation to liken SMEs to the student generation of the 
corporate community, containing considerable growth potential, if only their energy and 
enthusiasm can be harnessed and channelled in the right direction. Pushing the analogy 
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further, some SMEs will go on to great things in later life, while most will probably achieve 
more modest goals, and sadly some will come to a premature end for one reason or another.
Most policymakers and development practitioners deem the health of the SME 
community  to  be  highly  important  for  an  economy,  whether  subnational,  national  or 
regional. Not only do SMEs typically constitute the vast majority of company registrations 
in any economy, there is also the expectation that an elite few will make the leap “from 
garage to great”. The likes of Microsoft and Apple Inc. serve as living proof that the 
“American Dream” of SME development is no fantasy; it can be done, given the right set of 
factors and conditions. Here in Asia, Infosys of India was started with capital of just $250, 
but has risen to become a business with revenues of $4 billion, and is listed on NASDAQ 
in the United States of America.
Similarly, the bursting of the “dot.com” bubble in 2001 provides evidence that perils 
also abound for new SMEs that seek to pursue unviable business models (and for the 
investors that inject equity capital into them). There can be value destruction as well as 
value creation.
The main ingredients that make up factors and conditions conducive for SME sector 
development are increasingly well known and understood by policymakers and economic 
practitioners. Some of the fundamental ingredients of a benign enabling environment for 
SMEs are perennial in nature and will always hold true, particularly at the start-up stage. 
But it must also be recognized that SMEs do not operate in splendid isolation, and are 
not divorced from a constantly changing global business environment. The factors that 
made “SME X” successful in country A may not pertain to “SME Y” in country B. Similarly, 
the conditions that made “SME A” successful in “199X” may not pertain to “SME B” in 
“200Y”. Some of the pro-SME policy formulas are fairly generic and constant, and some 
are more specific and ever-changing. Just as SMEs themselves have to keep up-to-date 
with changing business practices (and technologies) if they want to remain commercially 
successful, so too must policymakers and development agencies ensure that their pro-
SME prescriptions are contemporary, if they want their strategies to remain relevant and 
useful.  
For  developing  and  transitional  economies  in  particular,  SME  development 
holds the added allure of being a key component of wider economic development and 
poverty alleviation. The SME community is seen as a major and sustainable generator 
of employment and income (and therefore tax revenues) for citizens working outside 
of the State sector. In the case of transitional economies, although many State-owned 
enterprises can also be SMEs, SME development is broadly synonymous with private 
sector development. In developing countries, SMEs can also serve as a useful bridge 
between the informal economy of family enterprise and the formalized corporate sector. 
Some of a country’s more able SMEs may also be a source of foreign exchange earnings, 
if they are able to meet the quality and quantity standards required to export their products 
or services overseas.
There is also a tendency to believe that a vibrant SME sector helps promote 
competition and a culture of entrepreneurship, which are both conducive for economic 
growth. Further, SMEs are often seen as being nimble and agile, and more willing to 
innovate than their larger and more well-established peers, as they navigate the frontiers 
of business activity. Youth versus experience. David versus Goliath. This is particularly 3
true of entrepreneur-driven SMEs, typically seeking to exploit business opportunities, 
as they can “… drive structural transformation [of an economy and corporate sector] 
through innovation, provision of intermediate inputs and services (which permits greater 
specialization  in  manufacturing),  and  by  increasing  employment  and  productivity  …” 
(Gries and Naudé 2008a, 1). Thus, some of the more innovative and dynamic SMEs 
can serve as catalysts in transforming developing economies in various structural ways, 
including advances up the value chain. The economic transformation of Taiwan Province 
of China is often viewed in this context.
It is important, however, to recognize that as yet there is no hard empirical evidence 
to support the assertion that the presence of SMEs in an economy will automatically 
deliver economic growth, nor alleviate poverty or lessen income inequality.1 SMEs are 
not a magic bullet for poverty alleviation, and they are not specifically pro-poor, contrary 
to popular belief. Rather, a more modest claim can be made, namely that the size of the 
SME sector in an economy does appear to be positively associated (if not quite correlated) 
with gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth in many countries. Strong SME 
sectors do not necessarily drive economic growth, but they are “characteristic of fast-
growing economies” (Gries and Naudé 2008a, 1). That said, there is clear recognition of 
the importance of SMEs in job creation—a key dimension of the development process, 
particularly in the lagging economies of Asia and the Pacific.
1.1.1.  What exactly is an SME ?
Definitions of what constitutes an SME vary quite widely from country to country 
and even within single countries, depending on the business sector concerned.2 Thus, 
there is no universal determinant or criteria of an SME. Much depends on the character 
of the relevant host country, and the profile of its own particular corporate sector, from 
which  a  relative  measure  of  an  SME  is  then  typically  made,  sometimes  on  a  rather 
arbitrary basis. Some countries just use the number of employees as the sole criteria for 
determining whether a business is an SME or not. Other countries use this same criterion, 
plus an additional criterion based on either the value of the firm’s assets or the size of 
revenues, typically denominated in the local currency.3 In cases where a currency value 
is cited (either for assets or revenues), any marked inflation can pose a problem for the 
SME definition over time. The criteria for SMEs are updated in some countries from time 
to time.
The form of ownership profile, type of legal entity, or general provenance of the 
company are typically deemed irrelevant when creating the definition. Thus, while an 
SME is typically thought of as a locally owned and privately held business, there is no 
reason why it may not be a State-owned or foreign-invested enterprise. Some countries 
will distinguish between a microenterprise and a small enterprise, while others—by not 
setting a floor for SME size—effectively include microenterprises within their SME umbrella 
definition (this is the case in Viet Nam). The above notwithstanding, most SME definitions 
pertain to businesses that are formal in nature and have been registered in some manner, 
and exclude small-scale, informal family enterprises.
1  See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2005). As the number of SMEs rise, one should not expect the 
Gini coefficient to automatically go down.
2   The Government of Malaysia provides a good example of this multisector breakdown of the SME 
definition. See its “Definitions for small and medium sized enterprises in Malaysia”, September 2005.
3   Cambodia is a notable exception, in that its definition uses United States dollars, not the riel, as the 
currency of measure.4
Table 1 serves to give a sense of the diversity of SME definitions in the Asia-Pacific 
region alone; table 2 provides the European Union definition for comparison.
a As cited in the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority (Pakistan) website (www.smeda.org.
pk/main.php?id=2).
Table 1.  Some differing definitions of SMEs in South-East Asia
Country Definition
Cambodia
Firms  that  employ  between  11  and  50  employees  and  have  fixed 
assets of $50,000 to $250,000 are categorized as small. Firms with 51-
200 employees and fixed assets of $250,000 to $500,000 are medium-
sized. Source: SME Development Framework of 2005.
Indonesia Fewer than 100 employees.a
Lao  People’s 
Democratic 
Republic
“Small enterprises are those having an annual average number of 
employees not exceeding 19 persons or total assets not exceeding 
two hundred and fifty million kip or an annual turnover not exceeding 
four hundred million kip”.
“Medium sized enterprises are those having an annual average number 
of employees not exceeding 99 persons or total assets not exceeding 
one billion two hundred million kip or an annual turnover not exceeding 
one 1 billion kip”.
Malaysia
Depends  on  the  business  sector.  Different  criteria,  based  on  the 
number  of  employees  and  annual  sales  turnover.  For  details,  see 
www.smeinfo.com.my/pdf/sme_definitions_ENGLISH.pdf. 
Philippines Fewer than 200 employees, and less than P 40 million in assets.a
Thailand
Depends on the business sector. Different criteria, based on number of 
employees and fixed capital size. For details see http://cms.sme.go.th/
cms/web/homeeng. 
Viet Nam
SMEs are independent production and business establishments that 
are duly registered according to the current law provisions, each with 
registered capital not exceeding VND 10 billion or annual labour not 
exceeding 300 people.
Sources:  Cambodia, SME Development Framework of 2005 (Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy).
  Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Decree 42/PM on the Promotion and Development of Small 
and Medium Sized Enterprises (Vientiane, 2004), art. 2.
  Malaysia, Definitions for Small and Medium Enterprises in Malaysia  (Secretariat to National SME 
Development Council and Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005), available at www.smeinfo.com.my/pdf/
sme_definitions_ENGLISH.pdf.
  Viet Nam, Decree on Support for Development of Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (Hanoi, 
Ministry of Planning and Investment, 2001), chap. 1, art. 35
Perhaps the one common denominator is that SMEs typically make up more than 
90 per cent of all registered enterprises in any country. Thus, in terms of the number 
of incorporations at least—if not always in terms of aggregate asset size or cumulative 
productivity—SMEs tend to dominate the corporate community. Economies differ, however, 
in the extent to which they rely on SMEs to generate a greater or lesser proportion of total 
output.
1.1.2.   SMEs in Asia and the Pacific: a profile of the corporate landscape
As noted earlier, SMEs tend to dominate the corporate community in all countries, 
at least in terms of company registrations, if not always in terms of aggregate size. In less 
developed countries, for example Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and 
Nepal, SMEs represent the vast bulk of the corporate sector. And even at the other end of 
the economic spectrum in Asia, in Japan for example, SMEs account for about 99 per cent 
of all firms, 70 per cent of total employment and 50 per cent of GDP output. SMEs play an 
important economic role in virtually all countries, albeit to varying degrees, and it is their 
relationship with other elements of the corporate community—including foreign-invested 
enterprises and large domestic corporations (whether State-owned or private)—that is 
often a critical determinant of their long-term success. Mutually beneficial linkages are 
typically established between these various elements of the corporate community.  
This  is  not  a  static  arrangement.  Rather,  it  is  a  fluid  set  of  relationships  that 
mutate over time, as individual SMEs and other business organizations inevitably wax 
and wane. This is particularly true of SMEs that are driven by entrepreneurs, typically 
seeking to exploit an opportunity that they have perceived to exist. And it is the “innovative 
tension” that arises which drives an economy forward; hence the crucial importance of 
property rights (including intellectual property rights). In the context of developing and less 
developed economies, Gries and Naudé (2008a), in the context of an endogenous growth 
model they developed,  depict the role played by entrepreneur-driven SMEs in advancing 
an economy thus:
In essence the transformation from a low-income, traditional economy to a modern 
economy … involves significant changes to production methods, a process of 
change where … entrepreneurs provide essential roles: first, in creating new firms 
outside of the household, second by absorbing surplus labour from the traditional 








Medium-sized < 250 ≤ 50 million ≤ 43 million
Small < 50 ≤ 10 million ≤ 10 million
Micro < 10 ≤ 2 million ≤ 2 million
Table 2. Just for comparison: the European Union definition of an SME
Source:   European Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition 
of  micro,  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises,  available  at  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
enterprise_policy/sme_definition/index_en.htm.6
firms, fourth by permitting greater specialization  in manufacturing, and fifth by 
raising productivity and employment in both the modern and traditional sectors. 
(Gries and Naudé 2008a, 25)
This is not to dismiss the crucial role played by foreign-invested enterprises, and 
large domestic firms too, in advancing a developing economy. But it does recognize the 
important role played by more innovative SMEs, and acknowledges that they are not 
passive spectators sitting on the sidelines of an economic development exercise from 
which they are largely divorced. 
However, the ability of more innovative SMEs to perform this economic function is 
significantly determined by the business environment in which they are obliged to operate. 
Without conducive conditions—the right kind of business enabling environment—in which 
to develop and grow, SMEs are likely to remain: (a) bonsai-like in stature; and (b) much 
less dynamic in their actions. This explains in large part why attention is often placed on 
various global indices and indicators that attempt to measure and compare the business 
environments in different countries. The better indices have a genuine benefit in identifying 
issues and comparing them across countries, as a basic form of diagnostic analysis.
1.1.3. Enabling environments for SMEs in the Asia-Pacific region
Although not specific to the SME sector, the World Bank’s annual Doing Business 
rankings comprise perhaps the most comprehensive survey of economies (181 in the 
latest  iteration)  and  their  differing  business  conditions.  Briefly,  the  Doing  Business 
exercise seeks to quantify and rate the ease of doing business in a country, based on 10 
components, comprising: (a) starting a business; (b) dealing with construction permits; (c) 
employing workers; (d) registering property; (e) getting credit; (f) protecting investors; (g) 
paying taxes; (h) trading across borders; (i) enforcing contracts; and (j) closing a business. 
Although there is some debate as to the methodological approach used for this exercise, 
the findings are useful in indicative terms and in spotlighting where a country’s main areas 
of strength and weakness lie, in terms of doing business. Table 3 shows the aggregate 
Doing Business 2009 rankings for Asia-Pacific economies covered.7
Economy Rank Economy Rank
Singapore 1 Brunei 88
New Zealand 2 Solomon Islands 89
Hong Kong, China 4 Palau 91
Australia 9 Viet Nam 92
Japan 12 Marshall Islands 93
Thailand 13 Papua New Guinea 95
Malaysia 20 Sri Lanka 102
Republic of Korea  23 Bangladesh 110
Azerbaijan 33 Nepal  121
Fiji 39 India 122





Taiwan Province of China 61 Indonesia 129
Samoa 64 Cambodia 135
Kyrgyzstan  68 Uzbekistan 138
Maldives 69 Philippines 140
Kazakhstan 70 Tajikistan 159





China 83 Timor-Leste 170
Table 3. Doing Business 2009: aggregate rankings for Asia-Pacific economies
Source:  World Bank, Doing Business 2009 (Washington D.C., 2009).
A similar exercise of sorts is conducted by the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom 
of the World Exercise, which has been running for over 20 years and now spans 141 
economies. Essentially it is an index that seeks to measure economic freedom in an 
economy across five principal components, most of which are pertinent to SMEs and the 
business sector as a whole.4 The latest report, published in 2008, analyses data for 2006, 
and ranks Asia-Pacific economies as shown in table 4.
4   The five components are: (a) size of government; (b) legal structure and security of property rights;   
(c) access to sound money; (d) freedom to trade internationally; and (e) regulation of credit, labour and 
business.8
Table 4.  Economic freedom: rankings for Asia-Pacific economies
Economy Rank Economy Rank
Hong Kong, China 1 India 77
Singapore 2 Fiji 83
New Zealand 3 Papua New Guinea 87
Australia 8 China 93
Taiwan Province of China 18 Indonesia 101
Japan 27 Sri Lanka 103
Republic of Korea  29 Pakistan 104
Kazakhstan 42 Bangladesh 108 
(joint)
Mongolia 43 Viet Nam 108 
(joint)
Thailand 56 Azerbaijan 118
Kyrgyzstan 60 Nepal 128
Malaysia 72 Myanmar 139
Philippines 73
Source:   James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, with the assistance of Joshua Hall, Economic Freedom of 
the World: 2008 Annual Report (Economic Freedom Network, 2008).
While not all of the elements within this particular index’s five components are 
entirely pertinent to SME sector development, some very much are, including (but not 
limited to):
(a) the size of government in business (which relates to “crowding out” issues);
(b) property rights protection;
(c) legal enforcement of contracts;
(d) freedom to hold foreign currency;
(e) regulator trade barriers;
(f) taxes imposed on international trade;
(g) private sector credit;
(h) hiring and firing regulations;
(i) price controls;
(j) starting a business and licensing restrictions;
(k) bribes and extra payments.9
For each of the 141 economies covered by the index, a detailed breakdown is 
conducted. More than 40 separate numerical ratings are applied, which allows one to: 
(a) undertake a diagnostic of where a specific economy is faring less well; (b) make 
cross-economy  comparisons;  and  (c)  monitor  a  single  economy’s  performance  over 
time, across any of the 42 elements that are measured by the index. For example, Viet 
Nam ranks relatively high in terms of “freedom to trade internationally” and “regulation of 
credit, labour and business”. However, it scores worst on the “access to sound money” 
component, which then drags down its aggregate ranking.
Thirdly, there is the Global Competitiveness Index. Like the previous two indices, 
this index does not focus on SMEs per se, but measures a range of issues that are highly 
pertinent to SME development, namely “the set of institutions, policies and factors that 
determine the level of productivity of a country” (Sala-i-Martin and others 2008, 3). Briefly, 
as discussed in The Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009 (Sala-i-Martin and others 
2008), the World Competitiveness Index tracks 12 pillars of economic competitiveness, 
which are grouped into three elements. The first element contains four pillars that are 
essential for a factor-driven economy, namely: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic 
stability, and health and primary education. The second element contains six pillars that are 
essential for an efficiency-driven economy, namely: higher education and training, goods 
market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market sophistication, technological 
readiness, and market size. And the final element contains two pillars that are essential for 
an innovation-driven economy, comprising: business sophistication and innovation. 
Table 5 shows the rankings for the Asia-Pacific economies included in the Global 
Competitiveness Index.
Table 5.  Global Competitiveness Index: rankings for Asia-Pacific economies
Economy Rank Economy Rank
Singapore 5 Kazakhstan 66
Japan 9 Viet Nam 70
Hong Kong, China 11 Philippines 71
Republic of Korea  13 Sri Lanka 77
Taiwan Province of China 17 Mongolia 100
Australia 18 Pakistan 101
Malaysia 21 Cambodia 109
New Zealand 24 Bangladesh 111
China 30 Tajikistan 116
Thailand 34 Kyrgyzstan  122
Brunei 39 Nepal 126
India 50 Timor-Leste 129
Indonesia 55
Source:  Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Jennifer Blanke, Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz, Thierry Geiger, Irene Mia and 
Fiona Paua, “The Global Competitive Index: Prioritizing the Economic Policy Agenda”, in Michael 
E. Porter and Klaus Schwab, eds., Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009 (World Economic 
Forum, Geneva, 2008), table 3, p. 10.10
An  interesting,  and  relatively  recent,  development  has  been  the  creation  of 
subnational  indices,  such  as  the  Provincial  Competitiveness  Index  in  Viet  Nam,  and 
an off-shoot of this in Cambodia.5 Such an approach recognizes that most SMEs have 
relatively limited relationships with national agencies and the like, and that they interface 
rather with municipal or provincial bodies, and conduct their activities largely or entirely 
within that sphere. Thus, the Provincial Competitiveness Index seeks to measure and 
rank the business conditions—allowing for “initial conditions”, such as natural-resource 
endowments—for private sector development in each of the 64 provinces of Viet Nam. 
Such an exercise is highly pertinent to SME development, as it focuses on 10 principal 
factors that impact SMEs, comprising: (a) costs of market entry; (b) access to land and 
security of tenure; (c) issues relating to the transparency of regulations and their enactment 
by provincial bodies; (d) the time required to be compliant with regulations; (e) informal 
charges imposed; (f) bias towards State-owned enterprises; (g) the proactivity of provincial 
authorities to assist firms; (h) the provision of private sector development services; (i) the 
availability of training for employees; and (j) the quality of legal institutions.
In  the  case  of  Cambodia,  a  provincial  business  environment  scorecard  was 
developed,  spanning  the  country’s  10  most  economically  active  provinces.  Like  the 
Provincial  Competitiveness  Index  in  Viet  Nam,  10  sub-indices  were  developed  for 
measuring the enabling environment in these provinces, but tailored to meet the slightly 
different  conditions  in  Cambodia,  including,  among  others:  tax  administration,  crime 
prevention and dispute resolution.
1.2. Market entries, survival, prosperity and exits
Nobody talks about entrepreneurship as survival, but that’s exactly what 
it is and what nurtures creative thinking.
 Anita Roddick, founder of The Body Shop6
Let  us  now  turn  to  SME  development,  and  policymaking  in  support  of  that 
development process, as it pertains to four stages in the SME life cycle: market entry, 
survival, possible prosperity, and ultimate exit. Some SMEs may encounter just one or 
two of these stages (such as entry and exit), while other SMEs may experience all four 
stages. Policymakers typically pay the most attention to market entry, and relatively less 
effort is expended on the latter stages, for understandable reasons. But this asymmetry 
in the focus of most SME development can be misguided in some cases. For example, 
too much emphasis on removing market-entry obstacles alone can, over time, result in 
diminishing returns for policymakers and development partners. Rather, there needs to 
be a balanced portfolio of interventions that can assist SMEs in overcoming obstacles 
throughout their development trajectory.
There are varying perspectives on the relationship and delineation between SMEs 
5   The Provincial Competitiveness Index in Viet Nam was developed by The Asia Foundation as part of the 
Viet Nam Competitiveness Initiative funded by the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID). The Cambodia variant was also developed by The Asia Foundation, with support from the 
International Finance Corporation-Mekong Project Development Facility and the Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID).
6  www.anitaroddick.com. 11
and entrepreneurs, and thus between SME development and entrepreneurial development 
initiatives. Most start-up ventures tend to be small, and therefore much of the policy-
related literature pertaining to entrepreneurship is also highly relevant to SMEs. That said, 
SME development and entrepreneurship support are not wholly synonymous. An SME 
can be entrepreneurial in its endeavours, but this is not universal. For example, an SME 
that has been established out of necessity or that is a long-established family business 
(common in countries where the legal protection of property and investor rights is weak) 
differs significantly from an individual or individuals pursuing a very specific perceived 
business opportunity.7
For entrepreneurialism to be vibrant in an economy, a willingness by individuals to 
take (calculated) business risks must also be present. If the social stigma associated with 
business failure is perceived to be too great, or the practical repercussions of business 
closure are too onerous (for example, if the difficulty or cost of closing a company is 
too great), then entrepreneurialism will not flourish easily. In addition, the right kinds of 
economic incentives need to be in place to prompt potential entrepreneurs to take a leap 
into the unknown. If the prospect of relatively substantial financial gain is a dim one, then 
the motivation to venture will no doubt be constrained. That in turn necessitates that the 
development of new products and services can be monetized (translated into a source 
of  income)  in  some  manner  by  new  business  ventures.  But  in  developing  countries, 
where incomes are often low, and thus consumer spending power is limited, and where 
intellectual property right protection is often inadequate, this can be a real problem.  
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor sees entrepreneurial endeavour evolving in 
different ways, depending on the economic stage of the host economy. First, for a less 
developed, factor-driven economy, the shift from agricultural sector dominance to greater 
industrial activity creates a dynamic described as follows in the 2008 Executive Report of 
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: 
As extractive industry starts to develop, this triggers economic growth, prompting 
surplus population from agriculture to migrate toward extractive and emergent 
scale-intensive sectors, which are often located in specific regions. The resulting 
oversupply of labour feeds subsistence entrepreneurship in regional agglomerations, 
as surplus workers seek to create self-employment opportunities in order to make 
a living. (Bosma and others 2008, 8)
Secondly, for a developing, efficiency-driven economy, the development of the 
industrial sector creates new venture opportunities that can be harnessed by entrepreneurs, 
thus:
As the industrial sector develops further, institutions start to emerge to support 
further industrialization and the build-up of scale in the pursuit of higher productivity 
through economies of scale. Typically, national economic policies in scale-intensive 
economies shape their emerging economic and financial institutions to favor large 
national businesses. As increasing economic productivity contributes to financial 
capital formation, niches may open in industrial supply chains that service these 
7  Entrepreneurial  initiatives  are  sometimes  said  to  go  through  at  least  four  stages:  (a)  conception  or   
identification;  (b)  gestation  or  evaluation;  (c)  infancy  or  explosion;  and  (d)  adolescence  or 
exploitation. 12
national incumbents. This, combined with the opening up of independent supply of 
financial capital from the emerging banking sector, would expand opportunities for 
the development of small-scale and medium-sized manufacturing sectors. (Bosma 
and others 2008, 8)
And finally, in an industrialized, innovation-driven economy, a third pro-entrepreneur 
dynamic usually becomes apparent, thus:
The  industrial  sector  evolves  and  experiences  improvements  in  variety  and 
sophistication. Such a development would be typically associated with increasing 
research  and  development  and  knowledge  intensity,  as  knowledge-generating 
institutions in the economy gain momentum. This development opens the way for 
the development of innovative, opportunity-seeking entrepreneurial activity that is 
not afraid to challenge established incumbents in the economy. Often, small and 
innovative entrepreneurial firms enjoy an innovation productivity advantage over 
large incumbents, enabling them to operate as ‘agents of creative destruction.’ To 
the extent that the economic and financial institutions created during the scale-
intensive phase of the economy are able to accommodate and support opportunity-
seeking entrepreneurial activity, innovative entrepreneurial firms may emerge as 
significant drivers of economic growth and wealth creation. (Bosma and others 
2008, 8)
Not  surprisingly  perhaps,  views  differ  widely  (Wennekers  and  Thurik  1999; 
Davidsson 2004; Godin and others 2008) on what are the key elements necessary to 
promote entrepreneurial endeavour in an economy. But clearly, the kind of “hothouse 
environment” necessary to seed, pollinate, nurture and harvest entrepreneurial initiatives 
is not easy to achieve, particularly in countries where government resources are limited. 
Even the advanced and affluent city-State of Singapore has had only mixed success in 
its relatively recent forays into developing a more vibrant and entrepreneurial business 
community, despite being able to apply quite considerable financial resources to this effort 
(see, for example, the website of SPRING Singapore at www.spring.gov.sg). Government 
funding initiatives in support of SME development (both debt and equity) in Singapore 
include the SPRING Startup Enterprise Development Scheme, Business Angels Scheme, 
Growth  Financing  Programme,  Micro-Loan  Programme,  Local  Enterprise  Finance 
Scheme, Loan Insurance Scheme, Export Coverage Scheme (trade credit insurance), 
and the Internationalisation Finance Scheme.
Furthermore, Singapore is part of a relatively elite group of economies in the Asia-
Pacific region with a strong industry of private sector fund management that can also 
pursue the venture capital/private equity support of the SME sector. One recent example 
is the S$30 million Sirius SME Growth Partners I fund, focused exclusively on SMEs 
located in the city-State. Launched in May 2008, with an initial closing of S$15 million, it 
aims to invest S$2 million-3 million in about 10-12 “growth and expansion-stage SMEs in 
various industries, who can be leaders in their respective fields” (see www.sirius.com.sg/
Sirius_growth_fund.html). Exit is likely to be through trade sales or a listing on Singapore’s 
secondary market for smaller enterprises.
This underlines the extent to which multiple economic, financial, industrial, social, 
cultural and other nuances are sometimes necessary, in addition to the basic regulatory 
structures and economic platform. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor cites a cocktail 13
of:  (a)  entrepreneurial  attitudes;  (b)  entrepreneurial  activity;  and  (c)  entrepreneurial 
aspiration, which it then seeks to quantify through a series of analytical measures.8 The 
consortium goes on to propose what it calls the Entrepreneurial Framework Conditions, 
which tend to differ, depending on the stage of the underlying economy, as discussed 
earlier (see figure 1).
It needs to be underlined, however, that SME development and entrepreneurial 
development are not synonymous. Many (and probably most) SMEs are not entrepreneurial 
in nature. Rather, entrepreneurial business ventures often tend to be a subset of the 
SME sector, and are perhaps the most attractive to policymakers, given the prospect or 
potential they have for contributing most to economic growth and development.
1.2.1.  Entry: what does it take to set up an SME?
The first critical stage in the development of an SME is that of market entry, or 
start-up. This entails all the steps and procedures to get a business up and running in 
compliance with the laws and regulations of the host country. There are typically two 
important factors in this regard: (a) the time is takes to start up a business; and (b) the cost 
8  Sadly, in the latest iteration of the Global Economic Monitor study, only two Asia-Pacific economies 
(Republic of Korea and Japan) were among the 43 countries taking part.
Source:   Niels  Bosma,  Zoltan  J.  Acs,  Erkko  Autio,  Alicia  Coduras  and  Jonathan  Levie,  Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor 2008 Executive Report (Global Entrepreneurship Research Consortium, 
2009) available at www.gemconsortium.org/download/1240814294671/GEM_Global_08.pdf.
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of doing so. Unreasonable waiting times and/or prohibitive costs can be major barriers 
for many potential new businesses, and can translate into a potentially major opportunity 
cost for the economy, in terms of, among other things, jobs foregone and income not 
generated. Within the Asia-Pacific region, Azerbaijan is recognized as one developing 
country that has made considerable improvements in its regulatory framework relating to 
start-up.9
But these are certainly not the only potential inhibitors to greater SME start-up 
rates. For example, if an entrepreneur is unable to gain access to the capital needed 
to finance the planned business venture, he or she may opt not to proceed. Another 
inhibitor can actually be found at the opposite end of the SME life cycle: closure. If the 
regulations pertaining to shutting down a business or bankruptcy are too onerous, then 
an entrepreneur may be unwilling to take the risk of establishing an SME, given the risks 
attendant with any new business, and the possibility of failure resulting in a gratuitously 
arduous process of legal closure.
While the obstacle posed by high costs of market entry can be easily understood, 
the obstacle posed by a time-consuming process is perhaps a little less apparent. For 
some business ventures, the timing of market entry can be an important determinant of 
success. If a business opportunity opens, but subsequently closes (for whatever reason) 
before all the regulatory hurdles associated with start-up are completed, then it is likely 
that fewer SMEs will be established. Returning to the Doing Business rankings again, 
table 6 shows the figures for Asia-Pacific economies covered by the survey, in terms of 
the ease of starting a business. This indicator is aimed at measuring the bureaucratic 
and regulatory hurdles that an entrepreneur must typically navigate through in order to 
incorporate a new firm that employs up to 50 staff and has start-up capital that is 10 times 
the per capita gross national income of the relevant country. There are some striking 
contrasts to be discerned, most noticeably in the number of days required to commence 
a business, which ranges from 1 to 116 days.  
9  See the starting-a-business case study on Azerbaijan produced by the Doing Business project: Svetlana 
Bagaudinova, Dahlia Khalifa and Givi Petriashvili, “Azerbaijan business registration agencies cooperate 
on a new one-stop-shop”, in Bruce Ross-Larson, ed., Celebrating Reform (Washington D.C., International 
Finance Corporation, World Bank and USAID, 2008).












Average for East Asia and the Pacific 8.6 44.2 32.3
Average for South Asia 7.4 32.5 31.9
Afghanistan 4 9 59.5
Australia 2 2 0.8
Azerbaijan 6 16 3.2
Bangladesh 7 73 25.7
Bhutan 8 46 8.515
Brunei 18 116 9.2
Cambodia 9 85 151.7
China 14 40 8.4
Fiji 8 46 25.2
Hong Kong, China 5 11 2.0
India 13 30 70.1
Indonesia 11 76 77.9
Japan 8 23 7.5
Kazakhstan 8 21 5.2
Kiribati 6 21 64.6
Kyrgyzstan  4 15 7.4
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 8 103 14.1
Malaysia 9 13 14.7
Maldives 5 9 11.5
Marshall Islands 5 17 17.3
Micronesia (Federated States of) 7 16 137.5
Mongolia 7 13 4.0
Nepal 7 31 60.2
New Zealand 1 1 0.4
Pakistan 11 24 12.6
Palau 8 28 4.6
Papua New Guinea 8 56 23.6
Philippines 15 52 29.8
Republic of Korea 10 17 16.9
Samoa 9 35 39.8
Singapore 4 4 0.7
Solomon Islands 7 57 53.6
Sri Lanka 4 38 7.1
Taiwan Province of China 8 42 4.1
Tajikistan 13 49 27.6
Thailand 8 33 4.9
Timor-Leste 10 83 6.6
Uzbekistan 7 15 10.3
Vanuatu 8 39 54.8
Viet Nam 11 50 16.8
Source:  World Bank, Doing Business 2009 (Washington D.C., 2009). 
Abbreviation: GNI, gross national income.16
It stands to reason that if it takes more than 100 working days to incorporate a new, 
small company in a country, then fewer entrepreneurs will take the plunge and embark 
on a business venture. A long delay in start-up also serves as a leading indicator that 
other, subsequent regulatory hassles associated with actually operating an SME (such 
as the granting of specific licences, tax appraisals or various site inspections) will also be 
onerous or problematic, thereby deterring entrepreneurs further.
Some observers have argued that the start-up phase for an SME usually lasts about 
3.5 years (or 42 months). If an SME passes that landmark date, then it has graduated 
beyond the critical period when most young companies tend to fail, and therefore can be 
regarded as a potentially sustainable business. Interestingly, the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor project has discerned a U-shape relationship between a country’s SME start-
ups and its level of economic development (as measured by per capita income) (Bosma 
2009). In relatively poor countries, the pace of SME start-ups can be quite impressive, but 
this pace then declines as the economy develops and more formal (salaried) employment 
opportunities evolve. Then, as the economy develops further, the pace of start-ups begins 
to increase again, as the domestic demand for services and goods rise, particularly for 
highly individualized items where economies of scale are of less relevance.  
1.2.2.   Survival: what does it take to advance beyond start-up? 
.The transformation from a low-income, traditional economy to a modern 
economy . . . involves significant changes to production methods, a process of 
change where entrepreneurs provide essential roles: first, in creating new firms 
[i.e. SMEs] outside of the household, which offer new products; and second, 
in growing firms by making use of scale economies. Such larger firms tend to 
specialize, and the clustering of specialized firms can give rise to localization 
economies, further encouraging innovation and specialization.
Wim Naudé (2008, 22).
Once an SME has successfully entered the market and commenced operations, a 
number of other factors will be critical in its subsequent performance, determining whether 
it can sustain its business model beyond the short term, and dictating whether it will be 
simply a survivor, or go on to prosper as a competitive entity. Those factors entail an 
interplay between the SME itself and its wider enabling environment. Key inputs include 
(but are not limited to) access to: (a) accurate and timely market information, and an 
ability to analyse that information in a meaningful way; (b) a range of appropriate financial 
resources; (c) high quality human capital; (d) technology; and (e) suitable premises. The 
more conducive the enabling environment; the more likely it is that SMEs will thrive.
In most cases, government agencies should not be in the business of providing 
these inputs directly to individual SMEs, as experience shows their ability to do so is mixed, 
and as such they can inadvertently undermine the development of more sustainable input 
providers. But policymakers do need to ensure that they are providing the kind of benign 
enabling environment that allows these inputs to be available, only stepping in directly 
when there is a clear inability of the private sector to provide such inputs, and for as briefly 
as necessary. 17
A good example is that of financing. In general, government agencies make bad 
bankers and private equity investors, as they lack the necessary expertise. But governments 
do need to ensure that SMEs have recourse to a spectrum of finance providers that offer 
a suitably diverse range of financial products and services. Bank loans tend to dominate 
this sphere, but high debt levels can sink an SME, and SMEs will be vulnerable if they rely 
too much on this kind of funding. If banks reduce their lending, or increase interest rates, 
then SMEs that rely too much on loans will suffer. It is therefore important that other pro-
SME forms of financing are available, such as financial leasing, factoring, private equity 
and angel investing. 
There is much that governments can do in this sphere, including: (a) ensuring that 
the regulatory framework pertaining to financing is supportive of SME-oriented funding, 
or at least does not constrain it; (b) catalyzing the creation and use of credit risk and 
scoring services that can radically reduce the perceived costs of lending to SMEs;10 and 
(c) ensuring that agencies such as secured transaction registries are available, to lessen 
the risks associated with SME lending.
Indeed,  improving  access  to  finance  is  perhaps  one  of  the  most  common 
interventions by policymakers and development partners in their efforts to support SME 
development. (For a profile of some of these, see Freeman 2005.) This is often because 
many respondents in diagnostic studies of SME development constraints perennially cite 
the common complaint that access to finance is inadequate. However, such responses 
need to be treated with some caution, as these comments can “often mask technical and 
managerial inadequacies” within SMEs (Gries and Naudé 2008a, 4). Rather, financing 
constraints play a more critical role later on, when operational SMEs are seeking to expand 
and develop, but lack access to sufficient long-term funding sources in particular.
Beyond debt financing, most commonly in the form of bank loans or a revolving 
overdraft  facility,  SMEs  often  struggle  to  identify  alternative  sources  of  funding,  and 
particularly long-term funding. Ideally, private equity/venture capital is seen as an attractive 
proposition, as it often comes with value-added post-investment technical assistance and 
business strategy guidance attached to it. (Rarely do banks provide much in the way of 
technical assistance attached to a loan.) But most SMEs are typically too small to be 
eligible for this kind of equity financing (let alone an initial public offering); the transaction 
costs of conducting such an investment are quite high, which in turn makes investments 
of less than $5 million often hard to justify or engineer. Only highly prospective SMEs, 
with perceived potential for steep growth, are likely to make the grade. One hybrid form 
of financing that has been developed to try and fill this “equity finance-cum-technical 
assistance” gap in SME funding has been that of business angels and business angel 
networks.  Here,  high  net-worth  individuals,  often  retired  after  a  successful  career  in 
a particular industry, take a personal equity stake in an SME and seek to mentor that 
business. This can be an attractive option for long-term funding support of SMEs. For 
more short-term funding needs, services like leasing and factoring also have very clear 
attractions as alternatives to “plain vanilla” debt financing.
10  SME-oriented lending is typically seen as having high transaction costs, relative to the amounts lent. This 
deters banks from lending to SMEs, and conversely lending activities are focused on bigger corporate 
clients. One way of lessening the transaction costs of things like credit appraisal and customer due 
diligence is to have credit scoring bureaus.18
The 2008 credit crunch: some initial considerations
The  recent  dramatic  events  in  global  banking  and  financial  markets 
throughout 2007 and 2008 will doubtless add to the financial constraints of SMEs 
in many Asia-Pacific economies in 2009-2010, even if the true severity of the 
impact is hard to gauge. Bank credit is the most common type of formal finance 
relied on by SMEs, and there is little doubt that bank credit—of all kinds—is 
almost certainly going to be scarcer in the near term.  
There is also likely to be a flight away from risk by financiers of all kinds, 
with regard to assets of all kinds, and SMEs will not be immune.  While there is 
some debate as to whether SME-related financing is more risky per se, or just 
entails a different kind of risk, we can expect bankers to be more discerning in 
their lending behaviour towards smaller firms. As credit becomes rationed, those 
SMEs most in need of funding are likely to be hardest hit, as bankers gravitate 
towards firms with an established track record of being credit worthy.
Of course, some SMEs are actually financed from personal loans (and 
even  mortgages)  taken  out  by  their  owners.  But  these  forms  of  credit  too 
will probably be less freely available in the near term. The anticipated global 
recession will also likely make it more difficult for individuals to provide loans to 
relatives, colleagues and friends, further tightening credit for the SMEs that rely 
on such informal financing.
The relatively small proportion of SMEs able to attract equity capital will 
also find the going harder. Private equity and venture capital companies will 
themselves find it harder to raise funding for investment, and will not be able to 
leverage their acquisitions as much.  With less equity capital available, deals 
will be scarcer, and the internal rates of return expectations of investors will be 
higher.
Although not specific to SME finance per se, the Milken Institute produces an 
annual survey of countries and their access to capital for business, entitled the Capital 
Access Index. The index is comprised of 56 different measures, grouped under seven 
categories: (a) macroeconomic environment; (b) institutional environment; (c) financial 
and banking institutions; (d) equity market development; (e) bond market development; (f) 
alternative sources of capital; and (g) international funding.11 Not all of these groupings are 
wholly appropriate to SME financing, but a, b, c and f are highly relevant. At present, 122 
economies are included in the Capital Access Index, and those located in the Asia-Pacific 
region are shown in table 7, along with their aggregate score and ranking for 2007.
11  For details of the methodology used, see Appendix A of the report, which can be downloaded at:   
www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/publications.taf.19
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New Zealand 7.00 18
Republic of Korea 6.87 19






Sri Lanka 4.11 70
Pakistan 4.06 72
Viet Nam 3.98 74




Lao People’s Democratic Republic 2.11 119
Source:  James R. Barth, Tong Li, Wenling Lu, Triphon Phumiwasana and Glenn Yago, Capital Access 
Index  2007:  Best  Markets  for  Business Access  to  Capital,  (Santa  Monica,  Milken  Institute, 
2008).
But access to finance is by no means the only determinant of a conducive business 
enabling environment. Good governance and minimal red tape can also be an important 
determinant as the corollary, that is, burdensome bureaucracy and corruption, can be a 
major disincentive for entrepreneurial endeavour. This is not to suggest that an economy 
should seek to completely do away with necessary regulation and oversight, as this is still 
required to ensure that SMEs and other business ventures do not pursue activities that are 
detrimental to society, the environment, the wider economy, and so on. Ex ante approvals, 
as well as inspections and other forms of ex post regulatory oversight, are inevitable, at 
least in some fields of business that SMEs will pursue. But where such regulations and 
their implementation are gratuitous in nature and entail an unnecessary compliance cost 
or opportunity cost for SMEs, they will serve as an inhibitor of business.  20
This can sometimes stem from a desire by State agency officials to extract additional 
“rents”  from  businesses,  including  SMEs.  Transparency  International  undertakes  an 
annual Corruption Perceptions Index exercise that scores and ranks economies according 
to the perceived level of corruption. Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with 
the methodology used to generate such indices, the perceived level of corruption will be a 
factor in any decision made to pursue a business, even among start-up, domestic SMEs, 
as it raises the spectre of heightened costs and business risk. Table 8 includes those Asia-
Pacific economies included in the 2008 iteration of the index.








New Zealand 1 Maldives 115
Singapore 4 Nepal 121
Australia 9 Viet Nam 121
Hong Kong, China 12 Indonesia 126
Japan 18 Philippines 141
Taiwan Province of China 39 Kazakhstan 145
Republic of Korea 40 Timor-Leste 145
Bhutan 45 Bangladesh 147
Malaysia 47 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
151
Samoa 62 Papua New Guinea 151
China 72 Tajikistan 151
Thailand 80 Azerbaijan 158
India 85 Cambodia 166
Sri Lanka 92 Kyrgyzstan 166
Kiribati 96 Turkmenistan 166
Mongolia 102 Uzbekistan 166
Solomon Islands 109 Myanmar 178
Vanuatu 109
Source:  Transparency  International,  Transparency  International  2008  Corruption  Perceptions  Index 
(Berlin, Ernst & Young Global Limited, 2008), available at www.transparency.org/policy_research/
surveys_indices/cpi/2008.
One  area  where  bureaucracy  can  often  be  particularly  burdensome,  notably 
for  manufacturing-related  SMEs,  is  in  the  area  of  land  acquisition/availability  and 
construction. Firms that are unable to find and develop adequate premises may not be 
able to commence operations, or may remain constrained at a sub-optimal size that 
prevents  them  from  developing  economies  of  scale  and  renders  them  uncompetitive 
with their peers. Hence, there is a need for policymakers to ensure that adequate land 21
is available for SMEs to establish viable operations, and that access to this land—and 
registering legitimate ownership rights—is not hindered by excessive red tape and/or 
corrupt practices. The same imperative pertains to the provision of construction permits 
and all the other approvals that an SME might require before erecting and inhabiting new 
premises. Industrial zones and incubators (addressed in more detail below), where some 
of the normal procedures can be circumvented, may provide part of the answer. However, 
it is hardly conducive to SME development, particularly in the broad field of manufacturing, 
when, as in some economies, it takes up to a year to complete the 25 or more regulatory 
steps necessary to commission a new building.
A similar issue pertains to the taxation of SMEs. A regulatory system that makes 
tax compliance unduly burdensome can create a major distraction and opportunity cost 
for the typically small number of managers and/or owners of an SME. Further, a tax 
regime that is overly complex or opaque in its administration and enforcement serves to 
make the risks of pursuing business far greater. Any sustainable business model requires 
some calculation of (after tax) profitability and internal rate of return, but that becomes 
hard to achieve if the tax liability of an SME is hard to forecast or unknown. Complex or 
inequitable tax regimes can also have a distortionary effect on the development of SMEs, 
as they are tempted to morph into forms that seem to offer a lower tax burden. But if the 
tax regime itself changes, as is often the case, then an SME can be rendered unviable 
because it was reliant on some prior tax ruling, and now finds itself with an unsustainable 
business model.  
Simplicity, consistency and predictability tend to be the best watchwords for pro-
business (and pro-SME) tax regimes and their enforcement. Recognizing that the tax 
regime, bureaucracy, licensing and other regulatory compliance elements for SMEs are 
often less than ideal, there is a common tendency for policymakers to offer incentives 
and other kinds of inducements, intended to offset these additional compliance costs and 
risks, rather like a palliative. On their part, SMEs that are surveyed will rarely say that they 
dislike tax or other incentive measures offered by the government, as they do offer some 
pragmatic value. But where the doling out of incentives makes the regulatory regime 
more  complex,  and  therefore  often  harder  to  implement  fairly  and  transparently,  the 
consequences can actually backfire. SMEs and potential entrepreneurs see a regulatory 
regime that is even more laden with risk and uncertainty, and opt not to pursue business 
ventures for fear of encountering obstacles that are not readily apparent or that are hard 
to predict in terms of their impact.
A  slightly  more  controversial  issue  is  that  relating  to  employment  regulations, 
and the relative ease with which SMEs can hire, oversee and fire staff while remaining 
legally compliant. For example, there may be limits in the local labour code or law on the 
number of hours that employees may work per day or week. There may be a minimum 
number of weeks’ salary that an employee is entitled to when laid off, or other regulatory 
requirements that must be fulfilled before an SME can make an employee redundant. As 
with regulations pertaining to the environment, there is a need to balance the interests of 
SMEs with that of the wider economy and society. If the regulatory regime is too onerous, 
then a country is in danger of regulating its business community, including SMEs, out of 
business. Yet a too passive regulatory regime towards business can see damage inflicted 
that is not conducive to sustainable development.22
For SMEs in less developed countries, and small economies in particular (such 
as  the  island  economies  of  the  Pacific,  or  the  landlocked  economies  of  Bhutan,  the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Nepal), another key determinant of long-term 
success—for SME development and sustained economic growth in general—is the ability 
to export products or services, which increasingly involve parts and components. Indeed, 
most firms will probably, sooner or later, aspire to serve international customers. And 
even SMEs that are wholly oriented towards a domestic market may need to import some 
items. In this context, the ability of firms to buy and sell relatively easily across national 
borders is another essential prerequisite for SME development, particularly in the context 
of the globalization of production, as will be discussed in section 2.  
In general, SMEs typically cannot thrive in splendid isolation. Rather, they need to 
be part of a wider and vibrant corporate community, both domestically and internationally, 
into which they can be integrated and burgeon. It is the free flow of information, finance, 
human capital, skills, technology and other key inputs, between SMEs and other members 
of the wider economy and corporate community, that allows individual SMEs to find their 
competitive niches, and to be successful. This “traffic” of inputs can be facilitated and 
promoted through various platforms and vehicles, particularly in developing countries. One 
such vehicle is foreign direct investment, whereby more technically advanced overseas 
firms can assist local SMEs through backward linkages of various kinds. (This is explored 
in greater detail in the fourth section of this study.)  
Another platform is business associations, which should allow members to pool and 
share information. Business associations may be centred on a particular location (such 
as a city or province), a particular industry or product, or a slightly more abstract shared 
goal or interest of some kind. Business incubators and clusters are another platform, 
often structured as public-private (or purely private) partnerships. The aim is to allow 
multiple SMEs to benefit from economies, synergies and other benefits derived from being 
located together. Indeed, there is a considerable research literature surrounding the issue 
of incubators and clusters for SME development, based on initiatives and experiences 
undertaken across the globe. As the term suggests, incubators are designed to help 
youthful enterprises make it through the first, critical stages of business development, as 
they seek to graduate to the level of a sustainable business.12
It should be borne in mind, however, that not all SMEs aspire to become larger 
enterprises. Many owners of SMEs wish to keep their business small in scale, for whatever 
reason. This may be because it is a family business, and the owner(s) wish to keep it that 
way. It may be because the SME supports a lifestyle that is deemed comfortable and 
adequate, so there is no need to aspire to anything more grand. Or it could be because 
an SME-owner worries about the so-called “tall poppy syndrome”, whereby larger firms 
attract unwelcome attention of various kinds, so feels it is better to remain small. Or this 
may be because the business model itself is not easily expandable (sometimes referred 
to as scalable), for whatever reason, and will remain a small, niche player.
12  However, not all SMEs are attracted to clusters or incubators, despite the apparent economies and 
value-added inputs that may be on offer. One reason may be that, in being located so close to other 
firms of a similar kind, SME owners worry that key employees will be more easily tempted away by rival 
companies, or that commercially sensitive information is more likely to leak out in the canteen or other 
shared space.23
1.2.3. Exit: what can we learn from the demise of SMEs ?
“. . . most firms die young”. 
R. Cressy (2006)
Turning now to SME exits, there are perhaps two scenarios we need to consider. 
The first is that an SME develops into a large enterprise, and therefore graduates beyond 
the SME sector. For all concerned, this is perhaps the most welcome outcome for an SME 
in most cases. The second is the actual demise and closure of an SME, for whatever 
reason. (As Headd (2003) notes, not all SME closures stem from business failure; some 
are the consequence of an orderly exit by the owner(s).)
The latter is undoubtedly a much less welcome outcome than the former, in most 
cases, but it should not be dismissed as a policy irrelevance. It is inevitable that not all 
SMEs will be successful ad infinitum. Some will have an early demise, while others may 
close after quite a considerable time. In general, at least half of all new companies close 
within two years of commencing operations. One study in the United States found that 40 
per cent of manufacturing firms were defunct within five years of beginning operations. 
And there is clearly little utility in allocating resources that seek to artificially prolong 
the life of a terminally ill SME. Rather, the important issue for policymakers to ensure is 
that their passing does not become a constraint on new SMEs emerging, and hopefully 
some (hard) lessons learned are disseminated into the collective awareness of the local 
business community. A form of knowledge management process, if you will.
While countries are often quite zealous at recording and reporting new company 
start-ups, they tend to be much less focused on recording company closures. Thus, in 
some countries, the “births” of SMEs are diligently counted, but the “deaths” of most failed 
SMEs go completely unrecorded. This is the case in Viet Nam. In fact, few companies in 
Viet Nam actually go through the regulatory process of formally closing. Instead, many 
go into a state of suspended animation, which has the attraction of being able to revive 
the company at a later stage, should conditions change for the better. Also, the fact that 
it can take five years to formally close a bankrupt company serves as a deterrent against 
officially closing a company. But this then makes it difficult for business service providers, 
including banks and financiers, to have a clear picture of the SME community. This in turn 
adds to the risks for service providers of various kinds, which are passed on to SMEs as 
higher fees. For example, banks will charge a higher rate of interest on loans to SMEs, to 
mitigate the higher risks associated with such opacity. Equity financiers will expect a higher 
rate of return on their investment to mitigate the same higher perceived risk. Perhaps the 
most comprehensive and accurate picture of the SME community in a developing country 
is held by the tax authority, but this information is rarely in the public domain, or even 
shared among pertinent government agencies.
Returning  once  again  to  the  Doing  Business  survey,  problems  encountered 
in undergoing company bankruptcy are measured and compared, in terms of: (a) the 
average time to complete the bankruptcy process; (b) the average cost of this process; 
and (c) the recovery rate (how many cents on the dollar claimants can expect to recover 
from an insolvent company). The results for economies in the Asia-Pacific region are 
shown in table 9.24










 (cents on 
the dollar)
Average for East Asia and the Pacific 2.7 23.2 28.4
Average for South Asia 5.0 6.5 19.9
Afghanistan - - 0.0
Australia 1.0 8.0 78.8
Azerbaijan 2.7 8.0 30.1
Bangladesh 4.0 8.0 23.2
Bhutan - - 0.0
Brunei 2.5 4.0 47.2
Cambodia - - 0.0
China 1.7 22.0 35.3
Fiji 1.8 38.0 20.1
Hong Kong, China 1.1 9.0 79.8
India 10.0 9.0 10.4
Indonesia 5.5 18 13.7
Japan 0.6 4.0 92.5
Kazakhstan 3.3 18.0 25.3
Kiribati - - 0.0
Kyrgyzstan 4.0 15 14.2
Lao People’s Democratic Republic - - 0.0
Malaysia 2.3 15.0 38.6
Maldives 6.7 4.0 18.2
Marshall Islands 2.0 38.0 17.9
Micronesia (Federated States of) 5.3 38 3.5
Mongolia 4.0 8.0 22.0
Nepal 5.0 9.0 24.5
New Zealand 1.3 4.0 76.2
Pakistan 2.8 4.0 39.2
Palau 1.0 23.0 38.2
Papua New Guinea 3.0 23.0 24.7
Philippines 5.7 38.0 4.4
Republic of Korea 1.5 4.0 80.5
Samoa 2.5 38.0 14.325
Source:  World Bank, Doing Business 2009 (Washington D.C., World Bank, 2009).
Singapore 0.8 1.0 91.3
Solomon Islands 1.0 38.0 23.6
Sri Lanka 1.7 5.0 43.4
Taiwan Province of China 1.9 4.0 80.9
Tajikistan 3.0 9.0 25.4
Thailand 2.7 36.0 42.4
Timor-Leste - - 0.0
Uzbekistan 4.0 10.0 18.7
Vanuatu 2.6 38 41.2
Viet Nam 5.0 15.0 18.0
Clearly, the relative ease with which a bankrupt SME can be wound up, and the 
amount that claimants (creditors, employees and tax agencies) can recover, have an impact 
on the perceived risk of SMEs. This in turn will influence the extent to which subsequent 
SMEs can access key inputs, most notably finance. In Singapore, for example, where a 
bankrupt SME can be wound up in less than a year, and claimants have a recovery rate 
of over 90 per cent on average, there is going to be a far greater likelihood that banks will 
lend to SMEs, compared with Cambodia or the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, for 
example, where the bankruptcy process is virtually non-existent. In the latter countries, 
banks will be much more conservative in lending to SMEs, knowing that they will have little 
or no chance of recovering the loan amount should the borrower become bankrupt. Little 
wonder, therefore, that Singapore ranks far higher than Cambodia or the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, for example, in the Milken Institute’s Capital Access Index.
There is a relatively strong correlation between the ease of access a SME has 
to capital and the degree to which: (a) investors are protected; and (b) contracts can be 
enforced in a particular country. One often tends to think of investor protection within the 
wider context of corporate governance, and for larger, stock-market-listed companies in 
particular, where there is a need to ensure that the management of the company is working 
in the interests of what can be a very widespread shareholder base, including many 
minority shareholders. But it also applies to many SMEs also, even if their shareholder 
base is quite small indeed. The Doing Business survey assesses investor protection in 
terms of: (a) the transparency of transactions; (b) liability for self-dealing; and (c) the 
ability of shareholders to sue directors and officers for misconduct. This may not seem 
particularly relevant to most SMEs, but the manner with which a company conducts its 
activities and governs its internal practices, and the extent to which stakeholders have 
some legal recourse in cases of improper behaviour, are the sorts of issues that banks will 
focus on when appraising SME loan applicants.  
The same broad dynamic pertains to contract enforcement, as a bank will be less 
willing and able to provide capital to an SME if it knows that a loan default will be difficult 
(costly, time-consuming or involving an uncertain outcome) to pursue by conventional 
legal means, notably in terms of taking possession of and liquidating any assets pledged 
as collateral. This is often made apparent in the selective regard banks have for collateral, 
only willing to take pledges on assets that can be easily sold.26
1.3.  Gender issues relating to SME development
Relatively little research has been conducted on gender issues in SME development 
within the Asia-Pacific region. One exception is a survey by Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor on women and entrepreneurship, albeit on a global level. The most recent such 
survey, using 2007 data, but published in a 2008 report, spans 41 economies, including 
just six in Asia: China; Hong Kong, China; India; Japan; Kazakhstan; and Thailand. Based 
on earlier research, it is posited that “… investment in women’s entrepreneurship is an 
important way for countries to exponentially increase the impact of new venture creation. 
Ignoring the proven potential of women’s entrepreneurial activity means that countries put 
themselves at a disadvantage and thwart their opportunity to increase economic growth”. 
(Allen and others 2008, 6)
In general, there tends to be a gender gap between male-owned SMEs and female-
owned SMEs, although some countries seem to have attained a broad gender balance, 
including Japan and Thailand (Allen and others 2008, 7). Indeed, in Japan, 2007 saw 
more women than men starting up new businesses (table 10). That gender asymmetry 
pertains to both newly established firms and more mature SMEs. Efforts to rectify this 
asymmetry will, in most cases, need to be country-specific in nature, addressing specific 
socio-cultural and/or economic factors that are identified as constraining the development 
of more SMEs owned and managed by women. One example is the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Viet Nam, and its project regarding a 
women’s entrepreneurship development programme in the food industry in Central Viet 
Nam, working in conjunction with the national Women’s Union in three provinces:
In many places in Viet Nam, men traditionally work in the fields and women process 
the agricultural products. As the economy was opened to the flow of goods from 
outside,  the  existence  of  this  traditional  occupation  for  women  was  put  under 
threat. There are hundreds of women involved in the business of food processing 
in Danang but many had to give up in the face of severe competition from other 
products of higher quality. For many of them, a new hope arrived with UNIDO’s 
project that provides skill development in business management, marketing and 
food processing technology. 
A rural resource centre at the Danang Women’s Union Vocational Training Center 
has  been  established  as  a  functional,  active  and  viable  centre  where  food-
processing women entrepreneurs can come for information, training and advice. 
Entrepreneurial  and  technology  training  modules  in  Vietnamese  and  English 
suited to the local needs of women entrepreneurs in the Central Region are in 
use. Trainers have been trained from the Viet Nam Women’s Union and other 
institutions. Women are organized in self-help groups in order to address specific 
constraints  such  as:  marketing  strategies  and  competitiveness;  access  to  raw 
materials, machinery and equipment, technology, finance, training and advisory 
services. With additional funds from Belgium, the project has recently embarked on 
the introduction of a lease-purchase service for the self-help groups. The women 
entrepreneurs are already linked to Belgium’s micro credit facility implemented by 
the Women’s Union. (UNIDO 2003)
Another example would be the Micro-Enterprise Development Programme of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Nepal, which, although not focused 27
exclusively on women entrepreneurs, has been markedly oriented towards women. Both 
the central Viet Nam and Nepal projects, and other projects focused on supporting women 
as entrepreneurs, stem in large part from the Beijing Declaration13 of 1995, and tend to 
focus more on micro- and small enterprises, as part of poverty alleviation goals.
1.4.  Cradle to grave: the role of policymakers and development   
  partners in supporting the SME sector
Policymakers in developing countries and development partners tend to place 
special attention on SME sector development, for reasons discussed above. In recent 
years, such interventions have tended to shift away from direct (and often subsidized) 
support to individual SMEs, which can bring undesired market distorting risks, and more 
towards economy- and market-wide initiatives that are market-oriented in nature.  
Pro-SME development interventions in developing countries tend to focus on those 
issues where SMEs have most problems of access, including (but not always limited to): 
(a) access to finance; (b) access to land; (c) access to business support services; (d) 
access to markets, especially overseas markets; (e) access to training and guidance; and 
(f) access to technology and infrastructure.14
The  schema  outlined  in  table  11  tries  to  profile  some  of  the  more  common 
interventions used for pro-SME development, in line with best practice, although it is not 
exhaustive in scope. In practice, of course, there tends to be quite a lot of overlap between 
the various components in this SME development smorgasbord.
13  Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September 1995 (United Nations 
publication, Sales. No. E.96.IV.13), chap. I, resolution 1, annex I.
14  For a cogent summary, see chapter 7 of the Best Practice Guide for a Positive Business and Investment 
Climate (OSCE 2006).









Male Female Male Female Male Female
China 19.3 13.4 9.7 7.0 28.9 20.5
Hong Kong, China 14.3 5.8 7.5 3.8 21.8 9.6
India 9.5 7.5 8.7 2.2 18.2 9.7
Japan 3.5 5.2 8.7 8.6 12.2 13.8
Kazakhstan 11.2 7.6 6.8 4.8 18.0 12.4
Source:   I. Elaine Allen, Amanda Elam, Nan Langowitz and Monica Dean, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
2007 Report on Women and Entrepreneurship (Global Entrepreneurship Research Association, 
2008), available at www.gemconsortium.org.
(Percentage)28
Table 11.  Matrix of common SME development interventions
Group Intervention
Training and information Encouragement  of  a  culture  of  entrepreneurship  in 
schools,  vocational  colleges  and  institutes  of  higher 
education
Train-the-trainers programmes of various kinds
SME  and  business  guidance  publications  of  various 
kinds (on marketing and exporting to overseas markets, 
for example)
Applied vocational training for employees of SMEs
Information technology and distance-learning programmes 
for SME owners
Training and guidance tailored for women entrepreneurs
Financial services Micro-loans and SME-oriented loan/debt products
Factoring
Leasing
Venture capital and private equity
Angels and angel networks
Secured transactions and registry
Guarantee mechanisms of various kinds
Credit scoring and ratings agencies
Bankruptcy legislation
Support structures Incubators (including virtual incubators)
Clusters  and  technology  centres  of  various  kinds, 
including those linked to universities
Business associations
Infrastructure of various kinds and access to land
Business-to-business  (B2B)  portals  and  e-business 
platforms
Policy advocacy for a 
conducive business 
enabling environment
Private sector and SME development in general, including 
investment promotion
Government procurement
Taxation issues (for example, simplified tax regime)
Trade issues
Permitted forms of doing business
Other  regulations  in  pertinent  fields  (for  example, 
labour and land, zoning, dispute resolution and contract 
enforcement)29
Intellectual  property  rights  and  other  private  property 
rights
Electronic commerce regulations
Competition policy and legislation
Reducing regulatory burdens of various kinds, so as to 
lessen compliance costs
Corporate governance
Corporate social responsibility and sustainable business
Capacity-building For  relevant  state  agencies  (such  as  conducting 
regulatory impact assessments or speeding up customs 
procedures)
For new and existing business associations, so that they 
become sustainable
For  providers  of  business  development  service  (for 
example  accountants, marketing firms, human resources, 
testing)
For markets of various kinds
Within  SMEs  themselves  (such  as  in  management  or 
technical skills, and turning entrepreneurs into successful 
business people)
Such interventions are typically enacted on a country-by-country basis, coordinated 
between the relevant government agencies and multiple development partners. There are 
some examples of regional and subregional initiatives, such as the Mekong Private Sector 
Development Facility, and the SouthAsia Enterprise Development Facility. Both are multi-
donor initiatives managed by the International Finance Corporation, but here too there is 
often a country-specific approach taken to individual initiatives that are pursued in areas 
such as the business enabling environment.
Hallberg (2000, 8) is probably right in asserting that: 
An SME development strategy is in reality . . . a “private sector development 
strategy”,  recognizing  that  the  majority  of  firms  are  small,  that  they  may  face 
different  constraints  and  opportunities  than  large  firms,  and  that  the  types  of 
institutions and instruments best suited to their needs may be underprovided in 
distorted and segmented markets. It points government action toward market-
completing interventions and the elimination of policy biases by: 
•   Addressing the market failures that create cost disadvantages for SMEs, restrict 
their access to markets, and inhibit the development of markets for a diverse 
range of financial and non-financial services appropriate for small firms; 
•   Improving  transactional  efficiency  in  financial,  product,  and  input  markets 
relevant  to  SMEs,  by  facilitating  access  to  information  and  developing 
mechanisms to manage risk; 30
•   Reconsidering public policies and regulations that discriminate against small firms 
or produce fixed costs that create a competitive disadvantage for them; and 
•   Investing  in  public  goods  that  open  market  access  and  build  enterprise 
competitiveness—including infrastructure (information, communications, power, 
water, and transport) as well as education and technology development.
At  perhaps  its  most  “Austrian  School”-lite,  purist  form,  this  approach  almost 
entails  keeping  away  from  quasi-interventionist  SME  development  initiatives  per  se, 
and instead focusing on trying to create—and then maintain—the key external enabling 
factors necessary for competitive SMEs to thrive. These are, most notably: (a) strong 
property rights protection and contract enforcement; (b) a stable macroeconomic and 
financial  environment,  with  low  inflation  and  currency  convertibility;  (c)  a  competition 
policy that allows everyone to pursue business opportunities; (d) socio-political stability; 
(e) regulatory and policy consistency, and an avoidance of “shocks”; (f) tax rates that are 
not too burdensome; (g) good governance and transparency, including low corruption 
levels; and (h) robust and competent State institutions for effective implementation and 
enforcement of all the above.  
Of course, this is not a check-list for SME development only, but for a favourable 
business and investment climate for firms of all sizes and ownership profiles. One can 
work diligently to overcome a relatively small-scale (but therefore removable) obstacle 
that is perceived to be constraining SME development, but may have relatively little impact 
in the big scheme if more generic business environment issues, such as a malfunctioning 
tax regime (which is much harder to address), go unreformed. Diminishing returns can 
rapidly set in for pro-SME initiatives that incrementally shave off time or money costs 
for business start-up procedures, if bigger—and therefore often harder to surmount—
obstacles persist.
Another fairly common approach taken by development partners is to support one 
or more State agencies mandated to coordinate SME-related development policies in a 
particular country. By building up the capacity of such bodies, it should be possible for 
the host country itself to lead efforts aimed at creating a more vibrant SME community. 
But evidence to support the attainment of this objective varies from country to country. 
One risk here is that the relevant State agencies end up becoming a burden on local 
SMEs, rather than a source of support. Rather than becoming effective exponents of SME 
sector development within the government, they burgeon into bodies focused on their own 
self-sustenance, and divert scarce resources away from the SMEs they are supposed to 
be helping. Given the choice, most successful SME owners in developing countries are 
merely looking for a safe and level playing field on which to conduct business, and are 
not particularly looking for special treatment. Nonetheless, many developing countries 
have  opted  to  establish  SME  development  agencies  of  one  kind  or  another,  and  of 
varying degrees of effectiveness. However, international development partners should be 
discerning in their approach to such agencies.
The pursuit of clusters and incubators to support SME development tends to be a 
relatively large-scale exercise, and one that typically needs a fairly strong degree of private 
sector involvement to be meaningful and sustainable, and therefore attractive to SMEs. 
In Viet Nam, for example, the first two incubator projects enacted in Hanoi (agricultural 31
processing and packaging) and Ho Chi Minh City (software), supported with European 
Commission funding, have experienced only qualified success. The concept of industry 
and product clusters has also been attempted in Viet Nam by a few development partners, 
including the Viet Nam Competitiveness Initiative funded by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), but the gains derived seem to have been fairly 
limited, at best. In Mongolia, USAID attempted a cluster development initiative around 
meat, cashmere and tourism, also without much success. The apparent experience of 
Viet Nam and Mongolia contrasts with that of markedly more successful incubators and 
clusters in some other developing and transitional countries, notably in Eastern Europe. 
This issue will be revisited in more detail in the next section of this report.
In general, one finds policymakers and development partners active in most areas 
of SME development. The sphere is typically well covered by initiatives of various kinds, 
with varying degrees of success. As noted above, an area that is typically well supported 
is removing constraints to market entry, as: (a) this is an important prerequisite of SME 
development; (b) the interventions required can be relatively simple and attainable; and 
(c) the positive impact can be easily measured and assessed. The number of approvals 
required, agency office visits, official and unofficial costs, and days required to start a 
business (and be compliant with the law in commencing operations) can all be reduced 
in many developing countries. One-stop shops of various kinds have become a fairly 
common initiative in this field, even if they consist of multiple entrances, windows and 
even “back doors”. Similarly, the establishment of business associations, commonly along 
business sector lines, is often pursued, although making such associations genuinely 
effective and economically sustainable in the long run is not always easy.
In short, such interventions often tend to be “low-hanging fruit” for policymakers 
and development partners. Conversely, some other, perhaps less readily tangible, factors 
relating to SME development attract less attention, partly because the positive impact 
arising is less immediate. But such “high-hanging fruit” may actually have a greater long-
term economic development impact, if, for example, it allows local SMEs to establish 
greater linkages with the foreign investment enterprise community, or to export much better. 
As a consequence, such interventions can have a greater impact on, among other things, 
employment (and poverty alleviation), foreign exchange earnings and addressing socio-
economic and gender imbalances of various kinds. In other words, supporting SMEs that 
they may graduate from survival to competitive (or sustainable) status.  Having navigated 
through the market entry process, an SME may survive for quite some time, without really 
attaining a level where it can be deemed a success. This is where SME support is perhaps 
most necessary in many developing countries, but also harder to achieve (and measure). 
Sections 2 and 3 of this report focus largely on this aspect. Section 4 of the report includes 
some specific policy recommendations on alternative SME development initiatives that 
could reap dividends.GLOBALIZATION OF PRODUCTION AND THE COMPETITIVENESS 
OF SMEs IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS
2.1. The setting
The focus of this section is on the trends and prospects for the competitiveness of 
the region’s SMEs, based on a review of the literature (as distinct from original research). 
In this context, the key dynamic shaping the prospects of Asia-Pacific SMEs relates to the 
globalization of production. This is changing the competitive environment for the region’s 
SMEs in both international markets and at home. Therefore, at the core of the story is 
the need to understand the nature of globalization and its implications for the competitive 
performance of Asia-Pacific SMEs. From this perspective, small traditional firms serving 
only small local markets are not of primary interest here, except insofar as they may 
evolve, or may be forced to evolve, into competitive enterprises in the above context.
As discussed in section 1, there is no consensus on the definition of SMEs; it differs 
among the economies of Asia and the Pacific with regard to common indicators, such as 
the number of employees, invested capital, sales volume and revenues, or production 
capacity. However, two common characteristics of SMEs in the region are: (a) the majority 
are small, employing fewer than 100 people; and (b) they typically make up over 90 per 
cent of registered enterprises in any given economy.
It  is  generally  recognized  that  SMEs  play  an  important  role  in  Asia-Pacific 
economies in terms of employment and value added, despite the disadvantages of both 
size and relative sophistication of their operations. However, estimates of their actual 
contribution to their respective economies in the region vary greatly (see, for example, 
estimates from the Asian Productivity Organization in table 12). In general, SMEs are seen 
as supporting competitive and flexible markets through relative ease of entry and exit, and 
through their role as subcontractors, which supports the restructuring of both public and 
private enterprises in the region. They are also seen as making important contributions 
to poverty alleviation, since SMEs often employ poor and low-income workers, frequently 
providing the primary source of income in lagging regions and rural areas.
Table 12.  SMEs among total enterprises, contribution to employment, and total 
value added, in selected Asia-Pacific economies
(Percentage)




establishments 99.7 95.0 100.0a 99.0 94.4 99.6 99.0 98.0
Employment 74.0 80.0 99.0 88.0 40.4 69.1 69.0 55.8
Value added 60.0 40.0 63.1 56.0 26.0 32.0 46.0 47.0
Source:   Mark Goh, “High-growth, innovative Asian SMEs for international trade and competitiveness: 
challenges and solutions for APO member countries” (Tokyo, Asian Productivity Organization, 
2007), p. 3, available at www.apo-tokyo.org/rr_papers/index.htm.
a Actual figure is 99.995 per cent.
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There are significant differences in the nature and role of SMEs in the diverse 
economies of Asia and the Pacific. Many SMEs are in the retail and service sectors, 
characterized by relatively low-level and stable technology and scale, and generally static 
performance in local markets. Other SMEs are internationally oriented subcontractors to 
large enterprises, at varying levels of sophistication of skill and technology. Still others 
are dynamic entrepreneurial firms active in key new product and service niches, including 
dynamic start-ups commercializing new products and technologies. As Lall (2000b) notes, 
the proportion of “modern” SMEs competing on the basis of sophisticated technologies 
and products varies significantly among the economies of the region. 
Very broadly, there is a dualistic pattern of SME development in the Asia-Pacific 
region, with a small relatively dynamic and competitive SME sector co-existing with a 
much bigger number of under-performing SMEs. A large proportion of Asia-Pacific SMEs: 
(a)  remain  in  traditional  activities;  (b)  are  characterized  by  low  levels  of  productivity, 
relatively simple technology and poor quality products; and (c) compete in small, local 
markets. A much smaller group has taken advantage of new opportunities offered by 
globalization, upgrading their products and production processes, entering new product 
markets, and expanding their domestic market shares. Ayyagari, Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt (2003), in reviewing the contribution made by SMEs to economies in 76 countries, 
observed the following relationship between the contribution that SMEs make to GDP and 
national income: in high-income countries, 51 per cent of GDP was produced by SMEs; 
in medium-income countries, 39 per cent (this context also includes the more advanced 
economies of East and South-East Asia); and in low-income countries, only 16 per cent.
For example, SMEs play an important role in job creation in the economies of China, 
Japan, India, Indonesia, Taiwan Province of China and Viet Nam, where they contribute 
over 70 per cent of employment, as compared with Malaysia and Thailand, where SMEs 
contribute less than 60 per cent of employment. The participation of the region’s SMEs in 
international trade, and therefore the extent of their global integration, also differs widely; 
export orientation in China, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan Province of China is rather 
stronger than that in India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. 
However, this aggregate picture can be somewhat misleading. SMEs based in 
Penang play a critical role in Malaysia, providing an important foundation for that country’s 
participation in the global economy in terms of competitive performance in the information, 
communications and technology (ICT) and electronics sector. In Singapore, SMEs have a 
relatively modest presence in terms of the number of establishments and contribution to 
employment, yet they play a key role in diversifying the production structure of the economy 
and  in  attracting  large  multinational  enterprises  (MNEs,  also  known  as  multinational 
corporations) to the supplier clusters they provide. In China and Viet Nam, SMEs have 
played an important role in the transition from a centralized planned economy to one 
that is more decentralized and market-oriented, and in the building of a vibrant domestic 
business sector. In Taiwan Province of China, SMEs have been critical in the country’s 
dramatic and sustained overall economic transformation and development. A summary 
profile of the diverse role of SMEs in the member economies of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation forum is presented in table 13. 35
Table 13.  A  summary  profile  of  SMEs  in  East  Asia/the  Asia-Pacific  Economic 
Cooperation forum
Key features




1.  There are about 20 million to 
30 million SMEs in East Asia.
2.  They account for 98 per cent 
of all enterprises.
3.  Microenterprises account for 
about 73 per cent of all private 
sector enterprises.
4.  On average there are about 
85 people for every SME.
1.  Most of the SMEs are in China 
(8 million), Japan (5 million) 
and the Republic of Korea 
(2.6 million), which together 
are home to 70 per cent of the 
SMEs in East Asia.
2.  In developed economies there 
are only about 20 people 
per SME, but the ratio is 
above 100 in the developing 
economies, especially 
in China, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Viet Nam.
Employment 5.  SMEs employ about 60 per 
cent of the private sector 
workforce, and 30 per cent of 
the total workforce.
6.  Microenterprises employ 
about 21 per cent of total 
APEC-wide employment.
7.  Over 95 per cent of 
enterprises employ fewer than 
100 people, and over 80 per 
cent employ fewer than five 
people.
8.  SMEs contribute about 70 
per cent of net employment 
growth.
9.  SMEs provide about 80 per 
cent of employment in the 
services sector, and about 15 
per cent in the manufacturing 
sector.
10. Women make up about 30 
per cent of employers/self-
employed in APEC—mainly in 
microenterprises
3.  In developing economies 
(below about $15,000 per 
head income) SMEs employ 
about 75 per cent of people; 
above $15,000 the level is 
closer to 50 per cent. Japan 
is a major exception—SMEs 
there employ about 80 per 
cent of the workforce.
4.  More developed economies 
seem to have more medium-
sized SMEs, and such 
SMEs play a greater role. 
Developing economies seem 
more likely to have a “missing 
middle”.
5.  In developed economies, 
most of this growth probably 
comes from fast-growth firms; 
in developing economies a 
higher proportion probably 
comes from net start-ups.
Output 
measures (such 
as sales and 
value added)
11. SMEs contribute about 50 per 
cent of sales, value added or 
output.
6.  The contribution varies 
from lows of 15 per cent 
(Singapore) and 30 per 
cent (Australia) to about 
60 per cent for most other 
economies.36
Key features
Regional differences and 
policy issues
Exports 12.  SMEs generate about 30  
per cent of direct exports 
($930 billion in 2000), much 
less than the SME contribution 
to employment (about 60  
to 70 per cent) or output 
(about 50 per cent).
13.  SMEs contribute indirectly to 
trade through supply chain 
relationships with other firms. 
SME contribution to total trade 
could rise to 50 per cent.
7.  SME exports figures are 
difficult to verify, but they 
range from about 5 per cent or 
less (Indonesia) to about 40 
per cent (Republic of Korea) 
of total exports. 
8.  Tariff cuts have increased 
total APEC member trade, 
but the SME contribution to 
direct exports has remained 
static or declined. Reductions 
in tariffs have not benefited 
SMEs; more emphasis needs 
to be put on tackling non-tariff 




14.  SMEs generate about 50  
per cent of the cases of 
foreign direct investment,  
but less than 10 per cent of 
the value of such investment.
9.  SMEs in Japan, the Republic 
of Korea and Taiwan Province 
of China contribute most 
foreign direct investment 






and the new 
economy
15.  SMEs already contribute 
the bulk of growth, and 
could make a much larger 
contribution to the Asian 
regional economy if efforts 
were made to address 
impediments to SME 
internationalization. This 
could add as much as $1.18 
trillion in trade over a five-year 
period.
16.  SMEs are moving towards 
services and away from 
agriculture and manufacturing.
10.  The developing economies 
need to create about 50 
million to 70 million more 
SMEs if they are to achieve 
“benchmark” levels of SME 
activity.
11. To achieve maximum gain 
from trade it is essential to 
improve governance with 
regard to building capacity, 
reducing transaction 
costs, promoting further 
liberalization, addressing 
non-tariff barriers, increasing 
Internet access and facilitating 
trade and investment to 
improve the capacity of SMEs 
to export.37
Source:   C. Harvie, “East Asian SME capacity building, competitiveness and market opportunities in a 
global economy”, Economics Working Paper Series, WP 04-15 (University of Wollongong, August 
2004), table 8, p. 13.
Abbreviations: APEC, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation; SMEs, small and medium-sized enterprises.
Key features
Regional differences and 
policy issues
12.  Capacity-building includes: 
access to finance; 
improved professional skills 
(information technology, 
management, accounting and 
entrepreneurship); improved 
business infrastructure; and 
removal of trade barriers that 
particularly and adversely 
affect SMEs. 
13.  E-commerce use by SMEs 
lags larger enterprises; 
e-commerce is important 
for cost saving and growth 
potential. The usage of 
technology is a problem due 
to set-up and usage costs, 
and a lack of adequate 
infrastructure and information 
technology skills.
As noted in table 13, the corporate landscape of many emerging economies in Asia 
and the Pacific often exhibit a “missing middle” of competitive SMEs. These economies 
tend to comprise a relatively small number of large enterprises, and a large number of 
small, often uncompetitive and static traditional SMEs serving small, local markets (see, 
for example, Freeman 2008 on Viet Nam). In a global economic environment characterized 
by trade liberalization, rapidly changing technology, and growing and changing demand 
for higher quality and differentiated intermediate and final products and services that meet 
a variety of stringent international standards, traditional SMEs find it difficult to make the 
upgrades they need to stay competitive even in their domestic markets. Therefore a key 
challenge facing SMEs and the related role of governments in Asia and the Pacific is to 
strengthen SME competitiveness in both domestic and international markets, to “fill the 
missing middle”. 38
2.2. SMEs and competitiveness 
2.2.1. Concept of “competitiveness”
The concept of “competitiveness”, although widely used, can be elusive and subject 
to considerable debate. In the context of enterprises, the meaning of competitiveness, as 
well as competitive strategy, is relatively clear. It refers to the ability of firms to compete 
for markets, resources and revenues, as measured by indicators such as relative market 
share, growth, profitability or innovation (see, for example, Roberts 2004; Greenwald and 
Kahn 2005). However, extending the concept from enterprises to economies is subject to 
considerable debate. Representing nations as competing with each other in world markets, 
and becoming more competitive or less competitive as economies has been called a 
“dangerous obsession”, reflecting a misunderstanding of the basic theory of comparative 
advantage that explains gains from specialization and trade (Krugman 1994).
Partly as a response, competitiveness is generally approached as a multilevel 
concept where national competitiveness is closely linked to enterprise competitiveness 
(see, for example, UNCTAD 2005b); Porter and others (2008)). A typical definition of 
competitiveness at the national level refers to “a nation’s ability to produce goods and 
services that meet the test of international  markets while  simultaneously  maintaining 
and expanding real incomes of its people over the long term” (United States Presidential 
Commission  on  Industrial  Competitiveness,  in  UNCTAD  2005b,  p.  3).  National 
competitiveness, in turn, is seen as a function of a country’s: (a) endowments (such as 
land,  labour  and  capital);  (b)  macroeconomic  conditions,  including  a  country’s  policy 
and institutional environment; and (c) microeconomic factors, including the quality of a 
country’s business environment, the relative sophistication of firms’ operations, and the 
state of a country’s enterprise cluster development (see, for example, Porter and others 
2008). This is the general framework used in the rankings for the World Competitiveness 
Index noted above (see also table 5).
From this perspective, the competitiveness of an economy is seen as ultimately 
reflecting  its  productivity.  This,  in  turn,  depends  on  the  value  of  a  nation’s  products 
and services, supplied by its enterprises, as measured by the prices they command 
on  international  markets,  and  the  efficiency  with  which  these  products  and  services 
are produced (UNCTAD 2005b; Porter 2008). An economy becomes more competitive 
through its ability—or, more precisely, through the ability of its enterprises—to increase 
productivity by using assets (human resources, capital, physical assets, among others) 
more efficiently. This, in turn, is shaped by a country’s endowments, macroconditions, 
and microfactors (figure 2). Therefore, getting macrofundamentals right is necessary but 
not sufficient for strengthening a nation’s competitiveness if, for example, the country’s 
business environment and/or the quality and operations of its enterprises are weak. At the 
same time, a lack of physical endowments need not be a binding constraint. Singapore 
overcame  such  constraints  to  become  one  of  the  most  productive  or  “competitive” 
economies in the world through effective policies and institutions that developed its human 
resources and attracted foreign investment. 39
Competitiveness is then ultimately an enterprise-level concept, referring to the 
relative performance of firms in particular product markets. It is the ability of a country’s 
enterprises to sustain superior market positions and profitability relative to their domestic 
and international competitors by producing products and services of superior quality and 
functionality, at competitive prices, delivered on time to both domestic and international 
buyers. Dynamic competitiveness—competitiveness over the longer term—refers to the 
ability of enterprises to respond flexibly, quickly and in a sustained manner to changes in 
demand, technology and resource availability and to the actions of competing firms. This 
can be achieved through adjustments in, among other things: (a) the efficiency of the 
production process; (b) product differentiation; and (c) innovative capacity, including both 
process and product innovation, and by developing entirely new markets for existing and 
new products.15 
In summary, many interacting factors, at different levels, shape the competitive 
performance of an enterprise, including: (a) its resources (people, skills, physical capital 
and technology, among other things); (b) its market power, for example through branding 
and customer loyalty; (c) its capacity to respond effectively to competitors, including to 
potential substitutes for its products; (d) its capability and flexibility to respond to changing 
circumstances,  for  example  in  the  availability  of  key  resources,  capacity  for  process 
and product innovation; (e) its capability to create new market niches; (f) the business 
environment which conditions its performance, such as the process of business licensing 
that controls ease of entry (see, for example, Freeman 2008); (g) the policy and regulatory 
environment, for example tax policy, competition laws and export/import procedures; and 
(h) supporting services provided by both public and private organizations, for example 
15   In  this  context,  non-price  competitiveness  is  potentially  more  important  in  the  long  run  than  price 
competitiveness. It allows an enterprise to shift the demand curve for its products and services outward, 
instead of simply moving the demand curve down through lower costs and prices (ADB 2003).
Source:   M.  Porter,  M.  Delgado,  C.  Ketels,  and  S.  Stern,  “Moving  to  a  New  Global  Competitiveness 
Index”, in Michael E. Porter and Klaus Schwab, eds., Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009 
(Geneva, World Economic Forum, 2008), figures 1 and 2, p. 45.
























the quality of physical infrastructure and logistics systems, and both general and specific 
skill-related education services. 
2.2.2. Competitiveness and exports
Traditionally, performance on international markets, or export competitiveness, is 
often taken as the key indicator of competitiveness. Export performance is seen to reflect 
the ability of domestic enterprises to compete on international markets as measured in 
terms of the scale of exports, relative prices commanded by domestic firms, diversification 
of exports, and the (changing) technology and skill content of exported products and 
services. The rationale for exports as the key indicator of competitiveness includes:
•  Export  price  and  demand  is  perceived  as  less  influenced  by  Government 
policies, and therefore may be a more appropriate reflection of actual enterprise 
competitive performance;
•  Exports provide key information essential for the competitiveness of enterprises 
(and therefore economies), for example on technology, on market demand and 
on leading competitors in the industry;
•  Exports allow for scale economies, which can be a critical factor in enterprise 
competitiveness. 
The global environment is changing in fundamental ways—including the very nature 
of exports. This has important implications for the competitive performance of enterprises 
in general, and SMEs in particular, in both domestic and international markets. It is a world 
characterized by policy liberalization, accelerating technological change, more intense 
and diversified market demands, and increasing mobility of capital, all leading to a more 
complex and demanding competitive environment at home and abroad. Traditional modes 
of competition based on low costs and prices are no longer sufficient for sustained success, 
as global production is characterized by large shifts in location, patterns of comparative 
advantage, and in the structure of global industries. The new competition in a widening 
range of product markets is more intensive and is waged over a wider range of factors, in 
both export and domestic markets. Price continues to be important, but competition and 
the prospects of firms are increasingly driven by factors such as: (a) the capacity to meet a 
variety of stringent global product and process standards; (b) flexibility and innovation; (c) 
design and differentiation; (d) reliability and timeliness; and (e) networking—the capacity 
to collaborate and/or form strategic alliances and partnerships with both similar firms and 
vertically linked enterprises. 
The  basic  competitive  challenge  to Asia-Pacific  SMEs  in  the  emerging  global 
environment is how to participate in global markets in a way that leads to sustained income 
growth. This is a twofold challenge: (a) Can SMEs participate effectively in production 
for regional and global markets, as well as in their home markets?; and (b) Can they 
achieve sustained income growth by upgrading over time through product and process 
innovation that increases pricing power and value creation? A related third challenge is: 
If domestic SMEs cannot or choose not to access international markets, is the emerging 
global environment changing the way they have to do business at home? Before looking 
more closely at the changing global environment and its implications for the competitive 
performance of Asia-Pacific SMEs, it is useful to touch briefly on the traditional constraints 
on SME competitive performance.41
2.2.3.  Traditional constraints on the competitiveness of Asia-Pacific SMEs: 
an overview
The  competitive  performance  of  Asia-Pacific  SMEs  has  been  constrained 
by a range of well-known and studied factors (see, for example, Asasen, Asasen and 
Chuangcham 2003; Beck 2007; Harvie and Lee 2003; Ferranti and Ody 2007; Goh 2007; 
Lall 2000a). They include the following:
•  Small firms are generally faced with higher costs in purchasing inputs such as 
equipment, raw materials, finance and business services. Smaller enterprises 
do not have the scale and/or bargaining power of larger firms;
•  SMEs are characterized by limited managerial capacity and skills in areas such 
as operations management, accounting, financial management, marketing and 
strategy;
•  Small firms are constrained by their ability to obtain information on potential 
markets and buyers. ICT can, in principle, loosen these constraints. However, 
Internet and e-commerce use among Asia-Pacific SMEs is generally lagging 
behind larger enterprises because of factors such as high set-up costs, lack of 
adequate infrastructure, and scarcity of ICT skills;
•  SMEs are limited in their capabilities to respond to market opportunities in 
terms of meeting demands for large volumes, standards and certification, and 
regularity of supply. For example, the transaction costs of large buyers in dealing 
with many SMEs are very high, limiting their interest in sourcing from many 
individual small firms; while SMEs find it difficult to meet the requirements and 
costs of certification necessary for the standards demanded by such buyers;
•  SMEs are faced with constraints in accessing factors and support services such 
as training and skill development, market intelligence, logistics, technology and 
financing. For example, with respect to human resource needs, basic education 
and in-firm training is no longer sufficient, as the emerging competitive setting 
requires  increasingly  higher  levels  of  specialized  training.  Constraints  on 
accessing financing are particularly important, limiting the capacity of small 
firms to invest in upgrading their skills and capabilities, to grow, and, more 
fundamentally, to meet the working capital needs necessary to carry on their 
day-to-day operations; 
•  Regulatory and policy environments often impose limitations and high fixed 
costs on SMEs. In comparison with larger firms, they generally demand a higher 
proportion of a small enterprise’s resources on a continuing basis—including 
management  time—for  learning  rules  and  regulations,  and  for  modifying 
operations for compliance with such regulatory requirements. 
These traditional constraints on the competitive performance of Asia-Pacific SMEs 
generally become even more pronounced (sometimes in modified form) in the context 
of  the  challenges  of  globalization,  which,  in  turn,  also  poses  new  challenges  for  the 
competitiveness of enterprises.42
2.3. Competing in a changing global economy
2.3.1.Drivers of a changing global economy
Globalization is the product of political, economic, and technological forces that 
have accelerated since the early 1980s. The focus here is on the nature and effects 
of globalization involving changes in the organization and location of the production of 
goods and tradable services. From this perspective, globalization is transforming the 
nature and location of international production, trade and investment (see, for example, 
Baldwin 2006a, Dicken 2007, and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2006). In the process, 
it is changing the competitive environment for business in general, and for Asia-Pacific 
SMEs in particular, bringing significant new opportunities, as well as increasingly intense 
competition and new challenges. The key drivers of (economic) globalization include the 
following:
•  Policy  liberalization,  which  is:  (a)  reducing  import,  export  and  investment 
constraints; (b) providing new options for the geographic location of production; 
and (c) integrating and expanding fragmented markets for both intermediate and 
final products, and in the process is creating regional and global opportunities 
for firms, including SMEs; 
•  Accelerating  technological  change,  which,  in  areas  such  as  transport, 
telecommunications  and  information  technology,  supported  by  managerial 
innovation for coordination: (a) lowers costs; (b) reduces distance and time; 
(c) extends the reach of firms; and (d) allows the simultaneous fragmentation, 
geographic dispersion and coordination of production;
•  Increasing mobility of capital, which is diversifying options for competitive local 
producers. Foreign direct investment is taking advantage of cross-border factor 
cost differences and local supplies of technology and skilled personnel; it is 
also providing new opportunities for domestic SME suppliers. At the same 
time, increasing portfolio capital flows can loosen constraints on financing for 
potentially competitive domestic enterprises;16
•  Demands  of  increasing  competition,  which  are  creating  simultaneous 
pressures for lower cost, higher quality, shorter delivery time and wider choice, 
thus changing the structure of industries. In some cases, this is leading to 
increasing consolidation for competitive scale (for example in semi-conductors 
and  pharmaceuticals),  and,  in  many  other  cases,  to  greater  fragmentation 
and  geographic  diffusion  of  production  (for  example  in  electronics/ICT).  In 
an  increasingly  fragmented  global  production  environment,  competition  is 
becoming less restricted to individual enterprises, and more observable between 
networks of linked firms that include SMEs as key suppliers (for example Nokia 
+ its network of suppliers vs. Motorola + its networks of suppliers).
16   The risks of the increasing mobility of capital and integration of capital markets is well understood in 
an Asia that still vividly remembers the experience of the “Asian Crisis” of the late 1990s, and that is 
presently experiencing the on-going global financial crisis triggered by the subprime problem in the 
United States, which has significantly constrained the availability of global credit. 43
As a consequence of these broad drivers of change, the number of products 
and  tradable  services  that  are  conceived,  manufactured  and  consumed  entirely  in 
one country—or in one enterprise—is rapidly  shrinking.  Globalization is reducing  the 
dominance of any single location in the production process. International production is 
increasingly organized in the form of global value chains (GVCs) and related international 
production networks (IPNs) that together present new forms of integration into the global 
economy for enterprises and economies.17
2.3.2.  Globalization of production: selected issues18
Organization  of  international  production.  Global  value  chains  and  associated 
production  networks  are  emerging  as  the  organizing  framework  for  production, 
investment, and trade in an expanding range of product groups, such as garments, agro-
industry,  furniture,  automobiles/auto  parts,  consumer  electronics,  telecommunications 
and ICT, as well as services (see UNCTAD 2002). This has resulted in increased task- 
and/or product-related specialization by firms in the production of goods and services, 
and  a  corresponding  acceleration  of  growth  in  intra-industry  and  intra-product  trade, 
as compared with traditional trade in final products. However, it should be noted that, 
while specialized and fragmented production (integrated through global value chains and 
production networks) is a key dynamic driving the evolution of international business, 
there are firms that compete effectively on global product markets with widely different 
organizational strategies, retaining a range of activities in-house and/or onshore.19 
Opportunities  for  SMEs.  The  trend,  however,  has  been  toward  the  GVC/IPN 
framework  for  organizing  international  production. Although  many  MNEs  continue  to 
provide  a  variety  of  products  and  services  on  global  markets,  they  now  increasingly 
purchase inputs and components from smaller companies (SMEs) in widely dispersed 
locations that serve particular industry niches. Global export markets increasingly involve 
exports of parts, components and services within the framework of GVCs and associated 
production networks. In this context, many companies, particularly smaller enterprises, 
are finding that success and “creating value” may be achieved through specialization in a 
limited set of activities, outputs and market niches. For example, even simple components 
such as radiator caps can be produced for regional and global markets by a supplier in the 
production networks of Toyota or Ford Motor Company. Specialized niche markets, such 
as organic fruit and vegetables, can be regional and even global in nature through access 
to global retailers such as Carrefour or Tesco. Two dimensions of particular importance 
to SMEs in the context of GVCs/IPNs relate to the key role of global standards and the 
emergence of new types of enterprises for organizing global production. 
Role  of  standards.  Product  and  process  standards  are  increasingly  shaping 
production,  especially  within  the  framework  of  global  value  chains. There  is  growing 
pressure in key markets, such as the United States and European Union, for global 
producers to adjust their operations to reflect not only profitability, but also social and 
environmental objectives (corporate social responsibility requirements, for example). In 
addition, within the framework of GVCs, standards play the key role in ensuring product 
17   See Abonyi (2007) for an introduction, discussion and examples of the concepts of global value chains 
and related international production networks.
18   Based on Abonyi (2007).
19   Examples include Intel in ICT/electronics, and Zara in apparel/garments.44
and process consistency and reliability along the chain (figure 3). Therefore, producers 
wishing to participate within GVCs increasingly have to meet the stringent requirements of a 
growing multiplicity of standards in a wide range of industries (wood furniture, automobiles 
and electronics, among others). Meeting a multiplicity of strict global standards is of 
particular challenge to SMEs, given their general constraints. Examples of the diversity 
of standards include: (a) internationally agreed standards, such as ISO 9000 (quality), 
ISO 14000 (environment), SA 8000 (labour) and G3 for cellular phones; (b) industry-
specific standards, such as phytosanitary standards and hazard analysis and critical point 
in the food industry; (c) region-specific standards, such as QS 9000 (quality in autos 
originating in the United States); and (d) firm-specific standards, supporting brand names 
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Figure 3.  Food safety and quality standards in the global value chains for fresh 
fruit and vegetables 
Emergence  of  global  suppliers.  Lead  firms  in  a  growing  number  of  industries 
are becoming increasingly reliant on global suppliers, often based close to home but 
supported by subcontractors globally, to organize international production. This spreads 
the risks and lowers the costs of doing business for lead firms. Global suppliers, in turn, 
are reorganizing networks within value chains, redefining the role and relationships of 
lower-level suppliers/producers further back in the chain. In this context, lead firms and 
their  supporting  global  suppliers  are  increasingly  looking  for  firms  that  already  have 
the requisite production capabilities, not firms that need to be brought up to required 
standards—posing new challenges to both enterprises and governments in the Asia-
Pacific region. This reorganization of networks, although most pronounced in electronics 
and  automotives,  is  becoming  a  factor  in  an  increasingly  wider  range  of  industries. 
Examples of global suppliers include Flextronics International in electronics/ICT and Li 45
& Fung in apparel/garments. As a consequence, global suppliers are emerging as key 
global investors, with significant influence on the export competitiveness of host countries 
and  on  the  fortunes  of  SMEs,  as  reflected  in  the  Flextronics  investment  in  a  major 
industrial park in Chennai, India. These global suppliers, whose core strategic function 
includes integrating production across borders, are looking for domestic suppliers with 
internationally  competitive  capabilities,  as  well  as  support  systems  that  facilitate  the 
smooth, continuous exchange of parts and components (well developed logistics systems 
and efficient import/export procedures, for example).
Central role of trade facilitation in the global supplier system. Within the framework 
of global value chains, a central challenge of integrating production involves shipping 
products, particularly parts and components, among geographically distributed production 
sites. Ensuring the ease of the import and export of products and services in the context 
of particular global value chains and networks is of critical importance for the competitive 
performance of domestic enterprises in individual economies. This is particularly important 
for SMEs as existing and/or potential suppliers within the framework of global value chains 
and production networks. This relates to the efficiency and effectiveness of a country’s 
logistics systems and its import/export procedures in the context of specific value chains 
where domestic enterprises are active. Returning to the Doing Business 2009 survey, one 
of its 10 components ranks countries on the procedural requirements for export and import 
standard goods, in terms of: (a) the number of documents required; (b) the time required; 
and (c) the cost entailed. Table 14 shows the results for the Asian-Pacific economies 
included in the survey.
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the Pacific
6.7 23.3 902 7.1 24.5 948.5
Average for 
South Asia
8.5 33.0 1 339 9.0 32.5 1 487.3
Afghanistan 12 74 3 000 11 77 2 600
Australia 6 9 1 200 6 12 1 239
Azerbaijan 9 48 3 075 14 56 3 420
Bangladesh 6 28 970 8 32 1 375
Bhutan 8 38 1 210 11 38 2 140
Brunei 6 28 630 6 19 708
Cambodia 11 22 732 11 30 872
China 7 21 460 6 24 545
Fiji 13 24 654 13 24 630
Hong Kong, 
China
4 6 625 4 5 63346
India 8 17 945 9 20 960
Indonesia 5 21 704 6 27 660
Japan 4 10 989 5 11 1 047
Kazakhstan 11 89 3 005 13 76 3 055
Kiribati 6 21 1 070 7 21 1 070




9 50 1 860 10 50 2 040
Malaysia 7 18 450 7 14 450
Maldives 8 21 1 348 9 20 1 348
Marshall 
Islands




3 30 1 255 6 30 1 255
Mongolia 8 49 2 131 8 49 2 274
Nepal 9 41 1 764 10 35 1 900
New Zealand 7 10 868 5 9 850
Pakistan 9 24 611 8 18 680
Palau 6 29 1 170 10 33 1 132
Papua New 
Guinea
7 26 664 9 29 722
Philippines 8 16 816 8 16 819
Republic of 
Korea
4 8 767 6 8 747
Samoa 7 27 820 7 31 848
Singapore 4 5 456 4 3 439
Solomon 
Islands
7 24 1 011 4 21 1 194
Sri Lanka 8 21 865 6 20 895
Taiwan 
Province of  
China
7 13 757 7 12 769
Tajikistan 10 82 3 150 10 83 4 550
Thailand 4 14 625 3 13 795
Timor-Leste 6 25 1 010 7 26 1 015
Uzbekistan 7 80 3 100 11 104 4 600
Vanuatu 7 26 1 497 9 30 1 392
Viet Nam 6 24 734 8 23 901
Source:   World Bank, Doing Business 2009 (Washington D.C., 2009).  47
These country figures are quite striking in their diversity, but the basic message in 
the context of this paper is clear. A SME operating in a country that takes more than 10 times 
longer than another country to go through the regulatory steps to export a single container 
is at a substantial disadvantage when serving international customers. This is true for a 
wide range of industries, from garments to electronics/ICT, where the anticipated delivery 
cycles have become remarkably short, delays are not readily tolerated, and the ability to 
meet tight deadlines is a key determinant in attracting (and retaining) customers. 
Similarly, an SME is at a clear competitive disadvantage if it operates in a country 
where the cost to export a single container is eight times higher than it is than another 
country. Typically, that additional cost will have to be absorbed by the SME, in a lower 
price per item, to mitigate the additional shipping costs incurred, if at all possible.20 That 
in turn lessens considerably the profit margin and potentially the viability of the enterprise. 
Even for an SME that does not export its output, but relies on imported inputs, higher 
shipping costs will lower the threshold of profitability. 
Furthermore, multinational enterprises contemplating where to invest in a new 
plant (Flextronics in electronics/ICT, for example), or from where to source (Li & Fung in 
apparel and garments, for example) will also consider these trade costs and time issues 
when seeking supplier locations. Thus, for SMEs in the host country aspiring to establish 
business linkages with foreign-invested projects in the context of expanding domestic 
markets, the cost and time of exporting and importing can have an impact, even if their 
own businesses entail absolutely no external trading activity. Put another way, pro-SME 
efforts expended in this field will have a positive impact far beyond SMEs alone, and can 
even help in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows.
One  indicative  example  is  that  of  Intel  in  Viet  Nam.  Intel,  a  specialized  and 
important global supplier in the electronics/ICT industry, manufactures and ships parts 
and components globally from geographically distributed locations. It recently decided 
to build a $1 billion chip-assembly plant near Ho Chi Minh City. Upon completion, the 
chip plant will undoubtedly wish to locally source a number of inputs—both products and 
services—from Vietnamese companies. 
Intel’s decision to locate its newest Asian chip plant in Viet Nam was taken despite 
the  fact  that  the  country’s  port  infrastructure  is  becoming  heavily  congested. This  is 
because, fortunately for Intel (and Viet Nam), the wafers that the plant will process can 
be imported by air, and not by sea. Nonetheless, Intel cannot afford to face delays with 
shipping, given the time sensitivities of its own clients. As a result, it has embarked on a 
project to assist the customs authority of Viet Nam to introduce an e-customs platform, 
operating  24  hours  a  day,  seven  days  a  week.  This  e-customs  initiative  is  possible 
because: (a) Intel’s investment is so large that technical assistance of this kind is a 
viable proposition; and (b) the host country Government was willing to make additional 
commitments in order to attract Intel’s $1 billion investment. However, this is not true of 
20   The case of IKEA is a good example of this issue. Principally based in Europe, IKEA sources products 
for its stores from around the globe, and has offices located in numerous countries to fulfil this sourcing 
function. In cases where two IKEA sourcing offices in different countries are both able to contract a 
respective local firm to produce a particular item of similar quality, then the main determining factor is 
price. But it is not the price of the item in the country of manufacture, but the price on arrival in Europe, 
including shipping costs, that matters. So, if an SME in country A can ship the item to Europe for less 
than an SME in country B, simply due to lower container or port costs, for example, then the SME in 
country B has no choice but to provide the same item at a lower price, to offset the higher shipping costs 
it faces.48
most foreign-invested projects, which tend to be smaller in scale and less high profile in 
nature. Thus, the combination of congested ports and unreliable customs procedures 
could well prompt a potential investor to select a different country to host a new plant. 
If this had happened in the case of Intel and Viet Nam, one can only speculate on the 
significance of the loss for some Vietnamese SMEs, in terms of a lost opportunity to 
establish linkages with and learn from a leading global technology company.
As the international production system evolves, the key role of GVCs and IPNs in a 
growing number of industries provides an increasingly effective mechanism for Asia-Pacific 
SMEs to access global and regional markets as suppliers within global value chains and 
associated networks. The globalization of production therefore offers Asia-Pacific SMEs 
new opportunities for internationalization beyond the traditional export of final goods. 
These enterprises can be suppliers to MNEs outside their home countries as exporters 
of parts and components, and they can also be domestic suppliers to exporting MNEs in 
the domestic market—provided they meet the required global standards. However Asia-
Pacific SMEs choose to participate in such value chains and networks, they must be able 
to deliver a specified product, in the right quantity, with the required quality, at the right 
time and meet an expanding range of increasingly stringent global market standards, 
for example on labour conditions and the environment. The payoffs from participating in 
GVCs and IPNs can be potentially high for SMEs, but generally so are the requirements 
for entry.
2.3.3.  Impact of the globalization of production on East Asian enterprises21
The impact of the globalization of production in Asia and the Pacific has been most 
pronounced to date in East Asia (including, as used here, South-East Asia).22 Expanding 
trade between East Asia and the rest of the world has reflected the region’s growing 
importance in the global trading system. East Asia’s share of world trade has increased 
from about 10 per cent in the 1970s to more than 25 per cent in 2006, overtaking the 
North American Free Trade Agreement’s share of about 20 per cent (though still lagging 
the European Union’s share of around a third of world trade). This interregional trade 
is dominated by final goods, primarily for key markets such as the United States and 
the European Union. However, the region’s demand for its final products is expected to 
continue to expand in the future, as there is an increasing focus on domestic consumers 
and markets.
Market-driven trade and investment integration has moved forward in East Asia 
without  formal  intergovernmental  or  region-wide  agreements;  it  has,  however,  been 
facilitated by (mostly ad hoc) policy liberalization. Intraregional trade has expanded as 
a share of the region’s total trade, increasing from about 35 per cent in 1980 to over 
55 per cent by 2006.23 This is driven by the growth of intra-industry trade in parts and 
components; the share of which in total regional trade is estimated to have increased 
from 55 per cent in 1990 to 78 per cent by 2005. Export profiles of countries increasingly 
match import profiles of other economies in the region, reflecting growing production 
complementarity and integration. Supporting trade expansion and integration, FDI to East 
21   See Abonyi (2008) for a discussion of the integration of East Asian production in the more general 
context of Asian integration and cooperation.
22   There are also significant links to global value chains from suppliers in other parts of Asia and the 
Pacific, for example, garment producers in Bangladesh; sports equipment and surgical instruments 
from Pakistan (Sialkot); and particularly business services from India. However, as a subregion, the 
participation and integration of East (South-East) Asian producers has been the most pronounced and 
advanced to date.
23   See IMF (2007) and ADB (2007).49
Asia has expanded even faster, from 7 per cent of total world FDI inflows in 1980 to 
13 per cent in 2006; with outflows also increasing to 12 per cent of world total outflows 
(up from 5 per cent) over this same period (UNCTAD 2008). Much of the FDI flows 
are intraregional, for example from Japan and newly industrialized economies to the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, as well as intra-ASEAN and 
from ASEAN to China; this further strengthens the regional economic integration process. 
The result is an increasingly integrated East Asian economy of expanding intraregional 
trade dominated by parts and components, feeding growing interregional trade of final 
goods with markets in North America and the European Union. 
Table 15.  Expansion of intra-East Asian trade, 1990-2005: the example of machinery 
and machine parts 
(Percentage)
Exports






growth from to 1990 2005 1990 2005 1990 2005
China ASEAN4a 5 13 3 038 3 9 3 145 4 11 861
NIEs3b 88 64 789 94 69 581 75 60 218
Japan 7 24 3 817 4 22 5 586 21 29 444
East Asia 100 100 1 122 100 100 829 100 100 294
ASEAN4 China 0 13 33 
332
1 16 16 
530
4 15 1 133
ASEAN4 8 18 1 743 9 19 1 560 8 19 640
NIEs3 69 49 461 68 38 368 39 39 223
Japan 24 21 589 22 27 906 49 28 83
East Asia 100 100 688 100 100 730 100 100 224
NIES3 China 32 54 1 457 30 43 566 30 50 622
ASEAN4 28 20 544 26 23 318 25 22 276
NIEs3 21 17 641 25 18 240 18 15 284
Japan 19 9 325 19 16 315 27 12 99
East Asia 100 100 812 100 100 373 100 100 335
Japan China 5 34 2 230 8 32 482 9 34 868
ASEAN4 35 26 141 33 21 -6 32 23 78
NIEs3 60 40 121 59 47 20 59 43 81
East Asia 100 100 229 100 100 48 100 100 150
East Asia  East Asia 100 100 541 100 100 323 100 100 251
Source:   M. Ando and F. Kimura, “Fragmentation in East Asia: Further Evidence” (January 2007), p. 32.
Abbreviations: ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations; NIEs, newly industrialized economies. 
a Refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.
b Refers to Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China.50
China plays a central role in global triangular trade and related regional integration. 
It imports intermediate products, mostly from other East Asian economies, and assembles 
and then exports final goods to global markets (figure 4). To date, the domestic value 
added in China to manufactured exports has been a relatively modest share, estimated 
as averaging around 20 per cent,24 though it is expected to rise over time. As a result, 
China runs a trade deficit with East Asia and a surplus with the United States. This reflects 
complementarity between the globally oriented assembly industries in China, and the 
country’s East Asian suppliers of parts and intermediate products. Labels on many of 
China’s manufactured exports should read as “Made in East Asia”, in order to reflect more 
accurately their true origins and the related regional production integration process. 
There are indications of increasing sophistication in the domestic manufacturing 
industry of China and a corresponding slowing of imported components, but the extent 
and implications of this trend are not yet clear.25 This dynamic is also an indication of 
China as both an opportunity and a challenge to the economies of the region. While China 
has been an opportunity for potentially competitive Asia-Pacific SMEs in some industries, 
both in terms of the integration of regional production and its expanding domestic market, 
the country has also presented an important competitive challenge, particularly in labour 
intensive industries. The “China challenge”, particularly in terms of pricing, has forced 
enterprises in the region to improve their productivity and performance, or to establish 
a China presence. As China begins to “move up the value chain”, so will the China 
challenge. However, there are also indications that emerging constraints in the Chinese 
economy in areas such as labour as well as product and process quality are providing 
new opportunities for competitive enterprises in the Asia-Pacific region at both the “higher 
end” of the value chain and in traditional labour-intensive activities.26 
24   See, for example, Lau and others (2006) and Koopman, Wang and Shang-jin (2008).
25  See, for example, Li Cui and Syed (2007).
26   See, for example, Gaulier, Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci (2005) and Athukorala (2007).
Source:   Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2007 (Manila, 2007).
a European Union, Japan and the United States of America.
Figure 4.  Correlation between growth in exports from China to major developed 
countries and imports from East Asia to China
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MNEs  from  outside  the  region,  such  as Apple,  Cisco  Systems,  Dell,  Hewlett-
Packard  Co.  and  Levi  Strauss  &  Co.,  have  been  key  participants  (direct/indirect)  in 
and beneficiaries of the regional production integration process. For example, MNEs 
accounted for close to 60 per cent of total exports from China in 2005, thus playing a 
central role in connecting East Asia’s increasingly integrated production system to global 
markets (ADB 2007). These MNEs, along with Asia-based large enterprises such as Acer, 
Lenovo, Li & Fung and Hon Hai Precision Industry, are using local SMEs as key suppliers. 
This is particularly pronounced in industries such as electronics/ICT, apparel/garments, 
autos/auto parts, and agro-industry. Therefore regional production integration, driven by 
the globalization of production, is providing expanding opportunities for Asian suppliers 
at all levels to access international markets. (For a discussion of regional enterprise and 
production integration, see Ando and Kimura 2007 and ADB 2007).
2.4. Implications for the prospects of Asia-Pacific SMEs
The globalization of production and the related production integration in (East) 
Asia have important implications for the growth prospects and competitive performance 
of Asia-Pacific SMEs. On the one hand, by facilitating linkages with foreign buyers and 
large MNEs—from within and outside the region—the forces of globalization loosen the 
constraints of domestic economies and markets, and provide local SMEs potential access 
to globally distributed assets, including information, technology, skills, capital and markets. 
On the other hand, globalization also brings about more intense competition in home 
markets from imports, new foreign investors, and expanding large domestic enterprises. 
The globalization of production seems to affect SMEs in three ways, according to 
studies by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) of SME 
adjustment to globalization in 18 OECD and 8 East Asian countries (OECD 2007 and 
1997, see also Goh 2007):27 
•  For a relatively small group that already have near internationally competitive 
capabilities (estimated by OECD at around 5 to 10 per cent of SMEs in the 
sample countries), globalization opens new opportunities to access international 
markets through linkages with foreign buyers, or as suppliers to MNEs;
•  For  a  larger  group  (estimated  by  OECD  at  25  to  50  per  cent  of  SMEs), 
globalization poses challenges at home. SMEs that are potentially competitive 
in terms of the capability to meet international standards are likely to be forced 
into export-oriented production (as suppliers to MNEs, for example) or will have 
to upgrade their capabilities to remain competitive at in the domestic market. 
Lagging SMEs in this group will not remain viable without significant upgrading 
in products, production processes and management capabilities;
•  For the remaining SMEs (about 40 per cent of the total) that are in traditional 
activities, particularly small-scale services, with relatively simple technology 
serving small, local markets, the pressures of the globalization of production 
are  less  immediate  and  urgent;  they  may  be  relatively  insulated  from  the 
opportunities and threats of globalization. However, although less urgent, the 
27   As Wignaraja (2003) notes, there are no comprehensive cross-country studies of this type available on 
the effects of globalization on SMEs in developing countries, and very few such studies on individual 
countries, including in Asia and the Pacific.52
competitive pressures are not necessarily absent for such firms. For example, 
the entry of global retailers such as Carrefour, Tesco and, increasingly, Wal-Mart 
into domestic markets in Asia and the Pacific is changing fundamentally the 
local competitive environment of small, locally oriented producers and retailers, 
as reflected in the case of Thailand. These enterprises are then forced to find a 
viable competitive strategy in this radically new environment, or face going out 
of business. It is not clear how far or how deep the winds of global change will 
sweep the traditional SMEs of the region.
The proportion of SMEs in the above three categories will vary depending on the 
level of development of specific economies in the Asia-Pacific region and the capabilities 
of their respective SMEs. In the more developed economies of East and South-East Asia 
that have a generally good base of SMEs with the potential to become internationally 
competitive, the pattern of adjustment can be expected to be similar to the above, for 
example in terms of the proportion of SMEs in the first two categories. The less developed 
and lagging economies of South-East Asia (such as Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam), Central Asia, South Asia and the Pacific are likely 
to have a smaller proportion of such SMEs that can take advantage of the new product 
market opportunities offered by the globalization of production. Therefore they are likely 
to have a correspondingly larger group of SMEs at risk from the increased competition 
resulting from globalization that requires significant upgrading, as well as a larger group 
of SMEs that may be relatively insulated from the effects globalization.
This leads to the central question: What factors are likely to increase the prospect 
of Asia-Pacific SMEs participating in the globalization of production in a way that leads 
to sustained income growth? That is, how can Asia-Pacific enterprises in the first and 
second categories identified by the OECD study—particularly the second—transcend 
the constraints of weak productivity and confinement to local markets? And what are the 
corresponding implications for government and public policy, and for international donors? 
Before considering these questions, it is important to examine not only the opportunities, 
but also the risks of the participation of Asia-Pacific SMEs in global production systems.
2.4.1. Potential risks and constraints for Asia-Pacific SME suppliers
To be a supplier to or an affiliate of an MNE can be a significant challenge for a 
local SME. To qualify as a subcontractor, a local supplier generally has to meet tough 
business standards and make potentially large up front investments to get its production 
process and products ready. Significant retooling of a company’s assets and workforce is 
generally required, and in order to do this, some cash-flow commitments are inevitable. 
Up-front investments can be highly specific to the product requirements of the 
MNE and, as such, could be financially risky for the investing firm if subsequent purchase 
orders or contracts are not forthcoming. The specificity of upfront investment may place 
the  local  SME  supplier  in  a  “lock-in”  position  to  a  particular  international  buyer,  and 
therefore potentially in a significantly disadvantaged negotiating position. The higher the 
specificity or the more specialized the investment, the greater the scope for the MNE 
buyer to renegotiate the contract for a better deal. Multiple sourcing opportunities of the 
MNE can further exacerbate this lock-in problem as the MNE can easily turn to alternative 
local suppliers who have also invested in specialized assets upfront and may be ready 
and willing to fulfil supply contracts at more competitive terms. 53
In  comparison  with  larger  domestic  suppliers,  local  SMEs,  as  noted,  may  not 
have: (a) the requisite cash-flows and/or the access to financing for the needed upfront 
investment; (b) the availability of a skilled, educated and trained workforce; or (c) the 
negotiating proficiency of larger suppliers when dealing with MNEs. Furthermore, larger 
domestic enterprises with significant scale economies may be able to offer lower prices 
than SMEs for the same quality, reliability and standards. Such economies would exist 
where the product to be supplied is standardized and more generic. Advantages of scale 
economies are less likely where products involved are more idiosyncratic and the size of 
delivery more limited.
To obtain a supply license or contract, firms must adhere to a new set of rules or 
codes of conduct—the global standards noted earlier. As recent examples in the toy and 
food industries have shown, significant attention is being placed on the traceability and 
the social and ethical provision of inputs and services. As noted, MNE-designated and 
potential suppliers must comply with a wider range of new and more restrictive standards. 
It is likely to be relatively more costly for smaller firms to put in place the required capabilities 
and receive “the good housekeeping seal of approval” from international buyers. Larger 
suppliers may be able to better manage this large fixed cost of doing business with MNEs 
as they can better realize scale economies. 
While improving the capacity to meet global standards and the corresponding 
upgrading of the delivery codes of SME suppliers could result in a pool of more competitive 
global suppliers in the longer run, a more immediate effect of this additional challenge to 
supplying MNEs is that it could cause a skewing of supply opportunities against SMEs. 
Ultimately, the ability to become a designated supplier and participant in the MNE global 
value chain depends on the capacity of indigenous SMEs to overcome the constraints of 
smallness and newness. 
At the same time, there are now indications that the offshoring activities of United 
States, European and even Japanese multinationals may be scaled back. Soaring oil 
prices, currency depreciation and rising wages are some of the reasons why multinational 
executives are rethinking their offshore activities. According to a recent analysis (Goel, 
Moussavi and Srivatsan 2008, 1) of a recent McKinsey Quarterly study:
The production of high-tech goods has moved steadily from the United States to 
Asia over the last decade. The reason is familiar: lower wages, a stable global 
economy, and rapidly growing local markets. These factors combined to make 
nations such as China and Malaysia favored manufacturing locations. In the last 
two years, however, the favorable economic winds that carried offshoring forward 
have turned turbulent. The new conditions are undermining some of the factors that 
made manufacturers of every stripe, including those in high-tech, move production 
offshore.
The  McKinsey  Quarterly  (2008)  conducted  a  series  of  interviews  with  senior 
executives of international firms on their global supply chain strategies. When asked to 
identify factors that contribute most to the setting of their global supply chain strategy, 
executives interviewed indicated that supply chain risk is rising sharply, and pointed to the 
greater complexity of products and services as the key influencing factor. Global supply 54
chain managers are now facing new complexity challenges and more turbulent economic 
conditions, which make cross-border sourcing more problematic. MNEs need to balance 
the  benefits  that  offshoring  can  offer  against  the  growing  risk  of  more  complicated 
offshoring  transactions.  The  possible  scaling  back  of  the  offshoring  of  multinationals 
could  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  prospects  for Asia-Pacific  SME  suppliers. As 
multinationals rethink their outsourcing strategies and contemplate scaling back, it is even 
more important that local SMEs become more relevant to multinationals, and be able 
to offer the kind of cost-saving and efficiency benefits that make offshoring economical. 
Domestic SMEs will need to offer clear advantages that create value for multinationals in 
order for them to be included in the production networks of MNEs. 
2.4.2. Implications of the globalization of production for SMEs: summing up
The emergence of global value chains and production networks has a number of 
important policy-related implications for the competitive performance of enterprises, in 
addition to the general competitiveness factors discussed above: 
•  Understanding  value  chains.  Global  value  chains  and  related  production 
networks require a basic change in mindset by public and private decision 
makers. Competitive performance is shaped to a significant extent by activities 
and relationships outside individual enterprises, and relates to linkages within 
particular  value  chains.  Therefore  the  traditional  focus  on  strengthening 
enterprise-level  productivity  is  not  sufficient  for  improving  the  competitive 
performance  of  firms  within  a  GVC  framework.  It  also  requires  improving 
value-chain related linkages, or “network efficiencies”, and the related policy, 
institutional and business environments. For example, a focus on GVC-related 
interfirm logistics is required, particularly as related to SMEs, as is a focus 
on  improving  import/export  procedures  for  particular  value  chain-related 
products; 
•  Opportunities—and risks—for new entrants, particularly SMEs. As noted, the 
organization of production within the framework of global value chains and 
networks allows specialization by small enterprises based on a single function 
or a few functions and/or parts and components. It also enables a focus on 
regional and even global niche markets. However, given the risks of lock-in, 
a key challenge for SMEs is to find ways to upgrade over time (for example 
through product and process innovation)28 within value chains in order to gain 
pricing power and flexibility and to add value; 
•  Opportunities  for  value  creation.  In  the  context  of  GVCs,  enterprise  core 
capabilities  in  a  given  industry’s  value  chain  are  the  key  to  competitive 
performance;  less  important  is  the  choice  of  industry  or  sector—there  are 
few  truly  “sunset/sunrise  industries”.  From  the  perspective  of  enterprises, 
particularly SMEs with their particular constraints, creating value is not restricted 
to possessing global brands or participating in high-technology industries. It 
is possible to create value and to be a competitive supplier anywhere along 
an  industry  value  chain  through  specialization  and  upgrading.  In  one  vivid 
example, suppliers of key personal computer components have higher profit 
margins than global brands such as Dell and Acer;
28   For a discussion of various options for upgrading, see Abonyi (2007).55
•  New paths to innovation. Global value chains provide a framework for creating 
globally  innovated  products,  which  allow  the  combination  of  activities  and 
technologies from diverse sources without having such capabilities in house. A 
dramatic example is the iPod, where Apple came up with the original concept 
for the product and combined the components all from outside suppliers around 
the world.29 It means that even a small firm with an innovative idea can leverage 
the resources of other firms (including other SMEs) to develop the concept and 
bring it to market;
•  Match the best—or outsource to the best. International buyers and MNEs in 
global value chains have options to source globally. Therefore, SME suppliers 
have to be able to match the performance of the best in their class in order 
to become and remain suppliers within the framework of GVCs. As stressed 
earlier,  this  requires  not  only  efficiencies  in  production  activities,  but  also 
the capability to meet a variety of stringent global standards. Meeting some 
standards will also require network efficiencies beyond the boundaries of the 
firm. For example, delivering products on time, as is essential within the GVC 
framework of integrating parts and components, is dependent on inter-firm 
logistics systems, and efficiencies in import/export procedures;
•  New types of financing needs. As noted, it is likely that SMEs aiming to become 
suppliers in GVCs will have to fund significant investments, for example, in new 
technology and skills. Given the general constraints on SME financing, this is 
an important constraint for small firms. Furthermore, participation in production 
networks has new financing implications, with potential risks for SMEs. For 
example, there has been a noticeable shift from the use of letters of credit, 
which allow bank financing of SME working capital needs to unsecured, open-
account trade finance; this shift places significant burdens and risks on smaller 
suppliers  lower  in  the  production  network.30  However,  there  is  increasing 
awareness that pushing costs and risks down the supply chain to smaller firms 
can risk the competitive performance of the network as a whole;31
•  Competition  among  networks—not  only  enterprises. As  noted,  competition 
within the framework of global value chains occurs, to a large extent, among 
networks of firms. For example, in the automotive industry it is not just Toyota 
that competes with Ford, but Toyota and its supplier network that competes 
with Ford and its supplier network; similarly, it is Nike and its suppliers that 
compete against Reebok and Adidas and their respective suppliers. It is in this 
context that competitiveness is a function of inter-firm or network efficiency, 
and not only individual enterprise productivity and performance. The network is 
only as competitive as its weakest link—and its weakest (inter-firm) linkages.
The  underlying  trend  of  the  globalization  of  production  is  changing  the  basic 
prospects for the competitiveness of Asia-Pacific SMEs on international and domestic 
product markets. For SMEs that are in traditional activities, and that use relatively simple 
technology, operate with low levels of skills and serve relatively stable and small, localized 
markets, the opportunities and threats of globalization may be less urgent and pronounced. 
For  those  SMEs  that  are  already  at  near-internationally  competitive  capabilities  and 
29   See Linden, Kraemer and Dedrick (2007). 
30   See, for example, Aron (2007).
31   See, for example, Global Business Intelligence (2007).56
are  active  in  export-related  markets,  the  challenges  of  globalization  pose  both  new 
opportunities and threats, as they must adjust their capabilities and performance to remain 
internationally  competitive  in  an  increasingly  complex  and  demanding  environment. 
Perhaps facing the biggest challenge—and opportunity—is a middle group of Asia-Pacific 
SMEs, at present active primarily in their home markets but that have the potential to be 
competitive on a larger scale. The globalization of production is likely to force these small 
firms to change in order to remain viable, either because of pressures to undertake export-
oriented production (for example as suppliers to MNEs), or to face new foreign competitive 
entrants into their home markets. Either way, the competitive prospects of these SMEs 
will hinge on their abilities to upgrade their performance—in production process, products, 
and management capabilities—to meet international standards. Although competitiveness 
is  fundamentally  an  enterprise-level  concept,  this  poses  new  challenges  collectively 
to enterprises, governments and donors. The importance of this issue is increasingly 
recognized by the countries of the region, as reflected in the comprehensive institutional 
frameworks to support SMEs in the Philippines and Thailand (figures 5 and 6).
Figure 5.  Institutional support for the development of small and medium-sized 
enterprises: the Philippines
Source:   Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Promoting SMEs for development”, 
background document for the Second OECD Conference of Ministers Responsible for Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) on Promoting Entrepreneurship and Innovative SMEs in a 
Global Economy: Towards a More Responsible and Inclusive Globalisation, Istanbul, 3-5 June 
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Figure 6.  Institutional support for the development of small and medium-sized 
enterprises: Thailand
Source:   Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Promoting SMEs for development”, 
background document for the Second OECD Conference of Ministers Responsible for Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) on Promoting Entrepreneurship and Innovative SMEs in a 
Global Economy: Towards a More Responsible and Inclusive Globalisation,, Istanbul, 3-5 June 
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SESFOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI), GLOBAL SOURCING 
AND INDUSTRIAL LINKAGES
As discussed in Section 2, the globalization of production is creating potentially 
important competitive opportunities and challenges for Asia-Pacific SMEs as suppliers 
and competitors within the framework of global value chains. It is useful to consider this 
issue within the more general context of trends in FDI and global sourcing, and their 
implications for industrial linkages involving SMEs. 
Over  the  last  two  decades,  the  use  of  external  outsourcing  has  become  an 
important  strategic  issue,  with  increasing  recognition  of  the  benefits  that  effective 
outsourcing and international production strategies can provide. In the never-ending quest 
for greater efficiency and cost savings, many companies have decided to source parts 
and components from low-cost suppliers globally, and in many instances have transferred 
certain segments of or the entire production process to new locations overseas.  Indeed, 
international procurement and novel offshore integrated production arrangements have 
become critical to the competitiveness and success of global firms. Many corporations 
now have established  presences across North America, Europe and the Asia-Pacific 
region, often away from their own corporate headquarters and traditional markets. As a 
result, FDI and trade have grown in an unprecedented fashion (UNCTAD 2008).  
3.1.  Motivations for FDI and the development of global value chains
Historically,  companies  have  invested  in  overseas  production  facilities  to  gain 
access to locally bound natural resources, to be closer to their customers and markets, 
and to access markets they otherwise would have been precluded from because of high 
tariff and non-tariff protections. In the academic literature, investment motivated by these 
types of factors is referred to as “horizontal” FDI. More recently, MNEs from developed 
countries have been investing overseas in order to take advantage of: (a) cross-border 
factor cost differences; and (b) an available and abundant pool of technology and skilled 
personnel. This latter type of foreign investment is referred to in the literature as “vertical” 
FDI (for discussions on FDI, see Caves 1982; Markusen 1984 and 1995; Helpman 1984; 
Helpman and Krugman 1985; Brainard 1993; Dunning 1979, 1980, 1981, 1993, 1996 
and 1998; and others). Multinational enterprises today are also motivated to establish 
overseas production facilities and cross-border sourcing for a variety of other reasons, 
including:
•  Reduced  inventory  costs  through  just-in-time  delivery  of  parts  and 
components;
•  More efficient utilization of capacity and core capabilities;
•  Access to specialized skills and resources that the company could not develop 
organically or acquire through mergers and acquisitions;
•  Benefits from special tax privileges and economic investment incentives of the 
host country;
•  Benefits from special tariff treatments available between the host country and 
key trading partners.
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3.2.  Trends in foreign direct investment
Developing countries are attracting more foreign investment than ever before. 
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2008), 
FDI inflows have rocketed from $316.4 billion in 2005 to nearly $500 billion in 2007. Among 
developing economies, those in Asia and the Pacific were the largest recipients of foreign 
investment. In 2007, the region received about 64 per cent of the overall investment to 
developing countries. By way of comparison, the 2007 figure is slightly lower than the 2005 
figure of 67 per cent, representing a slight shift in foreign direct investment to developing 
economies in other regions.  
Within the Asia-Pacific region, China attracted the most FDI with about $84 billion 
of investment in 2007, followed by Hong Kong, China with $60 billion, Singapore with $24 
billion, and India with $23 billion. China; Hong Kong, China; Singapore; and India together 
represented 59 per cent of the total FDI to Asia and the Pacific. This proportion is relatively 
unchanged from the 61 per cent figure of 2005. In terms of growth in FDI, the most 
remarkable increase was registered by India, with an impressive 200 per cent increase 
between the years 2005 and 2007. In 2007, a record-high level of investment poured into 
India. While still the fourth-largest destination economy in Asia, behind China; Hong Kong, 
China; and Singapore, India has rapidly caught up with Singapore and outstripped other 
South and South-East Asian countries in 2007 (figures 7 and 8).   
Figure 7.  Flows of foreign direct investment in select economies of Asia and the 
Pacific, 2007
(Millions of United States dollars)
 Source:   United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2008 (United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.08.II.D.23).
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As reported by UNCTAD, OECD countries remain the major sources of investment 
worldwide.  Of  the  record-high  outward  investment  of  nearly  $2  trillion,  developed 
economies accounted for 85 per cent of the total value, or about $1.7 trillion. The United 
States remains the biggest financier, followed by other European members of OECD. 
While the overall investment environment in developing regions is expected to remain 
positive, the onset of financial crises in the United States and in other developed countries 
is expected to slow down foreign investment in the coming years.   
3.3.  FDI and spillover benefits
International sourcing and contract production for multinational firms have significant 
economic  implications  for  domestic  suppliers  and  the  host  countries.  Multinationals, 
with their vast capital and technological resources, can assume an important role in the 
economic development of the host countries. An enormous amount of theoretical and 
empirical research has been done on the economic impact of multinationals and FDI. 
While generally the effect of FDI on growth has been viewed as positive—FDI raising 
the welfare level of the recipient country—there are circumstances where FDI could lead 
to an immiserizing growth (Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro 1977 and Anam and Bhanich 
Supapol 1992, among others). It has been shown theoretically that foreign investment 
Figure 8.  Inflows of foreign direct investment for select developing economies of 
Asia and the Pacific, 2005-2007
(Millions of United States dollars)
Source:   United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2008 (United 




















could lead to a perverse outcome, whereby the welfare level of the recipient country is 
negatively affected. Such an adverse effect occurs when FDI is combined with distorting 
economic conditions in the host country, such as non-productive rent-seeking activities, 
taxes, minimum wages and quotas, and inappropriate technology transfers.  
Empirically, the effects of foreign firms on the domestic economy and the extent 
of spillover benefits have also been extensively studied in the economic and business 
literature. The results of extant studies, however, have not been definitive. At both industry 
and firm levels, researchers have found a significant improvement in the local producers’ 
productivity as a result of foreign direct investment and participation (Blomstrom and 
Kokko 1998; Kathuria 2001; Lipsey 2002; Buckley, Clegg and Wang 2002; Görg and 
Greenway 2004; Alfaro and Rodríguez-Clare 2004; Wei and Liu 2006; Dreffield and Love 
2007; and Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter 2007). This correlation is believed to be related 
to  the  transfer  of  technology  and  management  know-how  from  multinational  parents 
to  their  foreign  affiliates  (subsidiaries,  local  joint  venture  partners  and  local  contract 
manufacturers), and possible spillovers of such knowledge and technology to domestic 
firms. On the other hand, Haddad and Harrison (1993), Aitken and Harrison (1999), and 
Chung, Mitchell and Yeung (2003) have found a negative or no correlation between FDI 
and local firm productivity. To some extent, the contradictory findings can be explained by 
the methodologies employed and the nature of the data used in the analysis.
Notwithstanding the inconclusive nature of the empirical evidence on the benefit 
and cost of MNEs, there is now a widespread belief among policymakers that foreign 
investment and MNEs generate positive economic externalities or spillover benefits for 
host countries (Meyer 2004). As such, in recent decades, Governments of developed and 
developing countries have competed fiercely for foreign investment and have introduced 
numerous laws and policies which favour multinational firms.  
It would appear that there is now a shared sentiment among policymakers that 
multinationals play an important and positive role in a country’s development strategy. 
Appropriate policies and incentives should be provided to multinational firms to encourage 
local-affiliate production, local sourcing of parts and components, and transfer of technology 
to local manufacturers so that maximum spillover benefits can be realized. It is therefore 
pertinent to systematically identify mechanisms and channels by which spillovers from 
MNEs are generated and absorbed by local firms. The conventional view is that local 
manufacturers  can  benefit  from  doing  business  with  multinational  firms  directly  and 
indirectly. Local contract manufacturers, parts and component suppliers, local distributors 
and back-office service providers may all benefit from new business opportunities and 
enlarged markets, and thereby economies of scale and scope, when they contract with 
an MNE. In many cases, they may also receive technologies and market knowledge 
from the contracting MNE firm, either through foreign parent-affiliate transfers or through 
technology licenses. Other local firms may also benefit indirectly through what is often 
referred to as the demonstration effect, as well as through increased competition and the 
transfer of skilled employees. These concepts are not new and can be traced back to the 
earlier work of Caves (1974), Mansfield and Romeo (1980), and others. Arguably, the 
existence and size of spillover benefits would be determined by the activities of the MNEs 
in the host country, the specific nature of the relationship between foreign MNEs and their 
local affiliates and contractors, the institutional factors of the host country, and the skills 
and technological absorptive capacity of the participating local firms.  63
3.4.  Global sourcing and the development of industrial linkages 
To many people, the term offshoring is often used interchangeably with the term 
outsourcing. However, according to the OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms (see http://
stats.oecd.org/glossary/index.htm),  “outsourcing  means  acquiring  services  from  an 
outside (unaffiliated) company or an offshore supplier. In contrast, a company can source 
offshore services from either an unaffiliated foreign company (offshore outsourcing) or by 
investing in a foreign affiliate (offshore in-house sourcing)”. Global outsourcing is basically 
the sourcing of goods or services, required by corporations to fulfil certain segments of their 
value chain activities, from vendors, suppliers or contractors located in different countries 
throughout the world. These suppliers could be affiliated or unaffiliated suppliers and the 
context of buyer-supplier relationships could range from simple once-and-for-all purchase 
orders  to  continuous  contracts  for  goods  and  services  or  longer-term  subcontracting 
arrangements. Affiliated offshore suppliers could be wholly owned subsidiaries, equity 
joint venture partners, or contractual joint venture partners. Unaffiliated offshore suppliers 
could  be  totally  independent  contract  manufacturers  or  suppliers  loosely  connected 
through strategic alliances or license arrangements. The decision to contract with outside 
unaffiliated suppliers for goods and services is often referred to as the decision to “contract 
out” or to “vertically disintegrate.” The categorization of the various forms of outsourcing 
and buyer-supplier relationships has been extensively discussed in the economics and 
organization literature (Masten 1984; Monteverde and Teece 1982; and Williamson 1975, 
1979, 1985 and 1992).
Outsourcing today is considered to be central to a firm’s strategic management, 
and outsourcing activities now involve much more than a tactic for reducing costs of back-
office functions such as accounting and ICT. Notwithstanding the fact that contracting out 
mundane back-office activities is still a big business, suppliers and consultants are now 
targeting much more strategically significant functions, such as manufacturing, logistics, 
product  design  and  other  innovation-related  activities  of  multinational  firms.  Clearly, 
what is being outsourced, the way global sourcing is structured, and the specifics of the 
relationship between buyers and suppliers can all have impacts on the development 
of  local  suppliers,  the  overall  supplier  network  and,  ultimately,  the  deepening  of  the 
development and economic growth of local industries. 
Typically,  multinational  firms  secure  the  inputs  and  services  required  for  their 
operations from either suppliers within their established international supplier network 
(with affiliated or unaffiliated companies) or from independent suppliers overseas. The 
measurement of the size of outsourcing worldwide by global firms is problematic, given 
the wide array of definitions and forms of “international outsourcing”. Nonetheless, it may 
be worthwhile to look at a commonly used measure—the share of manufacturing imports 
accounted for by intermediate goods, parts and components—as a rough proxy for the 
extent of international outsourcing. According to one study (Molnar, Pain and Taglioni 
2007), outsourcing by firms in OECD countries has increased steadily over the period 
1992-2004, and there was a sharp increase in the amount of parts and components (as 
a share of total manufacturing imports) imported from China and the ASEAN countries 
(see figure 9).
Indigenous suppliers, both upstream and downstream, benefit directly and indirectly 
from outsourcing contracts; through the development of industrial backward and forward 
linkages, the host country becomes more productive and internationally competitive (Lim 
and Pang 1982; Lall 1978, 1980; and Alfaro and others 2006).64
Source:   A. Bhanich Supapol, “Linkage effects, technology transfer, and the development of small and 
medium  enterprises  in  the  electrical  and  electronics  industries  in  Thailand”,  in  A.  Bhanich 
Supapol, ed., Transnational Corporations and Backward Linkages in Asian Electronics Industries 
(New York, United Nations, 1995).
Abbreviation: MNE, multinational enterprise.
 Figure 9. Global supply networks, global value chains and backward linkages
At the firm level, local subcontractors can benefit from supplying intermediate 
inputs to foreign manufacturing clients in a variety of ways, including:
•  Greater  rate  of  technology  diffusion—the  adoption  of  new  products  and 
processes introduced by foreign multinational clients, improved access to new 
production methods, management know-how and technology from buyers and 
other suppliers;
•  Upgrading of local skills through training and intra-industry transfer of talented 
workers;
•  Increased  demand  for  existing  products  and  services  leading  to  greater 
capacity  utilization,  employment  and  investment  in  new  facilities,  research 
and development operations, and new businesses with higher value-added 
(economies of scale and scope);
•  Access to new product designs, international quality standards and international 
market information; 














































There  are  ample  empirical  cases  where  contracts  between  foreign  producers 
and domestic suppliers have resulted in significant positive economic spillovers for the 
suppliers (Lall 1978; Bhanich Supapol 1995; Xu 2000; Buckley, Wang and Clegg 2002; 
Alfaro and Rodríguez-Clare 2004; Javorcik 2004; Meyer 2004). Additionally, it is now well 
recognized that spillover benefits could be realized by suppliers within the same industry 
as the multinational manufacturers (intra-industry or vertical spillovers), as well as by 
suppliers in related but different industries (inter-industry spillovers). 
While it is conventionally accepted that local suppliers can indeed benefit from 
contracting  with  multinational  firms,  what  is  not  as  clear  is  where  and  under  what 
circumstances benefits are expected to be greatest. Extant studies on backward and 
forward linkages have convincingly argued that a country’s capacity to take advantage 
of  FDI  externalities  may  be  limited  by  its  absorptive  capability—the  technological 
and  managerial  capabilities  of  local  contractors  and  local  conditions—  including  the 
educational level of the country, infrastructure, legal systems and financing (Lall 1980; 
Blomstrom 1986; Bhanich Supapol 1995; Kokko, Tansini and Zejan 1996; Blomstrom and 
Kokko 1998; and Buckley, Clegg and Wang 2002). By and large, the literature argues 
that FDI and global sourcing externalities are determined to a large extent by the type 
of products or services being sourced, how offshoring activities are being structured, 
the preparedness and technical absorptive capacity of local contractors, as well as by 
the willingness of multinationals to engage in the training of local suppliers and transfer 
proprietary technology and management know-how. 
Earlier studies (Davidson and McFetridge 1983; Masten, Meehan and Snyder 
1991; Bhanich Supapol 1995) argued that the characteristics of: (a) the home and host 
countries; (b) the multinational firm; (c) the supply contractor; and (d) the product being 
produced together determine how offshoring activities will be structured (that is, using 
either an arm’s length procurement contract or long-term subcontracting with a related firm, 
or producing internally through a wholly owned subsidiary). Relying on a well developed 
area of economic theory—the economics of transaction costs—it could be argued that 
products involving more technologically advanced components, more complexity, and 
output quality that is more difficult to assess would more likely be sourced from an affiliate 
or a wholly owned subsidiary rather than an outside contractor, everything else remaining 
the same. The implication is that multinationals would choose to outsource from a related 
party (where the supplier is either fully owned, or closely affiliated within a global supply 
network) for products that are higher valued, more complex and more difficult to transact. 
In terms of global value chains, it can be surmised that inputs and activities positioned 
closer to the higher value-added and possibly more technologically complex end of the 
production chain will likely be sourced internally or reserved for long-term trusted, reliable 
and proven suppliers within the established supply chain. New or unproven domestic 
suppliers may be precluded from participating in the MNE network altogether, or may be 
restricted to supplying only basic products involving older or antiquated technologies—
activities with relatively little scope for spillover benefits. 
From the perspective of multinational firms, one of the main considerations in the 
globalization of manufacturing and sourcing is how it may affect the locational configuration 
of the home bases for their various strategic businesses, and how this configuration 
may impact their future production arrangements, technological interdependency and, 66
ultimately,  future  ability  to  compete  internationally.  Globalization  is  likely  to  lead  to  a 
geographical dispersion of value-added activities. These activities necessarily involve the 
reallocation of resources, technology and management knowledge between firms and 
their subsidiaries, affiliated suppliers and independent arm’s-length local suppliers. In 
many respects, multinational firms must weigh the benefits of outsourcing and contract 
manufacturing against the risk of transferring assets, some of which may be strategic 
and core to the firm, over to related or independent overseas contract manufacturers. 
Internationally  contracting  for  production,  parts  and  components  could  result  in  the 
emergence of new players, representing potentially new competitors for multinational 
incumbents. In an earlier article published in the Harvard Management Update, Martha 
Craumer stated:
In some cases, companies leave themselves vulnerable to a market coup by former 
partners when they outsource. Such was the case with the German consumer 
electronics company Blaupunkt … To beef up the product line it offers to its dealers, 
Blaupunkt decided to add VCRs and contracted the work out to Panasonic (once 
a lowly circuit-board stuffer). Later, with the Blaupunkt reputation attached to its 
products, Panasonic approached the dealers directly and presto, it had a ready-
made distribution network for its own product line. (Craumer 2002)
As  cited  in  the  article,  according  to  Ed  Frey,  a  vice  president  at  Booz Allen 
Hamilton, “In effect, all Blaupunkt did was give access to its dealer network to Panasonic”. 
The implication here is that MNEs must decide carefully what segments of their global 
value chain ought to be outsourced and what activities should be done in-house. In 
theory, companies should be concentrating on unloading their non-core activities by using 
third-party service providers, and focusing on delivering their core activities well in order 
to boost productivity and returns. In practice, however, deciding what is core and non-
core is complicated, and what is considered non-core today may become strategically 
pertinent tomorrow. The use of contract manufacturers has allowed original equipment 
manufacturers  to  cut  costs  and  free  up  productive  resources,  but  as Arruñada  and 
Vázquez (2006) cautioned, it could also unleash new and dangerous competitors:  
As IBM and other companies have learned, however, contract manufacturing is 
a two-edged sword. For one thing, a CM [contract manufacturer] is privy to an 
OEM’s [original equipment manufacturer’s] intellectual property (IP), which it can 
leak to other clients or arrogate. For another, an ambitious, upstart CM can claim 
for itself the very advantage it provides an OEM. Having manufactured an OEM’s 
product in its entirety, the CM may decide to build its own brand and forge its own 
relationships with retailers and distributors—including those of the OEM. When 
these things happen, the OEM may find itself facing not only more dangerous 
incumbents but also a competitor of a new kind: the once under-estimated CM. 
According to the authors, smart contracting out means keeping the hazards of 
potential traitorous contractors under control. 
Also important to the supplier, in addition to the direct economic benefit of being 
selected to deliver goods and services to a multinational firm and being a part of the 
production  network  of  the  MNE,  is  the  potential  for  spillover  benefits  that  can  boost 
competitiveness and growth, and subsequently increase its shares of the market. In order 67
for a supplier to capture beneficial spillovers from its dealings with multinational firms, it 
first must be selected and included in the network of qualified suppliers. Multinational firms 
and the affiliated contract producers (tier 1 suppliers) of original equipment manufacturers 
normally would search for qualified contractors locally, and select firms that can deliver 
the best bundle in terms of quality, reliability and price. Once selected, the supplier may 
then rely on subcontractors locally or internationally and, in turn, would select the next tier 
of subcontractors based on their ability to deliver on quality and price. Local suppliers can 
benefit from their interactions with foreign buyers, and whether they benefit more or less is 
thought to be a function of their own resource endowment (technological capacity, human 
resource and capital resource), their entrepreneurial tendencies, and industrial clusters 
and networks (Meyer 2004).  
Local firms, large and small, compete for the business of multinationals. Market 
transactions and competition normally sort out who the suppliers in the network will be, 
and what the relative shares of the economic rent from the supply transactions will be. 
Do smaller and medium-sized firms face more constraints in accessing and linking into 
MNE supplier networks? That is, do multinational firms prefer to deal with larger and 
perhaps more established firms when selecting subcontractors? Are smaller firms more 
disadvantaged when negotiating a supply contract with MNEs? Do larger firms benefit 
more from the outsourcing activities of multinationals, and are they more equipped or 
better prepared to internalize the external benefits that may exist? If there are economies 
of scale and scope, larger firms may indeed have a distinctive advantage for participating 
in the GVCs of foreign multinationals. A policy question for the host country is whether 
small and medium-sized business should be supported so that they can better participate 
in the GVC activities, and if so, what should be the nature of such policy support?  
3.5.  Global supply networks: challenges and constraints for SME  
  suppliers
Whether achieved by subcontracting for parts and components using occasional 
purchase orders, or by engaging local suppliers on a longer-term contractual basis within 
or outside of their global supply networks, the establishment of backward and forward 
linkages and the deepening of industrial development as a result of the procurement 
process of multinationals are generally viewed by policymakers and business practitioners 
as important and integral parts of the economic development and growth. As in most 
developing nations, economies in the Asia-Pacific region are dominated by small and 
medium-sized manufacturers, with the exception of several countries where there are 
explicit policy biases in favour of large firms and conglomerates (Bhanich Supapol 1995). 
Small companies are affected by and, in turn, affect globalization. 
Small companies play a vital role in contributing to their national economies through 
employment, entrepreneurship, job creation, new product and process development, and 
exporting. Small local businesses face competing products from overseas and, at the 
same time, create new challenges for other companies overseas. With globalization, an 
increasing number of entrepreneurs and small business enterprises are being approached 
by potential offshore customers, largely as a result of intensified export promotion efforts 
and initiatives by governments, the large and ever-increasing number of trade shows and 
practitioners’ conferences and, above all, the rapidly growing reliance on e-commerce and 68
web-based Internet marketing. While the economic importance of SMEs and the economic 
contributions of foreign multinationals are well recognized, a relatively scarce amount of 
empirical research has been done directly on the relationship between multinationals and 
the development of domestic SMEs.
Multinational enterprises have been strategically sourcing from China, India and 
other emerging Asian-Pacific countries for years. However, new international sourcing 
arrangements are no longer restricted to the traditional lower-technology oriented industries 
(for example, automotive and electronic parts and components), with transactions for simple 
and low value-added activities. Such arrangements are now also found in technology 
intensive industries (pharmaceuticals, semi-conductors and aerospace, among others) 
involving more complex and specialized transactions.  
Landing a contract to sell its products to a multinational firm or an MNE affiliate can 
be a significant challenge for a small or medium-sized local company in Asia and the Pacific. 
To qualify as a subcontractor and participate in the MNE global supply network, a local 
supplier often has to meet tough business standards and make a huge upfront investment 
to get their products ready. Significant re-tooling of a company’s assets and workforce is 
generally required and, in order to do this, some cash-flow commitments are inevitable. 
Issues regarding constraints to becoming a supplier for an MNE in a changing, more 
dynamic and more demanding environment were discussed in section 2.4.1. Domestic 
tier 2 or tier 3 suppliers typically face the challenge of large upfront investments that are, in 
many cases, highly specific and serve specialized uses. Given the required commitment 
and risk, SME suppliers may choose to forego or may be unable to economically finance 
the investment, and thereby, are precluded from participating in an international supplier 
network of multinational firms. As argued above, this may be more of an issue for SMEs 
than for larger and more established suppliers.
Ultimately, the ability to become a designated supplier and participant in the global 
value chain of an MNE depends on the capacity of the indigenous SME to overcome the 
liabilities of smallness and newness. Getting supply contracts from MNEs means that 
local SMEs can: (a) expand their product lines and service more markets; (b) hire more 
people and make investments in training and educating their workforce; (c) acquire new 
machinery and equipment; (d) upgrade management skills and expertise; and (e) grow. 
Additionally, MNE supply contracts can also provide SMEs with greater access to funding 
from financial institutions, which is vital and necessary for growth. 
Dealing with MNEs through their supply networks or subcontracting arrangements 
can build industrial linkages for the home economy and can result in expanded production, 
employment and improved competitiveness. The impact of outsourcing can be significant 
where indigenous suppliers could also benefit “indirectly” (in terms of things that they did 
not explicitly contract for) from their buyer-supplier relationship. 
One aspect of outsourcing that is deemed to be highly beneficial to the suppliers 
is  the  transfer  of  technology  and  management  know-how  from  the  buyers  and  their 
affiliates. These types of spillover benefits have been well discussed and documented in 
the technology transfer literature. While the extant literature has highlighted the existence 
of such benefits through case studies and productivity analyses, more information is yet 
required on where and how they may in fact arise. Conventional wisdom would suggest 69
that the ability to capitalize on these external benefits depends heavily on the technological 
absorptive capacity of the supplying firm. What is pertinent on this score therefore, is 
whether the absorptive capacity of SMEs is greater or less than that of larger firms. 
Moreover, larger firms may be able to exploit technological spillovers better because of 
more diversified businesses, economies of scale, and perhaps experience. Serendipitous 
technologies may be more likely to be used because of the greater number of possible 
applications associated with a more widely diversified business. More capable scientists, 
engineers and workers may be more attracted to larger firms because of job security, 
profile and/or better pay. On the other hand, it is conceivable that small and medium-sized 
companies may be more flexible, nimble and agile, and thus can better and more quickly 
absorb spillover innovations or technological improvements. It may be argued that SMEs 
are more entrepreneurial and innovative and do not suffer from the bureaucratic inertia 
(X-inefficiencies) typically associated with larger firms. 
The motivation to transfer technology may also be different when dealing with 
SMEs as opposed to larger local suppliers. MNEs may underestimate SMEs, not viewing 
them as future rivals, and are therefore more likely to offer to transfer some of their 
technologies and know-how. Larger local supply firms can be more threatening to MNEs 
and represent a much more daunting potential rival down the road. For example, the 
Chinese computer manufacturer Lenovo, once a contract manufacturer to IBM, bought 
up the personal computer business of IBM for around $1.75 billion in 2005. This was a 
landmark deal and the transaction highlighted the new consequences of the globalization 
of production, where business is no longer unidirectional but expands also from emerging 
to developed economies. Consequently, MNE buyers may pre-emptively seek to protect 
their technologies more carefully and restrict spillovers or unintended technology flow.  
3.6.  Multinational enterprises and host country Governments
In a highly competitive global environment, being able to rely on local suppliers for 
commodities, parts and components is critical to the survival and success of multinational 
companies. As such, a multinational enterprise must seek out, engage and retain reliable, 
qualified  (technically  and  managerially)  and  cost-competitive  local  suppliers  for  its 
global supply network. At the same time, host country Governments compete fiercely 
for the potential business of multinational enterprises, and actively promote FDI through 
a number of initiatives (Bhanich Supapol 1995; Ostry 1998). While direct support from 
Government  in  terms  of  tax  incentives,  minimized  administrative  burden  and  other 
investment incentives can help promote FDI, arguably the crucial element for attracting 
multinational enterprises is still the availability of skilled and qualified local subcontractors 
(Bhanich Supapol 1995).  
In light of the changing nature of the offshoring activities of MNEs towards more 
specialized  and  higher  value-added  transactions,  increasingly  skilled  subcontractors 
will be required; failure to keep up with international standards would result in a loss of 
FDI and opportunities to benefit from MNE procurement contracts. If local SMEs fail to 
upgrade and meet the technological and sustainability challenges of the new outsourcing 
environment, they will likely be passed over by MNEs. Being precluded from international 
value chain activities is costly to the host economy directly in terms of the foregone foreign 
exchange and economic value of the supply contracts, but perhaps more significant is 70
the foregone economic value from indirect spinoffs and technological transfers that could 
have been realized. If a country no longer offered MNEs outsourcing cost advantages or 
market opportunities, MNE buyers would likely find alternative manufacturing platforms 
where they could produce and operate more competitively, and would turn to different 
subcontractors  for  parts  and  components.  The  reversal  of  international  integrated 
production trends can be very difficult and costly for the country, and it is pertinent that 
local small and medium-sized firms are appropriately encouraged to move up along the 
technological ladder and proactively upgrade their technological competencies so that 
they are better poised to participate in the evolving global value chain.
Arguably, SMEs face more constraints technologically. Larger parts and component 
supply firms have more resources that they can allocate to various inventive activities and 
are perhaps in a better position to exploit the results of their research and development 
because of economies of scale and scope. They may also have better access to foreign 
technology because of their possible greater involvement in international markets and 
exposure to technologies available elsewhere. In some countries, larger firms receive 
more support from the government. They have often been favoured to receive research 
and development subsidies and funding from the government because of: (a) their prior 
track  records  and  performance  (early-mover  advantages);  (b)  availability  of  in-house 
scientist and engineers; (c) developed expertise that cannot be found elsewhere; or (d) 
their established relationships with the government funding agencies. Moreover, larger 
firms may be more experienced in dealing with MNEs and more familiar with technology 
licensing  practices.  They  can  rely  on  in-house  legal  resources  when  contracting 
for  technology—resources  that  are  likely  absent  amongst  smaller  or  medium-sized 
business establishments. It has been argued that larger firms face lower funding costs. 
Possibly because of their available pool of assets that can be used as collateral, specific 
investments in both tangible and intangible assets, and an available corporate (financial 
and operational) information system which makes monitoring less costly, larger firms have 
greater access to different types of financial products and funding institutions. 
Entrepreneurial and smaller businesses typically find it difficult to finance longer 
term investments, such as in research and development, which have uncertain payoffs 
and longer return periods. Significantly disadvantaged by the liabilities of newness and 
smallness, entrepreneurs and SMEs may find it increasingly difficult to participate in the 
international supply chain of MNEs. This notwithstanding, some of the entrepreneurial 
and smaller research firms have been particularly successful as providers of scientific 
and technical inputs to large manufacturing MNEs both offshore and onshore. A case 
in point is the vast number of bioengineering firms that have played a vital role in the 
development of new blockbuster drugs for large international pharmaceutical companies. 
Indian research firms have participated in outsourced clinical trials and drug development 
for  North  American  and  European  pharmaceutical  giants  in  recent  years.  It  would 
appear however, that such offshore research firms are specialized and technologically 
more advanced, and can deliver added value for MNEs. Another example comes from 
the ICT industry, where small programme developers overseas have been involved in 
supplying application-specific and specialized programming services to mega-ICT and 
systems firms from developed countries, and have undeniably been pivotal to the latter’s 
commercial success. 71
Anecdotal  evidence  would  suggest  that  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises, 
regardless of their size, could successfully plug into the global supple network of an MNE. 
At the same time, it is important to note that there are indications of a slowing of the 
outsourcing of MNEs in a changing international environment. This has to be monitored 
carefully by both firm-level and government decision makers in terms of the competitive 
options of firms and implications for the role of government (see section 2). 
The questions of whether government support for SMEs is warranted, to what extent, 
and what form such support should take are indeed central to the host country’s industrial 
development  strategists  and  policymakers.  Policy  initiatives  to  allocate  appropriate 
resources to small and medium-sized suppliers could include providing supplemental 
resources for upgrading and improving the manpower of SMEs, and for the adoption 
and diffusion of new technologies and management techniques. Ideally, industrial policies 
should be designed to encourage the transfer of technology to local suppliers, and for 
MNEs to establish offshore manufacturing facilities in areas where employment effects 
and industrial linkage benefits are expected to be most beneficial. This should stimulate 
and pump-prime the creation of sustainable and balanced industrial developmental and 
growth for the economies of Asia and the Pacific.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1. Introduction
This final section reviews the requirements for increasing the competitiveness 
prospects of Asia-Pacific SMEs within the context of the challenges of the globalization 
of  production,  and  seeks  to  provide  some  specific  recommendations  on  how  SME 
development in the region could be taken in new and potentially fruitful directions. These 
recommendations seek to address the core question running through this research paper, 
namely: what can usefully be done to increase the competitive performance of Asia-
Pacific SMEs? 
As  introduced  earlier,  competitiveness  is  fundamentally  an  enterprise-level 
concept,  referring  to  the  relative  performance  of  firms  in  particular  product  markets. 
Nonetheless, the competitive performance of enterprises is shaped by a country’s: (a) 
endowment; (b) macroeconomic conditions, including a country’s policy and institutional 
environment; and (c) microeconomic factors, including the quality of a country’s business 
environment, the relative sophistication of a firm’s operations, and the state of enterprise 
cluster development in a particular economy. Given the challenges of current trends in the 
globalization of production, attention must be focused on the requirements of enterprise 
linkages and network efficiencies, and on upgrading options (for example, product and 
process innovation) as key dimensions of the competitiveness of Asia-Pacific SMEs.
Within this context, it is possible to identify a range of activities that can contribute 
to strengthening the prospects for the competitiveness of SMEs. As noted, Asia-Pacific 
economies vary greatly in terms of their characteristics and levels of development. In 
general,  there  are  three  types  of  economies  in  terms  of  SME  support  requirements: 
(a) economies with significant and widespread deficiencies in basic infrastructure, and 
constraining policy, institutional and regulatory environments; (b) economies with less 
severe or urgent deficiencies in the “basics” (for example, relatively good infrastructure, 
and adequate policy and regulatory frameworks) but some relatively weak key institutions; 
and (c) economies that have good basics for production activities (manufacturing and/
or  services)  and  a  relatively  efficient  SME  support  structure,  but  that  require  further 
strengthening  of  particular  policies,  institutions  and  support  services. Therefore  each 
country has to pick the appropriate mix of policies, programmes and institution-building 
initiatives to be undertaken by the government and private sector, and supported by 
international development partners.
4.2.  A role for government
The case for government intervention to assist SMEs is anchored in the assumption 
that  significant  market  failures  prevent  domestic  small  enterprises  from  building  the 
capabilities necessary to participate in global value chains. These are assumed to arise 
because of weaknesses or disadvantages that SMEs are perceived to have relative to 
large firms—and their peers in other countries—in accessing key resources and services 
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such as finance, information, technology and international buyers. Therefore, specific 
policies, programmes and institutional frameworks are seen as needed to assist SMEs in 
overcoming market failures. In this context, a public policy or publicly financed programme 
to support SMEs must be anchored in a sound economic rationale. 
While such a programme is necessary, alone it is not sufficient for an appropriate 
public policy or publicly financed SME support programme. Special-purpose policies and 
programmes, particularly if they involve subsidies in some form (for example, transfers 
from general taxpayers to special targeted interests, such as SMEs), carry the risk of 
creating economic distortions, for example with regard to business incentives. Therefore, 
it must also be demonstrated that such initiatives are likely to lead to net welfare benefits 
for society as a whole. From this perspective, examples of market failures cited as causing 
a bias against SMEs and requiring a public response include the following:
•  Asymmetric information on SMEs, (available to formal financial institutions, for 
example) and distortions in credit markets (such as in the operations of the 
banking system) restrict SME access to financing;
•  Relatively  higher  costs  of  training  and  technology  development,  along 
with the inability to appropriate the full benefits of such investments, cause 
underinvestment  by  SMEs  in  training  and  in  technology  acquisition  and 
development;
•  Smallness  creates  relative  cost  disadvantages  for  SMEs  to  an  important 
extent because small enterprises have a significantly weaker voice than larger 
firms, in terms of influencing policy and public expenditure decisions, because 
of,  among  other  things,  constraints  on  their  participation  in  public-private 
institutions and dialogue. As a consequence, policies and regulations often 
impose disproportionately high fixed costs on small firms;
•  Small size limits capacity-building options, for example restricting relative access 
to costly support services (consulting, financial, legal, training, among others) 
and information, limiting SME productivity and therefore competitiveness.
The above are all fairly generic and perennial adversities encountered by SMEs in 
virtually all economies, both developed and developing.
An effective public policy and programming framework for Asia-Pacific SMEs should 
begin with an understanding of constraints and possible solutions—as perceived by SMEs 
themselves. A useful way of identifying such constraints is by giving a voice to SMEs in 
appropriate forums for dialogue with government. This, in turn, requires recognition by 
governments of the need for effective channels of communication with small enterprises, 
not only the large firms that are the usual participants in national chambers of commerce 
and federations of industry in the Asia-Pacific region. This can be pursued in a number 
of ways, including outreach to SME associations and other business associations that 
have a large SME membership. At the same time, it has to be informed dialogue. In 
a recent study that surveyed SMEs about their perceived needs, OECD reported that 
enterprises indicated a lack of government support for facilitating their participation in 
global value chains. However, the study then went on to suggest that SMEs responded 
in this way because they had “…limited understanding of the global environment and 75
therefore cannot easily identify policy initiatives facilitating their effective participation in 
global value chains” (OECD 2007, 6), for example, existing and readily available SME skill 
upgrading programmes.  
A generally supportive macroeconomic environment for enterprise development 
includes  low  budget  deficits,  appropriate  inflation  management,  competitive  real 
exchange rates, and an outward-oriented trade regime. The macroeconomic environment 
needs to be particularly stable and predictable from the perspective of small firms, as 
fundamental unexpected policy changes may threaten the viability of SMEs more readily 
than that of larger firms (which have a larger resource cushion). The experience of Asia-
Pacific economies with financial liberalization and exchange rate adjustments provides 
suggestive examples. 
Furthermore, it may be necessary to put in place economic and financial safety 
nets  for  SMEs  to  prevent  the  large-scale  macroeconomic  and  financial  disruptions 
experienced during the Asian Crisis; this is increasingly important in the context of the 
present global financial crisis and its expected impact on Asia-Pacific exports.32 Beyond 
macroeconomics, a clear, fair and stable legal and general regulatory framework is also 
essential,  providing  SMEs  with  the  assurance  that  government  will  not  discriminate 
against  small  firms  in  the  interpretation,  implementation  or  enforcement  of  laws  and 
regulations, and that it will provide a framework for fair competition with respect to, among 
other things, commercial transactions, intellectual and commercial property rights, the tax 
code and labour legislation. 
It  is  also  important  that  FDI  promotion  policies  and  programmes  facilitate  the 
integration of domestic SMEs into global value chains, consistent with an economy’s 
comparative advantage. An important dimension here includes initiatives to attract new 
types of MNEs that may not be household names, but that play a pivotal role in managing 
global production integration in specific value chains of particular relevance to a given 
economy, such as Flextronics in the electronics and ICT space. In this context, it is essential 
to ensure that import/export regulations and procedures are efficient and consistent with 
global value chain-related requirements of the strategies and operations of such global 
suppliers. Estonia and Ireland are examples of countries that are taking effective GVC-
related approaches to FDI that could be instructive to Asia-Pacific economies. 
4.3.  Improving the micro-environment for SME competitiveness
4.3.1.  Quality of the business environment
Creating a business-friendly environment for SMEs is a critical requirement for 
enhancing  the  general  competitiveness  prospects  for  small  firms.  This  includes:  (a) 
ensuring the relative ease of entry and exit of new firms (see section 1 for a discussion 
of  this  issue);  (b)  simplifying  import-export  policies  and  procedures,  particularly  from 
the  perspective  of  small  firms  and  in  the  case  of  small  economies;  (c)  streamlining 
bureaucratic  rules  and  procedures  that  hinder  the  expansion  and  export  potential  of 
SMEs; (d) assessing the costs and benefits of specific regulations that could place a 
disproportionate  burden  on  small  enterprises;  and  (e)  implementing  regulations  with 
32   At the time of writing, Viet Nam seemed poised to allocate a proportion of its $1 billion stimulus package 
to a new SME credit guarantee fund—a somewhat controversial move.76
attention to the flexibility needed by SMEs. Focusing on trade facilitation issues, such as 
streamlining and improving customs procedures and regulations, is particularly important 
in the context of providing SMEs with access to participation in global value chains. The 
application of value chain analysis to identify constraints in import/export procedures is 
illustrated in figure 10 in the context of Cambodian garment exports (denim jeans), which 
are especially reliant on the import of parts and components.
Source:  World Bank, Towards a Private Sector-Led Growth Strategy for Cambodia, prepared by Global 
Development Solutions LLC (Washington D.C., 2003), Chart 10, p. 71.  
Abbreviations: CO, Certificate of Origin; CP, Certificate of Performance.
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Competition within the framework of global value chains hinges on the efficiency 
of  logistics  systems  that  link  geographically  distributed  producers  and  buyers.  Some 
Asia-Pacific economies, out of necessity, need to concentrate at this stage on building 
critical basic infrastructure, such as airports, highways, ports and telecommunications/
ICT  systems.  However,  it  is  essential  to  begin  to  focus  simultaneously  on  the  less 
visible  requirements  of  improving  the  flow  of  goods  through  an  economy,  including 
across borders. This includes addressing issues related to the institutional, legal and 
regulatory environment of transport services such as, among others: (a) consistency with 
international rules to ensure transparency and predictability; (b) efficiency of multi-modal 
transport linkages; (c) containerization; (d) load and warehousing centres; (e) hub and 77
feeder networks; (f) e-communications and e-commerce; and (g) a linking of logistics 
services to improvements in trade facilitation procedures (such as customs rules and 
procedures). This requires a “logistics perspective” from the outset, particularly one that 
explicitly recognizes the particular constraints and needs of SMEs. 
For  example,  small  enterprises  require  reliable  access  to  externally  provided 
logistics services that seamlessly link production with distribution and that can handle 
the distinctive needs of small-batch producers, including special purpose systems such 
as refrigerated trucks and pre-cooled storage facilities for fresh fruit and vegetables. An 
example of such a logistics perspective as the basis of public policy and public-private 
partnership, including a focus on the particular needs of SMEs, is provided by South Africa 
(see, for example, CSIR 2005). The impact of even marginal improvements in logistics 
and trade facilitation services on profits and competitiveness is illustrated in figure 11.
Figure 11.  Improvement  in  logistics  +  trade  facilitation  =  competitiveness  and 
profits 
Source:   Ian Sayers, Trade Facilitation in Export Delivery Supply Chains (Geneva, International Trade 
Centre, 2003). 
Any reduction in supply time and costs has a direct, large and






A 10 per cent reduction in export
supply costs =
















A 60 per cent increase in gross
profits without increasing sales
Financing is generally cited by Asia-Pacific SMEs as a critical factor determining 
viability and growth. As noted, commercial banks and investors have been reluctant to 
finance SMEs in the region, or when they do provide funds they charge a significant 
premium. This is due to factors associated with small firms, such as high perceived risk, 
higher transaction costs (per amount lent), incomplete accounting records, inadequate 
financial statements, and weak business plans. These general problems of SME financing 
in the region have received considerable attention (see, for example, Beck 2007 and 
Ferranti and Ody 2007). The general financing constraint is particularly important in the 
context of the participation of Asia-Pacific SMEs in global value chains. As discussed, such 
participation often requires substantial investments in developing appropriate production 
technologies,  logistics  services, skills, capacity expansion  and certification  to meet a 
variety of stringent global standards. Working capital requirements can be especially 78
challenging for small suppliers in GVC-oriented production networks. Suppliers in GVCs 
may not receive payment from their (often bigger) customers until weeks or even months 
after the delivery of orders. With the shift from letters of credit, which allow bank financing 
of the working capital needs of SMEs, to the increasing use of unsecured open account 
finance, SME suppliers face additional financing constraints and risks. Payment delays 
and, in the event of further complications, contract enforcement and collection of late 
payments, can be particularly significant challenges for a small firm. 
Therefore a key requirement is for financing mechanisms that can help small 
suppliers overcome liquidity constraints, for example through the increased use of creative 
financing services such as equipment leasing, factoring (the purchase of a firm’s accounts 
receivables), and securitization of SME loans, as in the case of Bangladesh, the Republic 
of Korea and Singapore. Wider use may also be made of guarantees from multilateral 
development banks, for example to enhance credit ratings of securitized SME loans in 
Asia-Pacific economies. Additional measures could include providing legal assistance 
to  suppliers  negotiating  contracts,  providing  legal  protection  against  unfair  (payment) 
practices, and shortening payment delays for local SME suppliers through legislation or 
fiscal incentives. An exploratory initiative to establish business-angel networks in one or 
more Asia-Pacific countries might also have merit, possibly working in conjunction with 
established business associations.
In other areas of SME development, identifying ways of addressing the gender 
imbalance between SME owners is one field that probably has not received as much 
attention as it might (beyond basic gender mainstreaming), at least in those countries 
where the asymmetry is most apparent. Similarly, in some countries where this is pertinent, 
there has perhaps been insufficient attention paid to the paucity of robust SMEs in areas 
belonging to minority ethnic groups and/or remote or economically depressed areas, 
where this is seen to be a problem. Subregional and country-specific initiatives in areas 
such as eco-tourism and handicrafts—such as “stay another day” interventions—may 
have utility in this regard.
Cultural and social issues relating to risk-taking in business, and the stigma of 
business failure, also tend to get limited coverage beyond the academic community of 
researchers, as does the promotion of an entrepreneurial culture in a country. Initiatives 
designed to identify and then support the entrepreneurial framework conditions of Asia-
Pacific countries would be worthy of pursuit. Possibly a good starting point would be 
to support the inclusion of more Asia-Pacific economies in the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor exercise. An alternative would be to design a regional equivalent, intended to serve 
as an evidence-based diagnostic platform on which to pursue some specific interventions, 
on a national or subregional basis.
As  yet,  there  has  been  relatively  little  attempt  to  take  the  creative  economy 
approach  to  SME  development  in Asia-Pacific  developing  countries.  In  2008,  UNDP 
and UNCTAD (2008) co-published the Creative Economy Report 2008, which seeks to 
explain the thinking behind the (still evolving) creative economy approach.33 As the report 
33   Definitions of the creative economy tend to differ, although a good point of reference might be a context 
in which: “… the interface among creativity, culture, economics and technology, as expressed in the 
ability to create and circulate intellectual capital, has the potential to generate income, jobs and export 
earnings while at the same time promoting social inclusion, cultural diversity and human development” 
(UNDP and UNCTAD 2008, iii).79
intimates,  the  creative  economy  concept  is  particularly  pertinent—and  enticing  —for 
cities or regions (as opposed to whole countries) that already host resource wealth in 
terms of the creative arts, education, culture and history. Some of the issues raised in 
the report are highly pertinent to SME development, and would merit some exploratory 
research work in the Asia-Pacific region, perhaps focusing on some cities that have a 
strong cultural legacy, but that, with the possible exception of tourism (which is a critical 
ingredient in the creative-economy mix), have arguably underperformed economically. 
Cities such as Luang Prabang and Hue, in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Viet 
Nam respectively, immediately come to mind.  
Indeed, the whole issue of business innovation (and entrepreneurship), and how to 
promote it, usually does not feature prominently in more conventional SME development 
initiatives in developing countries—particularly in those that are least developed. (One 
notable exception is Bhutan and its “Tenth Plan” (Bhutan 2009), which seeks to support 
SME  development  in  part  through  the  promotion  of  greater  business  innovation  and 
creativity,  focusing  in  particular  on  niche  products.)  SME  development  programmes 
are often focused most on poverty alleviation and making household enterprises more 
sustainable and formalized. While of undoubted merit, such interventions may not add 
significantly  to  a  country’s  overall  economic  competitiveness  and  long-term  growth 
trajectory.  Initiatives  that  seek  to  acknowledge  and  reward  innovation  and  creativity 
among SMEs and entrepreneurs, either at the regional or national levels, could be a 
useful catalyst in promoting productivity within domestic business communities. 
Furthermore, innovation and creativity in business is virtually impossible to achieve 
if  adequate  intellectual  property  rights  protection  (both  regulations  and  their  effective 
enforcement) is not in place. And yet the issue of intellectual property rights is not often 
given prominence within many SME development programmes, possibly because of the 
perception that it is something most keenly pursued by multinational enterprises, to the 
detriment of local SMEs. Regional and national initiatives aimed at raising awareness 
of intellectual property rights could be of merit for SME sector development, and could 
improve the wider enabling environment for business as a whole.
Another area that receives relatively less attention is that of SME exits, including 
bankruptcy.  The  notion  of  technical  assistance  that  assists  in  the  orderly  closing  of 
small firms, and the efficient recycling of assets, may not appeal to policymakers and 
development partners that do not wish to be seen as “corporate undertakers”. But the 
issue is an important one, as discussed earlier. If financiers are to lend to SMEs, and 
entrepreneurs are to take the professional (and socio-cultural) risk of starting up new 
business ventures, then there needs to be a transparent and efficient means by which 
less competitive SMEs can close down, and more competitive SMEs can then enter that 
space. There is also scope for more work in helping developing countries to create markets 
for SMEs, so that new market entrants and/or investors have the option to acquire existing 
companies, rather than establish wholly new ventures. Sadly, this may be an increasingly 
vexing issue in the next few years, as the global economic downturn takes its toll on 
numerous Asia-Pacific SMEs.80
4.3.2.  Sophistication of enterprise operations and strategy 
Business  development  services.34  Governments  and  donors  in  Asia  and  the 
Pacific have focused on providing business development services (BDS) for SMEs to 
help overcome perceived market imperfections. BDS refers to all types of SME support 
services, including: (a) training in business-related skills; (b) counselling and consulting; (c) 
technology development and transfer, involving the adaptation, design and development 
of  appropriate  technologies;  (d)  information  on  markets,  buyers  and  technology;  (e) 
business linkages, including between SMEs and large firms (subcontracting, for example) 
and among SMEs (such as the development of enterprise clusters); and (f) financing. As 
discussed in Abonyi (2007), the “market development paradigm” is now the most widely 
used organizing framework for the provision of BDS. It involves creating a market for 
a diverse array of services, with government and donors playing the role of facilitators 
for privately provided BDS. The basic assumption is that BDS can be best provided not 
directly by governments and donors, but by well-developed markets for such services 
on a commercial basis, even for the lowest income segments of the SME sector. The 
experience with this approach to BDS has been mixed to date.35 
The rest of this section touches briefly on selected business development services 
of particular relevance for strengthening the prospects of participation of Asia-Pacific 
SMEs in global value chains.
Understanding  global  value  chains.  SMEs  traditionally  serve  local  markets. 
Therefore they generally have a limited understanding of the opportunities global value 
chains could provide for small enterprises, and of the corresponding structure, dynamics 
and requirements of subcontracting to foreign buyers within the framework of GVCs. Given 
the limited resources and restricted managerial capabilities of small firms, it is generally 
both difficult and expensive for SMEs on their own to obtain such information. Increasing 
the competitiveness-related sophistication of Asia-Pacific SMEs then has to begin with 
familiarization with the potential benefits and operational requirements of engaging with 
international buyers in the context of particular global value chains. 
Standards  and  certification. Access  to  global  markets  through  GVCs  depends 
increasingly on meeting a range of stringent standards, confirmed through a credible 
certification of: (a) inputs (sourcing of wood for furniture, for example); (b) products (such 
as safety and health standards); and (c) production processes (such as labour standards). 
International buyers generally look to source from certified companies as an indication that 
the minimum required capabilities are present. Where testing and inspection is not carried 
out by the GVC buyer, suppliers must be able to prove the reliability of their inspection 
procedures, test data and conformity with international standards. The costs of certification 
and compliance with an increasing number and variety of standards may be relatively high 
for SMEs. But meeting such standards provides potential access to international markets, 
and strengthens the general competitiveness of SMEs by improving their production-
related capabilities. Governments (and development partners) can support the availability 
of certification systems, and help ensure that they do not impose a prohibitive burden on 
small enterprises. SPRING Singapore, a government agency for fostering a competitive 
34   This section is based on Abonyi (2007).
35   See Abonyi (2007) for a more detailed discussion of business development services, particularly from 
the perspective of SME participation in global value chains. 81
SME sector, is a good example of this; among other things, it publishes a highly informative 
(50-page) guide for SMEs: Make Standards Work for You. Similar guides for SMEs in other 
Asia-Pacific countries would undoubtedly be of use. Furthermore, the use of clusters (see 
below) can provide a mechanism for group certification for small enterprises, increasing 
the likelihood of a sufficient “supply” of certification services, and reducing their cost.
Government procurement. In many Asia-Pacific countries, State agencies are a 
major source of revenues for companies, but SMEs often struggle to qualify as suppliers 
to State-run procurement departments, for a host of reasons. This excludes them from a 
potentially large client base. Governments, and SME development agencies in particular, 
could do much to make their procurement policies more transparent and inform the SME 
community about the criteria necessary to become an approved supplier. Here again, 
SPRING Singapore is a good example, providing SMEs with a user-friendly guide on 
government procurement, published in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance. (Not 
only is such an initiative useful for SMEs, it also obliges State agencies to streamline 
their procurement policies, from which various efficiency and cost gains can be derived.) 
Governments  can  also  review  their  procurement  policies  to  ensure  that  they  do  not 
needlessly discriminate against SMEs.36
Technology upgrading. If they are to improve their competitiveness prospects in 
the context of global value chains, SMEs need to upgrade their technological capabilities 
and sophistication in areas such as production layouts, productivity improvements, raw 
material  testing,  quality  standards  and  management,  metrology,  information  systems 
and other technical services. Supporting measures could include: (a) providing financing 
to  enable  SMES  to  obtain  technical  certification;  (b)  establishing  productivity  centres 
specifically for SMEs; (c) setting up technology-related training services; (d) promoting 
partnerships between SMEs and technical institutes; and (e) supporting public technology 
institutions in developing special services aimed at small enterprises. 
Of particular importance to SMEs is the adoption of modern ICT technologies 
that are essential for participation in global value chains, and that can also enhance the 
general competitive performance of small firms by reducing their costs and time, and 
by extending their reach and coverage. In particular, ICT can: (a) improve management 
efficiency by strengthening the organizational capability to process large amounts of data 
at a relatively small cost; (b) allow small firms to access key information and analysis that 
has traditionally been available to larger firms, on, among other things, markets, customers 
and competitors; (c) strengthen the operational efficiency of small firms, through, among 
other things, more efficient inventory management, ordering, and scheduling; (d) enable 
SMEs to provide effective after-sale services and support to maintain customer contact and 
loyalty; (e) increase the capabilities of SMEs for in-house product and process innovation; 
and (f) leverage existing capabilities and capacity of individual small firms to reduce the 
advantage of the scale economies of larger enterprises, for example by opening options 
for new partnerships and linkages.
36   With the current global economic downturn prompting many governments to increase their spending 
through stimulus packages and the like, in a Keynesian strategy to support their domestic economies, 
SMEs would be well advised to make efforts to become acquainted with government procurement 
procedures.82
Skills development and training. Participation in global value chains is likely to 
require a generally higher level of threshold skills from SMEs. Therefore policies and 
programmes aimed at raising technical and managerial skills can increase the prospects 
of SMEs to be competitive suppliers in global value chains. This may be supported by 
training schemes, information campaigns to educate SMEs about the benefits of increased 
training and skill development, tax breaks for training, and special-purpose courses in 
local training institutions. An example of a comprehensive training programme aimed at 
upgrading SME skills is provided by SPRING Singapore, which, among other things, is 
the national standards and accreditation body aimed at enhancing competitiveness:
The SME Training for Enhanced Performance and Upgrade (Step-UP) programme 
is an initiative by SPRING Singapore and the Singapore Workforce Development 
Agency to address the training needs of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
It aims to identify the training gaps and relevant courses for SMEs, focusing on 
industry and occupational skills that are immediately applicable to the workplace.
These courses will offer targeted training with defined end results to help SMEs 
develop new capabilities and raise the overall industry standards. SMEs that send 
their workers for such training will enjoy enhanced course fee support from the 
Skills Development Fund.
To kickstart the programme, SPRING Singapore and the Singapore Workforce 
Development Agency will work with the industry associations supported under 
the Local Enterprise and Association Development programme (LEAD) to identify 
industry-relevant courses.37
Information  “brokerage”.  Domestic  SME  suppliers  need  to  understand  the 
requirements of buyers at different levels in specific global value chains. Government 
agencies can sometimes play an important role in bringing together MNE buyers (such 
as  Danon,  Carrefour,  Flextronics,  Li  &  Fung)  with  potential  domestic  suppliers—or 
related business associations—in order to help SMEs understand the requirements of 
becoming a supplier in GVCs. At the same time, as domestic SME suppliers upgrade their 
capabilities, government can play an important role in providing information to MNEs on 
supplier capabilities. The Penang Skills Development Centre in Malaysia is example of 
an institution that plays this kind of a two-way information brokerage role effectively in the 
electronics/ICT industry; it also provides a related capacity-building role for SMEs.
Corporate  social  responsibility  and  the  environment.  Congruent  with  growing 
concern about the environment and climate change (impact, mitigation and adaptation), 
there has been relatively little research and technical assistance done in the area of 
sustainable business for the SME sector. For many SMEs themselves, the notion of 
having to comply with an increasingly burdensome array of regulations pertaining to the 
environment is, at first glance, not an attractive proposition. Indeed, it threatens to become 
yet another set of compliance costs, both informal and formal. While such a perception is 
understandable, it does belie the opportunity for SMEs to leverage a sustainable business 
model to competitive advantage, in a number of ways. For example, local SMEs with ISO 
14000 accreditation are more likely to attain linkages with foreign-invested enterprises. 
And export-oriented SMEs that are able to pass a spectrum of environmental audits are 
37   See the SPRING Singapore website at www.spring.gov.sg/Content/WebPage.aspx?id=f68177c9-2dca-
4ec2-b6a7-d7ce086962e4.83
much more likely to: (a) have their products sourced from international buyers; and/or (b) 
participate in international production networks.  
As institutional and retail investors, as well as retail customers, become increasingly 
attuned  to  sustainability  issues,  issues  of  price  competition  for  SMEs  in  developing 
countries will become more diluted, and replaced by the extent to which they comply with 
various community and environmental standards. For an SME competing globally, this 
can be a welcome escape route out of a zero-sum game of accelerating price competition 
and ever-diminishing profit margins, and a means by which to trap more of the value 
chain through its brand. And yet many SMEs have little knowledge of this trend, or how 
to adjust to best effect. There is a need for guidance on this topic, ranging from: (a) 
how to be compliant in terms of current national and international regulations; through to 
(b) how to proactively embrace community and environmental standards for competitive 
advantage.
Codes of conduct for corporate social responsibility. Recent difficulties in the toy 
and food global value chains highlight the problems of supplier compliance to global 
standards. When suppliers are unable to meet global standards, related to safety or 
labour for example, the production network as a whole suffers the consequences. It is 
important to have a regional forum for supporting best-practice monitoring in the Asia-
Pacific region within the broader framework of corporate social responsibility. An effective 
example of how this can strengthen SME competitiveness is the Cambodian experience 
in the apparel and garment industry, where the International Labour Organization has 
acted as an informal monitor, in effect certifying Cambodian garment factories as adhering 
to high labour standards, supported by capacity-building through the Foreign Investment 
Advisory  Service,  thereby  strengthening  the  competitive  performance  of  Cambodian 
enterprises in this sector.38
4.3.3.   Enterprise clusters39 
The  investment  requirements  of  participation  in  global  value  chains  and  the 
constraints  of  size,  discussed  above,  can  make  it  difficult  for  individual  SMEs  to  be 
competitive as international suppliers or to upgrade within production networks. However, 
through focused cooperation, local suppliers can gain collective efficiencies based on scale 
(input purchases, for example), specialization (such as producing different parts of a given 
product) and joint action (such as joint marketing). This enhances their “attractiveness” 
as suppliers by reducing transaction costs for international buyers sourcing from these 
firms. 
Enterprise clusters are, then, groups of enterprises in the same or related value 
chains who cooperate to compete. The collective efficiencies gained through cluster-
based cooperation, for example in complementary areas of specialization and/or pooled 
production capacity, can help local SMEs as a group enter and/or upgrade in global value 
chains. For global suppliers such as Li & Fung in garments, or for global retailers such 
as Carrefour in fresh fruit and vegetables, SME clusters lower the transaction costs of 
input collection and marketing output. In technologically more complex GVCs (such as 
for  automotive  parts,  electronics  and  ICT),  clustering  allows  the  collective  sharing  of 
investments needed by subcontractors in process and product upgrading, for example, 
38   See for example Sok Siphana (2005) and FIAS (2005). 
39   For a comprehensive discussion of clusters see Abonyi (2007), on which this section is based. See also 
Andersson and others (2004) and Das (2008).84
acquiring and adapting new equipment, that would be beyond the technical or financial 
capabilities  of  individual  SMEs.  Membership  in  clusters  therefore  can  enhance  the 
productivity, innovation potential, and competitive performance of SMEs, and allow small 
enterprises to combine the advantages of smallness (flexibility) with the benefits of size 
(economies of scale and scope). Clustering increases the effective size of the market and 
reduces the cost of market access for cooperating SMEs. Furthermore, the existence of 
supplier clusters in particular industries can also provide competitive locational advantages 
for attracting GVC-related FDI. Operationally, clusters represent a range of partnerships 
and linkages, as summarized in table 16. 
Types  Description 
Vertical supplier linkages Relationship  with  (global)  customers  or  higher-tier 
suppliers to provide better services
Horizontal informal links Contacting  other  firms  for  information,  assistance, 




Collaboration  among  firms  for  joint  activities  (for 
example sourcing and production) supported by formal 
agreements
Formal associations Membership  clubs,  trade  associations  and  networking 
groups, such as those set up by service providers, and 
benchmarking
Gaining access to common 
assets/resources
Government agencies and other support institutions that 
provide needed services, education and infrastructure
Table 16.  Cluster linkages and partnerships
Source:   George Abonyi, Linking Greater Mekong Subregion Enterprises to International Markets: The 
Role of Global Value Chains, International Production Networks, and Enterprise Clusters (United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.07.II.F.2).
The critical success factor for clusters is the existence of effective institutions, 
particularly at the industry level, that facilitate the variety of linkages, such as those: (a) 
among SMEs; (b) with international buyers; and (c) with government agencies and other 
support  organizations.  Successful  examples  of  such  institutions  include  the  Surgical 
Instrument Manufacturers Association of Pakistan in Sialkot and the Sialkot Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (Pakistan), the Tirupur Exporters’ Association (India), and 
the Penang Skills Development Centre (Malaysia) (see Abonyi 2007 for a discussion of 
clusters in the context of global value chains).
Landlocked Bhutan, with its considerable transit constraints, is just one country 
that is embracing the cluster concept as part of its strategy for both SME development 
and wider economic development. The Government has identified three industrial parks 
(Dhamdum, Motanga and Jigmeling), and two dry ports (Gelephu and Samdrup Jongkhar) 
for initial focus as strategic growth centres, with a mandate to catalyse SME development. 
It is also beginning to examine the potential for business incubators to support new and 
entrepreneurial SMEs in prospective sectors.85
4.3.4.   Subregional cooperation
Subregional  cooperation  that  focuses  on  production  integration  within  the 
framework  of  global  value  chains  can  make  potentially  important  contributions  to 
strengthening  the  competitive  performance  of  Asia-Pacific  enterprises,  particularly 
SMEs.40 Such cooperation can support the development of cross-border partnerships 
among  enterprises,  strengthening  their  competitive  performance  and  the  investment 
attractiveness of the respective economies. To date, subregional cooperation programmes 
such as the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Program and the Central 
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program have focused primarily on strengthening 
physical  connectivity  through  cross-border  infrastructure  and  related  “software”, 
particularly trade facilitation. There may be merit for similar initiatives within the members 
of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, and across the island economies 
of the Pacific. For smaller economies where the domestic hinterland is limited, such as 
Bhutan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Nepal and most Pacific island States, 
such initiatives could have a significant and positive impact on SME development by 
helping to improve critical export performance.  
Various other programmes have also touched on areas such as tourism (including 
eco-tourism  and  “stay  another  day”  initiatives),  human  resource  development,  and 
cooperation on public goods such as environment and health (including initiatives by the 
Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Program). This has helped strengthen 
the competitiveness of enterprises in these subregions by, among other things, improving 
cross-border transport and trade linkages. The Asian Development Bank, for example, is 
to commence the Greater Mekong Subregion Sustainable Tourism Development Project, 
with a goal of “sustainable tourism development that creates livelihood opportunities for 
the poor”. It will be enacted across nine provinces of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
and five provinces of central Viet Nam. One of its core outputs will be to make operational 
“pro-poor,  community-based,  supply-chain  tourism  projects”,  across  33  subprojects.41 
This project may well serve as a model for replication in other subregions.
However, there has been limited focus to date on the integration of subregional 
production within the framework of global value chains (the key drivers of East Asian 
economic growth and integration), as a way of strengthening the competitive performance 
of Asia-Pacific enterprises, particularly SMEs. Focusing on an integration of subregional 
production that involves cross-border production partnerships, and related areas such as 
cross-border logistics, standards and certification, and enterprise clusters, is especially 
important  for  small  enterprises  in  lagging  economies  that  are  not  well  connected  to 
regional production systems and international markets. Such integration could provide 
potential building blocks towards integrating SMEs in a subregion into wider international 
markets.  While  some  work  has  been  conducted  in  this  area,  such  as  the  technical 
40   See Abonyi (2007) for a suggested framework for GVC-oriented subregional cooperation in the Greater 
Mekong Subregion, with particular focus on SMEs.
41   See  www.adb.org/Documents/Profiles/GRNT/38015022.ASP.  More  specifically,  it  “includes  the 
development of tourism products and tours designed and operated by local communities in partnership 
with the private sector, and supply-chain initiatives to link the production of agricultural goods and 
handicrafts by poor communities to the local, regional, and national tourism economy. … The output 
aims to increase rural employment and the incomes of the poor by developing new tourism products and 
services in partnership with the private sector. New opportunities will be developed to produce and sell 
local handicrafts, food, and other products to tourists.”86
assistance provided under various SME development programme loans enacted by the 
Asian Development Bank, it has been done principally on a country-by-country basis, and 
not on a subregional level.
As touched on in section 3, among the countries of the Asia-Pacific region there 
is the risk of “beggar thy neighbour” policies aimed at promoting domestic SME suppliers 
to international buyers and investors. It may be useful to have an effective forum at both 
the subregional level (the Greater Mekong Subregion, for example) and regional level 
(such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area) to discuss the options and implications of regional 
production  integration.  In  particular,  such  a  forum  could  focus  on  how  to  rationalize 
individual country policies within a broader framework of intraregional specialization—in 
particular GVCs—in a way that is consistent with the World Trade Organization.
4.3.5.   A proposed programme of action
Finally, we conclude this section, and the paper as a whole, with an indicative 
programme  of action  for an  international  agency  like  ESCAP, based  on  the  analysis 
and policy recommendations provided above. It is primarily focused on improving the 
competitiveness  of  SMEs  in  the Asia-Pacific  region,  specifically  within  the  context  of 
increasing globalization of production and the resulting need to participate in global value 
chains.  
As noted previously, SME (and private sector) development tends to be a fairly 
crowded field of activity for policymakers, State agencies and international development 
partners of various hues. So this programme of action focuses on areas where we believe 
there is currently a gap or paucity of useful initiatives, and therefore where some real 
“additionality” could be achieved. As intimated earlier, there is a tendency for policymakers 
and  development  partners  to  (quite  understandably)  focus  most  of  their  attention  on 
overcoming the hurdles that prevent initial market entry by new SMEs. And there is a 
definite need for these kinds of initiatives in many Asia-Pacific economies.  
However,  for  some  countries  at  least,  diminishing  returns  from  activities  are 
becoming  apparent  in  this  field,  and  there  is  probably  a  greater  need  for  initiatives 
that assist SMEs in upgrading into more robust and sustainable business entities—in 
becoming medium and large enterprises, in other words. That is arguably an even greater 
challenge for many SMEs, for a host of reasons. And yet there can be a tendency for 
policymakers in particular to focus more on headline numbers for new business start-
ups and incorporations. But if those headline numbers are derived in large part by SMEs 
splitting into two or more business ventures, or inflated by the fact that failed companies 
are not being logged, then they depict a false El Dorado. More importantly, they also miss 
the point when one considers that in today’s international business environment, SMEs 
need to graduate to a level where they can establish linkages with global value chains 
and become active members of these GVC communities. Establishing a greater number 
of SMEs should not be seen as the end, but rather a means to an end: a robust, varied 
and vibrant corporate community, comprising business entities of many different forms 
and sizes.
With the above in mind, the indicative programme of action focuses on interventions 
that might be most fruitful in some of the less developed subregions of Asia and the Pacific, 
based on useful lessons learned in some of the more developed economies of the region. 87
It also seeks to be innovative in its approach, albeit based on robust and evidence-based 
research. That then means the interventions are mostly of an entry-level kind, intended to 
serve as an initial platform, from which a more long-term programme could be developed 
and sustained over time.
The programme of action comprises: (a) six components directly pertaining to the 
globalization of production; and (b) four slightly more generic pro-SME initiatives that we 
suggest have tended to be overlooked in SME development activity, and that also could 
have particularly strong impacts during this current global economic slowdown. The 10 
components are by no means mutually exclusive; indeed, there is a strong degree of 
overlap and complementarity between some of them. Nonetheless, we would suggest 
that each one focuses on an important issue or topic that would be of benefit for SME 
development efforts in the Asia-Pacific region.
  PROPOSED COMPONENTS OF A PROGRAMME OF ACTION  
1.  A detailed survey and diagnostic analysis of logistics networks (as opposed to 
physical infrastructure) in select subregions of the Asia-Pacific region, to: (a) identify; (b) 
gauge the extent of; and (c) propose ways to address weaknesses in these networks that 
are cumulatively serving to constrain the ability of SMEs to “plug into” and better integrate 
in global value chains and production networks. The fruits of this empirical research 
could  then  be  disseminated  and  discussed  in  various  specialist  forums,  attended  by 
relevant stakeholders, leading to a set of specific recommendations and actions relating 
to logistics. Such an intervention might be expected to have the most impact in some 
of the landlocked and less developed States of mainland Asia, and some of the island 
economies of the Pacific, likely pursued on a subregional basis.
2.  A project designed to support the conceptualization, design and piloting of 
new enterprise clusters in select (and pertinent) value chains, with the primary aim of 
forming groups of SMEs in complementary fields of specialization that could then better 
plug into global value chains. This would probably need to be pursued at a national level, 
possibly focusing on economies and SME communities identified as being most likely 
to benefit from such an initiative. But there may also be some potential for subregional 
initiatives, where existing frameworks, such as the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic 
Cooperation Program and the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program, 
already exist.
3.  A  project  intended  to  foster  and  support  the  development  of  cross-border 
partnerships  among  SMEs  at  the  subregional  level,  with  the  aim  of  strengthening 
competitive performance. Again, this could build on existing subregional initiatives, such 
as  the  Greater  Mekong  Subregion  Economic  Cooperation  Program  and  the  Central 
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program, which until now have focused more on 
strengthening physical connectivity. The intervention should also develop subregional 
forums that could explore ways to rationalize individual country policies (relating to SME 
and industrial development) within a broader framework of intraregional specialization in 
relevant global value chains.
4.  An intervention aimed at increasing awareness and knowledge among Asia-
Pacific SMEs on standards and certification and their increasingly crucial role as “pass keys” 
to entering global value chains. The project would be aimed directly at SMEs, providing 88
detailed information and practical guidance on the (sometimes quite daunting) world of 
standards and certification, ideally in conjunction with relevant business associations, 
chambers and SME development agencies. Such an intervention is likely to be focused 
around  key  and/or  prospective  business  sectors,  with  seminars,  documentation  and 
other materials distributed to SME communities in select subregions. Ideally, it would be 
useful to get relevant MNEs from pertinent sectors directly involved in this intervention 
(for example, participating in some of the seminars and printed materials), so that SMEs 
could see the benefits to be derived; hopefully, such MNE participation would also provide 
a platform for the establishment of business linkages.
5.  Improvement of the framework conditions for entrepreneurship and business 
innovation.  Relatively  little  has  been  attempted  in  seeking  to  foster  and  promote 
entrepreneurial endeavour and business innovation among SMEs and new ventures. 
There  is  a  need  to  identify  what  specific  framework  conditions  are  missing  in  select 
economies  or  subregions,  possibly  using  the  methodological  approach  adopted  by 
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor surveys. This could then lead to a set of specific 
recommendations  on  how  select  economies  could  pursue  enabling  environment 
policies that would encourage a more vigorous and vibrant entrepreneurial community 
of potentially high-growth SMEs to develop and blossom. Further, more research work 
needs to be done on the nexus between SME development, innovation and the creative 
economy, possibly focusing on specific municipalities in Asia that meet the criteria. Such 
an intervention—on entrepreneurship and business innovation—would have the asset of 
focusing on some of the more prospective fields of SME endeavour, expected to be likely 
future elements in global value chains.
6.  A research project relating to SME development and sustainable business 
(including  corporate  social  responsibility),  within  the  context  of  the  globalization  of 
production and global value chains. The project would seek to design a programme by 
which manufacturing SMEs in select countries or subregions of Asia and the Pacific could 
pursue more sustainable business practices, both for the direct benefits to be derived, 
and so as to meet the requirements of MNEs (for example, ISO 14000 accreditation). In 
turn, this would enable SMEs to better: (a) plug into international production networks; 
(b) establish linkages with foreign-invested enterprises; and (c) connect with international 
buyers. The fruits of the research could also extend to a series of guidelines and seminars 
for SMEs in specific business fields on how they could effectively pursue sustainable 
business practices (and higher corporate social responsibility standards). Again, it would 
be desirable to get MNEs directly involved in the project, at various levels, both for the 
expert inputs they could provide, and with an eye to the project serving as a platform for 
any subsequent follow-up efforts. The project could focus in particular on economies (or 
even subnational regions) expected to be impacted most from climate change, such as 
Viet Nam and islands in the Pacific.
7.  Action  to  support  SMEs  in  better  understanding  government  agency 
procurement policies, and how they could better position themselves to take advantage 
of these policies. Relatively little has been done in this area, and conversely, relatively 
little has been done to encourage government agencies to put in place more transparent 
procurement policies that do not discriminate against SMEs. Thus, there would be utility 
in  surveying  government  procurement  policies  in  the  economies  of  the  Asia-Pacific 
region, from which: (a) a set of applied information guidelines could be issued for SMEs 89
in relevant countries; and (b) a set of detailed recommendations could be provided to 
individual governments on how they could make their procurement policies more SME-
friendly,  based  on  international  best  practices.  With  government  spending  poised  to 
increase markedly in many Asia-Pacific economies, as part of various economic stimulus 
policies to counter the global slowdown, this could be a particularly timely and effective 
initiative.
8.  Business-angel networks, which can be very useful in bringing both equity 
capital and expertise to high-growth SMEs, and at an appropriate scale that bridges the 
gap between bank lending and more conventional private equity financing. With regard 
to SME finance, little has been done in the Asia-Pacific region to try and establish such 
networks, which are quite common in Europe. Even when bank lending is abundant, 
SMEs need to ensure they do not take on too much debt financing, and must balance this 
with equity capital if they can. Therefore, a pilot project to try and establish one or more 
subregional or national business-angel networks would merit closer examination, likely 
working in conjunction with established business associations and/or cluster initiatives.
9.  A project to look at how select economies might go about “dovetailing” their 
approaches towards FDI and SME development more closely, for mutual benefit. As 
pointed out in section 3 of this paper, there are very real and considerable synergies to 
be derived between SME sector development and foreign direct investment, most notably 
through backward linkages. And yet the strategies by which many developing economies 
in the Asia-Pacific region tend to support SME development are often independent from 
their  FDI  attraction  strategies.  Such  an  initiative  might  have  the  most  impact  in  less 
developed or developing economies where FDI inflows are relatively strong, but where 
SME development activity is thought to be less effective, or vice versa.
10.    An  examination  of  the  regulatory  issue  of  SME  closure  and  bankruptcy 
(perhaps an apt element on which to finish). The notion of expending energy on this issue, 
in support of SME sector development, might seem rather counter-intuitive at first glance. 
However, this is not the case when one considers that all SMEs have a life cycle of sorts. 
If it is excessively difficult or expensive to close an enterprise down, entrepreneurs may 
hesitate to set a new company up. Providers of capital (especially debt finance) will also 
be far more hesitant to provide funding if the mechanics of business bankruptcy—and 
taking possession of assets pledged as collateral—are unduly burdensome. Ideally, the 
orderly closure of enterprises needs to be as smooth as that of establishment, but this 
is rarely the case. Instead, enterprises in many Asia-Pacific developing countries go into 
a state of suspended animation, thereby sometimes preventing the efficient recycling of 
business assets. It also makes SME-related policymaking difficult because data on the 
SME sector is inaccurate, containing as it does many mothballed businesses. The next 
year or so is likely to see the number of company closures rise markedly, and now would 
be a good time to enact an initiative that seeks to assist select Asia-Pacific countries in 
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